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Abstract
Information security is a growing concern in our modern world, where almost every-
thing can be done online. To protect security, classical encryption protocols, such as RSA,
are used. These encryption protocols are almost always based on mathematical problems
that are computational difficult. Therefore, the security is only valid under limited com-
putational resources, and therefore do not provide provable security. An exception is the
one-time pad protocol, which is provably secure but requires an existing shared key that is
as long as the information it must encrypt. The exchange of such a key can be challenging,
often requiring the two partied to physically meet to exchange the key or the use a trusted
courier to physically carry the key on a hard drive.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a solution by utilizing quantum mechanics
to grow a secure cryptographic key shared between two distant parties. The quantum
nature of the particles used in the exchange ensure that any eavesdropper would leave
signs of their presence, allowing the users to precisely quantify the security of the key that
is produced. This allows secure generation of a random key which can be used for the
one-time pad encryption protocol which, unlike most encryption protocols, does not rely
on computational assumptions, and is secure regardless of available computational power.
Current implementations of QKD are limited to a single link distance of ∼200 km,
preventing implementation of QKD on a global scale, or even between distant cities within
a single country, without some additional techniques. One promising solution is the use of
orbiting low Earth orbit satellite platforms as trusted nodes in a quantum communications
network. The main purpose of this work has been to show the viability of this solution,
trough theoretical performance modeling and experimental demonstrations.
Thorough numerical simulations have been developed to evaluate the performance and
challenges in implementing QKD using a low Earth orbit satellite platform and determine
an optimal approach to its implementation. The simulations include a realistic satellite
orbit analysis, all expected loss mechanisms, estimates of background contributions and
realistic simulation of quantum optical processes. This work addresses the questions of
optimal wavelength and beam waist, the effect of the telescope design and pointing er-
ror, and the impact of detector degradation due to exposure to radiation in the space
v
environment. The simulation is used to determine the length of secure key for QKD and
the performance of fundamental quantum optics experiments such as Bell tests and quan-
tum teleportation. We compare the advantages and disadvantages of uplink and dowlink
scenarios, and show that an uplink, despite having reduced performance compared to a
downlink, offers more scientific freedom, by allowing changes to the quantum source, and
benefits from a simpler satellite design with reduced pointing requirement. This work pro-
vides a theoretical foundation for ongoing design and development of quantum systems for
satellite implementation of QKD.
In addition to theoretical analyses, experiments where developed and conducted cor-
responding to the challenges likely to be faced by a satellite uplink. Two main challenges
where identified and experimentally overcome. First, the difficulty of operating in the high
loss regime of a satellite uplink, which typically experience losses in the range of 40–50 dB
when above 40◦ of elevation from the horizon, an elevation only reached by half of the
satellite passes. This challenge was addressed by demonstrating full QKD protocols at
losses exceeding 50 dB. Also, the ability to perform full QKD during the short duration of
a satellite pass was shown by replicating the varying loss of archetypal passes and success-
fully extracting secure keys. Secondly, the difficulty of accurately tracking and pointing to
a receiver platform traveling at the high angular speed of a satellite was overcome by suc-
cessfully exchange quantum signals to a truck traveling at angular speeds exceeding that
of a low Earth orbit satellite. This required the design, construction, and implementation
of a transmitter system and a quantum receiver system capable of active pointing using a
custom pointing system.
An additional experiment was also performed where we experimentally investigate the
feasibility of performing QKD using light scattered by a diffusive screen. A system capable
of doing so could be used to create QKD hot-spots, where a QKD source could be aimed
at a diffusive screen to allow multiple users to simultaneously exchange secure keys with
the source without the need for high precision pointing.
Through these analyses and experimental demonstrations we evaluated the performance
of QKD using a satellite and have shown its technological readiness to be implemented.
Implementation of such a system would allow QKD to be performed on a global scale,
enabling communications security that is not based on computational assumptions without
the need to physically transport the key from one party to the other.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we briefly introduce classical and quantum cryptography, the challenges of
applying quantum key distribution globally, and how satellites could be used to overcome
these challenges.
1.1 Classical encryption
With the widespread use of computers and growing use of online services, our modern
society as become heavily reliant on electronic communications and data transfer. Many
of these activities, such as online banking, shopping and other activities that use personal
information, require security and privacy. Protection is needed on all kinds of information,
from personal data to trade secrets, which is regularly transmitted over public commu-
nication channels. To prevent unauthorized access to this information, many different
cryptographic techniques are used.
Most of the cryptographic schemes used today do not provide provable security. Instead,
these cryptosystems, such as RSA [1], are deemed secure by using assumptions about
the limited computation power of an adversary [2]. These protocols use mathematical
operations that are difficult to reverse, such as factoring of large integers. The size of
these integers are chosen so that and adversary would typically be unable to break security
within a certain time frame with realistic hardware, usually chosen several decades. The
security therefore relies on estimates of the computational power available to an adversary.
Because of the fast growth of computational power, these estimates have often proven to
be too conservative. These underestimations have lead to secure communication, assumed
unbreakable for decades, being broken in a fraction of that time [3].
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In addition, some of the cryptosystem have been showed to be vulnerable to Quantum
computers. Shor’s algorithm [4] is a quantum computer algorithm that can be used to
efficiently factor integers and find discrete logarithms, thus breaking some cryptosystem
such as RSA. As a result, quantum computers have the potential to easily break many of
the currently used cryptosystem. Not all cryptosystem have been shown to be efficiently
breakable by quantum computers. These alternative cryptosystem, called post-quantum
cryptosystem [5], are being actively studied to be implemented as alternatives. However,
post-quantum cryptography is still based on computational assumptions, and thus still rely
on accurate estimates of the computational power available in the near future. In addition,
while these cryptosystem have not been shown to be efficiently breakable by either classical
or quantum computers, there is no formal proof that an efficient algorithm cannot exist.
Not all cryptographic schemes are based on computational assumptions. The one-time
pad, invented by Frank Miller in 1882 [6] and re-invented by Gilbert Vernam in 1917 [7],
uses a secret key that is shared between two parties to encrypt and decrypt messages.
Unlike RSA and other public cryptosystem, the one-time pad protocol does not provide
any key distribution, and instead relies on a preexisting secret key. To ensure security, the
key must be at least as long as the message, so that each bit is encoded randomly, and the
key must be kept secret by both parties, and only used once. This protocol was proven
optimal by Claude Shanon in 1949 [8], that is, no other encryption method can provide
proven security with less key. The main limitation of this scheme as been the difficulty
of securely distributing keys among the two parties. Classically, the most reliable way of
doing this has been to physically transport the key, either by one of the two parties or with
the use of trusted couriers. Quantum information has brought a solution to this problem
called quantum key distribution.
1.2 Quantum key distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows the exchange of secure keys between two parties,
typically referred to as Alice and Bob, by exploiting the fundamentally quantum mechanical
nature of reality [9]. In QKD, the key is obtained by exchanging quantum states using a
quantum channel. One peculiar property of quantum states compared to classical systems
is superposition: a quantum state can be in many states simultaneously [10].
A good example of this phenomenon is observed in the double-slit experiment, first
performed by Thomas Young. In this experiment, a beam of quantum particles are pro-
jected onto two small and closely spaced slits. If the particles are detected on a screen
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placed a certain distance after the slit, they will show a wave-like interference pattern.
This occurs even if the beam fires only one particle at a time, the particle can therefore
interfere only with itself. This strange observation signifies that the quantum particle has
passed through both slits simultaneously, meaning it’s in a superposition of having passed
through each slits. Even stranger, if one chooses instead to measure the particle at the
slits, it will only be measured at either one slit or the other, never both. The effect of
measuring the state has thus collapsed the superposition, forcing the quantum particle in
either one state or the other. This effect of measurement on quantum states is what allows
QKD to be provably secure.
If an eavesdropper, typically referred to as Eve, attempts to extract information from
the quantum states in the quantum channel, she will be performing some form of measure-
ment and will therefore, in general, modify the state. Alternatively, if Eve tries to copy
the state, the no-cloning theorem [11] provides a formal proof that one cannot copy an
arbitrary unknown state without disturbing the original. Therefore, any attempts made
by Eve to extract information from the key will inevitably leave signs of her presence in
the form of errors in the key. By sampling and revealing a random part of the key, which
is later discarded, Alice and Bob can estimate the amount of errors and therefore detect
the presence of an adversary. If an eavesdropper is detected, the compromised key is dis-
carded. Because Eve cannot prevent signs of her presence, any key that shows no sign of
an eavesdropper is provably secure with a certain  probability, typically chosen on the
order of 10−9, i.e. the key has a probability  of deviating from perfect security (where no
bits are compromised).
In general, QKD can be performed with any quantum states. Implementations of
QKD however, are almost always performed using photons [9]. The main reason for this
is because light can be transmitted over long distances without decoherence, i.e. without
unreversable change in its initial quantum state. In free-space applications of QKD, the
information is typically encoded in the polarization state of light. These states are typically
the horizontal (|H〉), vertical (|V〉), diagonal (|D〉), and antidiagonal (|A〉) polarizations,
where |D〉 and |A〉 are superpositions of |H〉 and |V〉:
|D〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V〉) (1.1)
|A〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V〉) (1.2)
The photons are therefore encoded in two polarization bases: the H/V basis and the D/A
basis. These two bases are mutually unbiased, meaning any state in one basis that is
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measured in the other basis will give a random result with equal probability across all
possible outcomes [12] (in this case there are two measurement outcomes, thus each will
have a probability 1
2
). If either Alice, Bob or Eve attempt to measure the state in its proper
basis, such as measuring |H〉 in the H/V basis, they will gain information on the state of
the photon without modifying it. If however they measure using the wrong basis, such as
measuring |H〉 in the D/A basis, they will perturb the state. When Bob measures in the
wrong basis compared to Alice, the results is simply discarded. If there is no eavesdropper,
the events where Bob measures in the right basis should be perfectly correlated with Alice.
If however Eve is present, there is a chance that she will measures in the wrong basis, thus
breaking the correlations. The results of Alice and Bob will then only randomly agree with
each other. When a large number of photons are exchanged, the probability that Alice and
Bob obtain completely correlated results in the presence of Eve becomes infinitesimally
small.
In fiber implementations of QKD, photons are typically encode in phase [9]. This is
mainly because propagation through fiber modifies polarization states. This change in
encoding method does not affect the performance or security of QKD. In this work we
focus on free-space QKD using polarization encoding of photons.
The original QKD protocol was proposed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in
1984 [13]. In this scheme, called the BB84 protocol, Alice generates single photons in a
polarization state randomly chosen from a predefined set, typically |H〉, |V〉, |D〉 and |A〉.
Bob receives the photons and measures them in one of the two nonorthogonal bases H/V or
D/A, chosen randomly. Whenever Bob measures in the same basis which Alice prepared in,
his measurement outcome will match the prepared state with unit probability (neglecting
experimental imperfections). Alice and Bob then exchange information about the bases in
which states were prepared and measured, but not the states themselves, across the public
classical channel, allowing them to establish a secret key from their shared knowledge of
the states. The additional steps of error correction and privacy amplification can then be
employed to correct errors from background noise and other practical imperfections in the
source and detectors, and to reduce the amount of information that may have leaked to
Eve to an exponentially small amount.
One way to generate the BB84 states is to use a weak coherent pulse (WCP) source, i.e.
a pulsed laser with each pulse attenuated to an average of less than one photon. A WCP
source is only an approximate single-photon source, with a small probability of creating
states consisting of two or more photons. To maintain security with a WCP source, one
must either keep the probability of multi-photon events very small (by keeping the average
photon number small, which also reduces the single-photon probability and thus reduces
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the key rate), or by amending the protocol with a decoy state method [14].
In a decoy state protocol, the intensity of the pulses are randomly varied between
a signal and a smaller decoy intensity, with the signal state typically having a higher
probability of being produced. If Eve tries to take advantage of all the multi-photon pulses
by measuring one photons when there are two or more and blocking the pulses with only
one photon, she will block a higher ratio of decoy pulses (which have a lower chance of
producing two or more photons) compared to signal pulses. By comparing the number of
received signal and decoy states Alice and Bob can determine if they suffered the same
attenuation and thus quantify the probability of an eavesdropper being present.
The BB84 protocol is known as a prepare-and-measure schemes because Alice prepares
the photons in a randomly chosen state and Bob measures them. There exist a second main
type of QKD schemes known as entanglement-based schemes, such as the Ekert91 proto-
col [15] or the simpler BBM92 protocol [16]. These schemes take advantage of quantum
entanglement to perform QKD.
Quantum entanglement occurs when two or more particles, photons in the case of QKD,
are in a combined quantum state that cannot be separate, i.e. one cannot express the state
of one particle without the other. One example of entangled states are the Bell states [17]:
∣∣φ±〉
12
=
1√
2
(|H〉1 |H〉2 ± |V〉1 |V〉2) (1.3)
∣∣ψ±〉
12
=
1√
2
(|H〉1 |V〉2 ± |V〉1 |H〉2) (1.4)
where the subscript 1 and 2 are used to indicate which particle is referred to. If we take,
for example, the state |φ+〉 and measure one photon to be in the polarization state |H〉,
the second photon will be immediately projected into the state |H〉, even if the particles
are physically separated. This paradox of action at a distance became a source of debate
in the early years of quantum mechanics [18, 19] but was later proven to be correct [20–24].
One remarkable results of quantum entanglement is that some of the entangled states,
such as the Bell states, are capable of producing correlations that cannot be replicated
classically using separable states. When using an entanglement-based QKD scheme, Alice
and Bob can verify, by measuring these correlations, that their states where truly entangled.
The presence of an eavesdropper would necessarily disrupt the entanglement and therefore
would be revealed when Alice and Bob measure their correlation. This test of correlation is
know as a Bell test because it’s a measure of success is the violation of a Bell inequality [25].
In the BBM92 protocol [16], entangled pairs of photons are generated by a source, with
one photon of the pair sent to Alice and the other to Bob. Alice and Bob each randomly
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choose a basis in which to measure the photon they have received. In the cases that those
bases align (which Alice and Bob reveal publicly after their measurement), entanglement
ensures that Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes are fully correlated, thereby allowing
them to establish a shared secret key. The difficulty in preparing and subsequently mea-
suring high-quality entangled photons for entanglement-based QKD schemes is offset by a
number of potential advantages; the most interesting of these is that the trustworthiness
of the source can be determined by assessing the strength of the measured correlations via
a Bell test [26]. Thus the source needs not be trusted and does not need to be located at
either Alice’s or Bob’s site. In addition, QKD protocols based on entangled photons do
not require random preparation of the state, as the correlation exists in all basis. Only the
measurement bases need to be randomly chosen, something that can be achieved passively
(using a non-polarizing beam-splitter). Therefore, these protocols do not require random
number generators for secure implementation.
1.3 Global QKD
Various implementations of QKD have been performed [27–31] and technological advances
have allowed, in the recent years, for QKD to reach the level of maturity sufficient for
commercial implementation [32, 33]. Despite this, QKD currently suffers from a significant
flaw: the method used to transmit the photon states are limited to distances of only a few
hundred kilometers for direct links [34].
There are two practical methods of transmitting photons: through optical fibers or via
free-space. Over short distances, optical fiber can often impart less loss than free-space.
However, loss in fiber scales exponentially with distance and quickly renders long-distance
transmission impractical. Current technologies allow QKD to be performed only at up to
250 km of fiber [35–37], with future advances predicted to only moderately extend this
range to 400 km [34].
For free-space transmission, atmospheric absorption also scales exponentially, but other
more significant loss contributors within this regime scale much slower—for example, beam
divergence caused by diffraction, which scales quadratically. This gives free-space propa-
gation the potential to be feasible at a larger distance regime than is currently possible
with optical fiber. Yet, practical implementations on ground often exhibit atmospheric
transmission losses that are too high for such long distances, and the difficulty of obtain-
ing line-of-sight link between two points on Earth cannot be avoided. As of this writing,
free-space QKD has been demonstrated up to 144 km [38, 39].
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Three main strategies have been proposed to solve this long distance issue: networks
of trusted nodes, quantum repeaters, and orbiting satellites. A network of trusted nodes
would use a large number of individual QKD links, relayed between trusted nodes, to
create a secure key between two parties [40–43]. As the distance between the two parties
increases, the number of trusted nodes must also be increased. The drawback of this
approach requires each of the trusted nodes to be secured, as a breach in even a single
node would allow access to any key generated using the breached note.
Quantum repeaters utilize entanglement swapping [44] to effectively extend the dis-
tance of photon correlations without sending individual photons the entire distance [45].
Quantum memories, to store the photon state until it is required, are vital for this to take
place efficiently, but despite extensive research and considerable improvements in recent
years, this technology is not yet ready for practical application [46, 47].
In the orbiting satellite approach, a satellite is used to extend the range of QKD by
acting as a node in a quantum network [48–55]. This general approach, with various
potential implementations, is being actively studied by a number of groups worldwide [56–
63] with projected launch dates as early as 2017 [60].
1.4 QKD using satellites
There are two approaches for using satellites to establish long-distance QKD links. The
first approach takes advantage of the verifiability of entanglement correlations in schemes
such as BBM92. This approach can be achieved by using an entangled source on a satellite
to distribute photons to Alice and Bob. Alternatively, Alice and Bob can used a prepare-
and-measure schemes to send photons to a satellite which performs an entangling Bell
state measurement [64]. The result of this Bell state measurement allows Alice and Bob
to determine, when they used the same basis, if their prepared states where the same or
orthogonal (i.e. if one prepares |H〉 the result of the measurement will indicate whether the
other one prepared |H〉 or |V〉) without revealing either states. Both implementations of this
approach allows QKD to be performed without the satellite gaining any information about
the key, the satellite can therefore be untrusted. This approach is, however, challenging
as it requires the satellite to establish and maintain two links simultaneously. In addition,
the curvature of the Earth, which limits the distance between two parties who can both
see the satellite, and the high loss experienced by both links significantly reduce the long
distance capabilities of this approach, particularly when using lower orbit satellite.
In the second approach, both parties independently establish a secure key with a satel-
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lite by using a single link when the satellite is in view. Once both keys have been exchanged,
the satellite reveals a combination of the two keys, typically the bitwise sum. One user can
then, knowing one of the keys, determine the other key. The two parties can then use this
key to communicate securely. The other key is discarded since the known combination,
which is revealed publicly, makes the two key related, i.e. using both keys would be equiv-
alent to using the same key twice. The main drawback of this approach is the satellite
also obtains a copy of both keys, and must therefore be trusted, that is, one must assume
that an adversary is unable to manipulate the satellite. This is still the most common
approach considered due to its simplicity, requiring only a single quantum link at a time.
This makes it is technologically easier, more cost-effective, and therefore faster to deploy
than the untrusted satellite schemes.
1.5 Demonstration of the feasibility of satellite QKD
To demonstrate the feasibility of satellite QKD using current technologies we first developed
a detailed theoretical model to predict the performance of a such a system using a trusted
node approach. This model, described in Chapter 2, includes a simulated satellite orbit,
loss and background simulations, and an estimation of the secure key generation. The
model is applied to both downlink and uplink scenarios and using both WCP (BB84)
and entangled photon (BBM92) sources. In addition, we also investigate the capability of
this satellite platform to perform long-distance Bell tests [25] and quantum teleportation
experiments [44].
This theoretical feasibility was then demonstrated in the lab by implementing full QKD
protocols at high losses using a free-space receiver similar in design to a quantum receiver
on a satellite platform. This test, detailed in Chapter 3, showed the ability to perform full
QKD at over 50 dB of constant loss. The experiment was also used to simulate a satellite
pass by simulating the varying loss expected during such a pass.
With the ability to perform QKD at high loss came the concept of using a diffusive
screen to perform “QKD off of a wall”, where a QKD source is aimed at a diffusive screen,
scattering the signal in a large angle. Multiple users would then be able to exchange keys
simultaneously with little to no pointing. This concept was experimentally investigated and
showed to be feasible but would require detectors with lower dark counts than those used
in order to be demonstrated. The details of this concept, its feasibility, and its limitations,
are briefly discussed in Chapter 4.
As a final experimental demonstration, a pointing system was built to demonstrate the
8
performance of QKD using a moving receiver platform. The QKD receiver was placed
on a pickup truck and was driven along Westmount road, approximately 0.7 km from the
transmitter, which remained at a fixed location on the roof of the Research Advancement
Center 1. The receiver was moved at an angular speed similar to the maximum angular
speed of a satellite platform. This work is detailed in Chapter 5.
The main results and conclusions are summarized in Chapter 6, and the future steps
to enable the implementation of satellite QKD are discussed.
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Chapter 2
Performance analysis of satellite QKD
This chapter describes the theoretical model used to predict the performance of satellite
QKD. Section 2.1 explains the orbit used and how it is modeled. The estimation of the
loss and background counts are detailed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. In Section 2.4
we show how to estimate the secure key generation for QKD and the performance of two
other important fundamental quantum experiments: Bell test and teleportation. Finally
in Section 2.5 we show the important results and conclusions of the performance analysis.
Author contributions
Evan Meyer-Scott wrote the initial version of the MATLAB code used to predict the
visibility and secure key rates. Bassam Helou wrote the initial version of the MATLAB
code used to estimate the background. Brendon Higgins helped modify and improve various
parts of the MATLAB codes used to estimate the loss and the background. Balaji provided
the orbit analysis data. Thomas Jenewein, Brendon Higgins, Chris Ervin, Hannes Hu¨bel,
Jean-Franc¸ois Lavigne, Ralph Girard, Ian D’Souza and Danya Hudson provided advice
on modeling the loss. I wrote the MATLAB code used to estimate the loss. I modified
parts of the MATLAB code used to estimate the background and the code used to predict
the visibility and secure key rates. I integrated the Matlab programs, and extracted and
analyzed the results.
2.1 Orbit analysis
To predict the realistic performance of a satellite QKD we used a detailed one year orbit
analysis that was provided by Balaji Kumar of COMDEV, using Systems Tool Kit (STK)
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9 from Analytical Graphics, Inc. (AGI) [65]. The orbit considered is a circular, sun-
synchronous noon/midnight low Earth orbit (LEO) at an altitude of 600 km. To reduce
background noise, only nighttime passes are considered. A sun-synchronous noon/midnight
orbit is defined as an orbit that crosses over the equator at noon and, after half of its
orbital period, at midnight solar time. This orbit was therefore chosen because maximizes
the nighttime passes by having the satellite intersect the Earths shadow during every
orbit. The LEO orbit (500 km–1000 km) was chosen because of its lower loss, cost, and
complexity; making this orbit a more realistic short term implementation of satellite QKD.
Low elevation angles typically exhibit losses too high to be used with any of the con-
sidered schemes, therefore we only incorporate satellite elevations greater than 10◦ above
the horizon. Nights where the moon is strongly illuminated (full moon or close to it) are
also ignored as the extra background light would prevent QKD. With these conditions we
obtain a total of 713 usable passes over one year, or about 2 passes per night. We found
that the results of the simulations are largely insensitive to the selection of orbit height—
e.g. lowering the orbit to 500 km does improve the signal-to-noise ratio, but this effect is
muted by the reduced contact time to the ground station.
Examples of passes for the 600 km orbit, including the best, upper quartile and median
passes are illustrated in Figure 2.1. The best pass is the pass possessing the maximum
usable duration, the upper quartile pass is the pass for which 25% of all satellite passes
have longer usable duration, and the median pass is the pass for which 50% of all satellite
passes have longer usable portions (and 50% have shorter usable portions). Figure 2.2
shows the range and elevation of these three pases over time.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of satellite passes (top) over the ground location. Best, upper
quartile, and median passes are shown as thick blue, green, and red lines, respectively
(thin lines connect the ground station with the link termination points for these passes),
with 20 additional example passes (brown dotted lines). The best pass transits directly
over the ground station (i.e. reaching 90◦ elevation), while other passes fall to either side.
The best pass, upper quartile pass, and median pass, are defined as having the longest,
upper quartile, and median usable duration, respectively, of all passes over one year.
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Figure 2.2: Range and elevation angle of the satellite relative to the ground location during
the best pass, upper quartile pass, and median pass. Half of all passes have a duration of
at least 450 s, only 80 s less than the best pass, yet less than 25% of passes reach 53◦ of
elevation from zenith.
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2.2 Estimating the loss
To accurately predict the loss that would be experienced by a quantum link between a
satellite platform and a ground station, we had to include several effects that contribute to
deterioration of the optical transmission. The first class of effects are geometric broadening
caused by diffraction, systematic pointing error, and atmospheric turbulence. In addition,
the optical transmission will be further reduced by atmospheric absorption and scattering,
detector efficiency and the imperfections of the various optical components. This loss also
depends on the telescope design, initial beam waist and type of source used. In this section
we explain these loss contributers and show how each ones were taken into account in our
analysis.
Figure 2.3 shows a sketch of the transmission from a satellite (left) and to a satellite
(right), illustrating the various loss mechanisms encountered along the transmission chan-
nel. The variables used in the sketch corresponds to the variables that will be used in the
equations. Not shown are the loss contributions that are not from the free-space channel:
the detector efficiency (ηd) at the receiver and the optical losses (ηo) that combines the
various imperfections in the polarization analyzer as well as those of both telescopes .
2.2.1 Diffraction
A collimated beam exiting a telescope will unavoidably have a certain divergence angle
due to diffraction, causing it to expand as it propagates. This diffraction depends on the
size and shape of the transmitting telescope aperture as well as the initial beam shape
and its wavelength. To analyze this effect in detail we used the Rayleigh-Sommerfeld
diffraction [66] to calculate numerically the beam profile after diffraction:
I1(~v) =
∣∣∣∣∣d2λ2
∫∫
St
√
I0(~v ′)
|~v − ~v ′|2 exp
(
2ipi|~v − ~v ′|
λ
)
dxdy
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (2.1)
Here I is the intensity at the receiver, ~v is the location at the receiver, ~v ′ is the location at
the transmitter, and we integrate over the surface of the transmitter, St. I0 is the intensity
at the transmitter, λ is the beam’s wavelength, and d is the distance from the satellite to
the ground station. By using the fact that the beam’s profile has circular symmetry, we
need only calculate the intensity at y = 0 (or x = 0) and determine I(r) where r is the
radius from the center of the beam.
The surface of the transmitter St can be be specified to any shape and size, allowing us
to consider different telescope designs and properly determine their impact. Although it is
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Figure 2.3: Sketch of the downlink (left) and uplink (right) transmission with a satellite.
The variables follow those used in the text: St is the transmitter’s surface, Sr is the
receiver’s surface, σ is the pointing error, d is the distance from the satellite to the ground
station, and ζ is the elevation angle from ground. ηt is the atmospheric transmittance, and
the atmospheric turbulence is characterized by r0, the transverse coherence length, and
C2n(z), the refractive-index structure constant.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of turbulence after 700 m on a beam. The shape of the beam and its
intensity distribution rapidly change over time. The average beam size is approximately
30 cm in diameter. Wavelength of the beam used is 532nm. Timestamp in seconds
possible to reduce the effect of diffraction by using either a shorter wavelength or a bigger
telescope, these solutions are not alway practical. A lower wavelength will suffer more from
atmospheric turbulence and atmospheric attenuations due to Rayleigh scattering [67], while
a larger telescope will come at an increased cost.
2.2.2 Atmospheric turbulence
Atmospheric turbulence is the beam broadening, beam wander and intensity fluctuations
that occurs to a beam while it propagates through the atmosphere [67]. It is caused by
local refractive index fluctuations that occur due to temperature variations. It as been
shown that atmospheric turbulence has no negative effect on the polarization states used
for QKD [68]. The effect of turbulence is thus limited to a source of additional loss. An
example of the effects of turbulence is shown in Figure 2.4.
The beam broadening will cause divergence to the beam that will propagate until the
beam reaches the receiver. Therefore, the effect of beam broadening will be much worse
for an uplink, where the beam broadening occurs at the very beginning of the free-space
channel. In contrast, a downlink will only encounter atmospheric turbulence during the
last fraction of the free-space channel. The divergence from beam broadening will then
only apply to this last fraction of the propagation path.
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The beam wander caused by atmospheric turbulence can cause significant fluctuations
in the received signal with time scales on the order of 10–100 ms. The signal fluctuation
can have a significant negative impact on applications that require continuous signal (such
as classical communications). This is not the case in QKD, where each photon contains
information that is independent and uncorrelated to the other photons. The performance
of QKD is therefore determined by the total received signal regardless to its distribution in
time. Recent studies have even showed that short-term temporal fluctuations can increase
the efficiency of QKD by using sophisticated filtering techniques to remove the periods of
low signal, thus increasing the average signal to noise [69–72]. Here we have chosen to
ignore temporal fluctuations and its possible improvement to obtain a lower bound on the
performance of satellite QKD. When averaged over time, the beam wander can be modeled
as more beam broadening.
The last effect of turbulence, intensity fluctuations, will cause the intensity distribution
across the beam to fluctuate. This effect, also known as scintillation, does not increase
the average loss. Since short-term temporal fluctuations in signal intensity do not have a
negative effect on QKD, atmospheric scintillation effects can be ignored.
In addition to spacial fluctuations, atmospheric turbulence will also induce temporal
fluctuations. This time-of-flight variation has been recently studied [73] and showed slow
variations in the time of flight of ≈27 ps over the course of two hours with transmission
distances of a few kilometers. This suggest that the time jitter due to atmospheric tur-
bulence over the course of a satellite pass (5–10 min), where the atmospheric propagation
distance is on the order of 20 km, would remain bellow 50 ps.
Calculating the time-averaged beam broadening due to turbulence is done by calculating
the long term beam width w of the distribution at the receiver [67, 74]
w =
2
√
2dλ
piρ0
, (2.2)
where ρ0 is the transverse coherence length,
ρ0 =
[
1.46 sec(
pi
2
− ζ)
(
2pi
λ
)2 ∫ h
0
C2n(z)
(
1− z
h
) 5
3
dz
]− 3
5
, (2.3)
with ζ the elevation angle of the satellite from the ground, h the altitude of the receiver,
and C2n(z) the refractive-index structure constant. The transverse coherence length can
be related to the more widespread used atmospheric coherence length, or Fried coherence
length, (r0) with the relation r0 = 2.1ρ0 [67, 75]. Both quantities can be used to describe the
strength of the turbulence. The atmospheric coherence length has the added advantage of
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representing the the maximum size of the transmitter for which diffraction dominates over
turbulence. In the limit of transmitter diameters much greater than r0, diffraction will be
negligible compared to turbulence and the beam divergence will be completely determined
by turbulence, a process that is independent of the transmitter size. This imposes an
effective limit on the size of the transmitter: transmitters with diameters larger than r0
will have their geometric loss dominated by turbulence and increasing the transmitter size
further will yield little to no improvement in performance.
This effect is shown in Figure 2.5 for an uplink with three different strength of turbulence
(r0=5 cm, 10 cm and 15 cm). Both figures show reduced gain from increasing transmitter
size beyond the the atmospheric coherence length, with negligible gain for increases beyond
5 times r0.
It can be seen from Equation (2.2) and 2.3 that the width of the distribution from
turbulence scales as λ−
1
5 . This small dependence on the wavelength means that shorter
wavelength will be more affected by atmospheric turbulence. Because of this dependence,
it is sometimes beneficial to use a higher wavelength to reduce atmospheric turbulence
despite the increased diffraction caused by longer wavelengths.
The refractive-index structure constant (C2n(z)) is a crucial parameter for atmospheric
turbulence as it allows to predict the strength of turbulence for any propagation distance.
There are many models designed to predict C2n(z), the most widely used being the Hufnagel-
Valley model of atmospheric turbulence [67, 74]. This model of atmospheric turbulence
predicts the profile of C2n(z) based on two parameters that depend on the atmospheric
conditions: The upper level wind speed v, given as the root mean square wind speed
averaged over the 5-20 km range, and the surface value of the refractive-index structure
constant (A = C2n(0))
C2n(z) = 0.00594(v/27)
2(z · 10−5)10e−z/1000 + 2.7 · 10−16e−z/1500 + Ae−z/100. (2.4)
For this work we used two typical values of these parameters at sea-level during night-
time [76]: A = 1.7 × 10−14 m− 23 and v = 21 m/s. These values produce atmospheric
coherence length (r0) between 5 cm to 15 cm for most elevation angles. In these condi-
tions, increasing the telescope diameter beyond 25–75cm (5 times r0) will have negligible
impact on the performance of the system (see Figure 2.5).
The distribution from turbulence is a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution of width
w:
gt(r) =
2
piw2
exp
(
−2r
2
w2
)
. (2.5)
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Figure 2.5: Effect of Increasing the transmitter diameter (TD) beyond the atmospheric
coherence length (r0). The top figure shows the effect on the beam waist (w) to the
turbulence distribution width (wt) ratio (shown to be insensitive to r0, with all three
traces overlapping), and the effect on the link loss is shown in the bottom figure. The gain
from increasing the transmitter size is reduces for transmitter diameters greater than r0.
Wavelength, 785 nm, satellite receiver diameter, 20 cm, propagation distance, 1000 km.
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The beam profile with atmospheric turbulence I2(~v) is then obtained by taking a two-
dimensional convolution [77] of the beam after diffraction with the distribution of the
beam at the receiver caused by atmospheric turbulence:
I2(~v) = (I1 ∗ gt)(r, θ) =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ′
∫ ∞
0
I1(r
′)g(r − r′)dr′. (2.6)
As the density of the atmosphere gets smaller with increasing altitude, the atmospheric
turbulence also gets weaker with the stongest turbulence occurring near the surface. The
lower 20 km of the atmosphere is where atmospheric turbulence predominately occurs [67],
thus its impact on a downlink will only occur during the last fraction of its propagation
distance. The linear dependence of Equation (2.2) on d means that for the same turbulence
strength (i.e. the same coherence length), the width of the distribution from turbulence in a
downlink from a 600 km altitude LEO satellite will be roughly 20 km/600 km=1/30 times
the width for an uplink. In this regime the contribution to geometric losses from turbulence
is negligible compared to diffraction. We therefore ignore atmospheric turbulence in the
case of a downlink (I2(~v) = I1(~v)).
In the case of an uplink transmissions, the effects of turbulence propagate over the
entire optical path leading to an important contribution to geometric losses. It is possible
to reduce the effect of turbulence by choosing a ground station in a location with better
atmospheric conditions or higher altitude. This improvement may not alway be possible
as certain locations that would benefit from the implementation of a global QKD link will
not have access to a good site for a ground station. An adaptive optics system could also
be used to compensate the effects of turbulence [75], but would come at an increased cost.
2.2.3 Pointing error
The last geometric broadening effect is caused by misalignment between the transmitting
and receiving telescopes. This is due to imprecision in the tracking system and jitter in
the telescopes. This pointing error, typically fluctuating on a time scale of ∼0.1–1 s, can
be averaged over time as additional beam broadening. This can be reduced with higher-
quality tracking and pointing systems, which however incur increased cost and complexity.
Controlling for jitter is more challenging on a satellite, thus a downlink will be more
vulnerable to this effect.
The loss from the pointing error is calculated by first determining the distribution
over time of the beam center at the receiver. We assume a two-dimensional Gaussian
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distribution of pointing, given by
gp(r) =
1
2piσ2
exp
(
− r
2
2σ2
)
, (2.7)
where σ is the standard deviation caused by pointing error. As was the case for atmo-
spheric turbulence, The beam profile with pointing error I3(~v) is obtained by taking a
two-dimensional convolution of the beam after diffraction and turbulence (I2(~v)) with the
distribution of the pointing error:
I3(~v) = (I2 ∗ gp)(r, θ) =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ′
∫ ∞
0
I1(r
′)g(r − r′)dr′. (2.8)
Once all geometric broadening effects have been taken into account, we can use the
profile of the beam at the receiver (I3(~v)), to obtain the received optical power (P ) by
integrating the beam profile over the receiving area:
P =
∫∫
Sr
I3(~v)dxdy, (2.9)
where Sr is the surface of the receiver. This surface can again be specified to any shape
and size to accommodate various telescope designs. The resulting power is proportional to
the average number of detected photons.
Figure 2.6 shows the excess loss due to transmitter systematic pointing error (the loss
added to the system from pointing error compared to the same system with perfect pointing
accuracy) for a downlink (top) and for an uplink (bottom). In a downlink, the impact
depends strongly on the transmitter size which determines the contribution of diffraction.
To minimize loss, it is sufficient to reduce the pointing error such that diffraction becomes
the dominant source of broadening. In the case of an uplink however, the dominating beam
broadening effect, for transmitters of 20 cm or more, is atmospheric turbulence. We then
simply need to reduce pointing error below the influence of atmospheric turbulence. We
have found that pointing accuracies of better than 2 µrad root mean square (RMS), would
cause 1–4 dB of loss in a downlink for up to a 20 cm transmitter, and less than 1 dB of
loss in an uplink for all transmitter sizes. This pointing accuracy as been demonstrated in
previous satellite experiments [78] and is therefore feasible. For the rest of our analysis,
this value is applied for the transmitter pointing accuracy.
The receiver pointing accuracy in much more relaxed as it only needs to point to an
accuracy within its field of view which is typically much greater than 2 µrad. For our
analysis we assume 50 µrad of field of view. This value was chosen to keep the received
background light to a manageable level, while keeping the complexity of the system as low
as possible.
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Figure 2.6: Excess loss due to systematic pointing error of the transmitter for various
transmitter sizes at 40◦ from zenith in a downlink (top) and in an uplink (bottom) assuming
a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution of the pointing error. For our performance analysis
we assumed a pointing error of 2 µrad, inducing only up to 4 dB of loss in a downlink and
less than 1 dB of loss in an uplink. For downlink: wavelength is 670 nm, ground receiver
diameter is 50 cm. For uplink: wavelength is 785 nm; satellite receiver is 30 cm. In both
cases, the orbit altitude is 600 km and the atmosphere is rural sea-level.
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2.2.4 Atmospheric transmission
In addition to atmospheric turbulence, a beam propagating through the atmosphere will
also suffer non-geometric losses due to scattering and absorption [67]. The two main types
of scattering in the atmosphere are Rayleigh and Mie scattering. Rayleigh scattering are
caused by small molecules and particles and are responsible for the sky’s blue appearance.
This type of scattering is more significant for light with a smaller wavelength, limiting
the improvement one can obtain from reducing diffraction with a smaller wavelength. Mie
scattering, responsible for the white glare around lights, is caused by larger particles and
is largely wavelength independent [79].
Atmospheric absorption is largely dependent on the concentration of the various con-
stituents of the atmosphere. Many molecules contribute to atmospheric absorption, creat-
ing widows of high and low transmission. Water vapor and carbon dioxide are the main
contributors to molecular absorption in the visible and infrared ranges [67]. To ensure
manageable loss it is crucial to chose a wavelength away from the low transmission win-
dows.
Given the complexity of the atmosphere, several programs have been developed to
predict atmospheric transmission with good accurately based on user given atmospheric
composition. One widely used commercial program to predict atmospheric transmission
is MODTRAN [80]. Using MODTRAN 5, we modeled atmospheric transmittance of a
rural sea-level location with a visibility of 5 km. We chose this atmosphere type to reflect
the possibility of a ground station close to a large city. There exist many locations with
significantly better atmospheric conditions than the one described by this model. This
type of atmosphere thus represents a worst case scenario of atmospheric transmission. The
interest of having ground stations close to a city, despite the worst atmospheric conditions,
is to enable the possibility of city-wide QKD networks globally connected using satellite
QKD. The MODTRAN parameters we used are listed in Appendix D.
The results of the MODTRAN calculations are shown in Figure 2.7. The left side
of the figure shows the dependence on wavelength, revealing several low-loss transmission
windows. Of particular interest are the widows at 665–685 nm, 775–785 nm, 1000–1070 nm,
and 1540–1680 nm, all of which support wavelengths of commercial laser diodes. The
dependence on the transmission angle is shown on the right side of the figure.
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Figure 2.7: Simulated atmospheric transmittance at a typical rural location, for propaga-
tion at zenith (top) and for different elevation angles (bottom). Coloured lines represent
wavelengths of commercially available laser systems. Several transmission windows are
evident, within which optical transmission would experience low loss. Generally, the trans-
mission tends to be better at higher wavelengths, but other factors (e.g. diffraction, sources,
detectors) must be taken into account to properly determine the best wavelength choice.
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Table 2.1: Summary of the comparison between single-photon detectors showing typical
values of their main parameters. The manufacturer of the detector used for comparison is
referenced in the detector column.
Detector Wavelength Peak Dark Timing Cooling
[nm] efficiency
[%]
counts
[cps]
jitter
[ps]
method
Thin Si APD [82] 550 50 20 50 Thermoelectric
Think SI APD [83] 700 70 20 350 Thermoelectric
InGaAs APD [32] 1300 20 200 200 Thermoelectric
PMT [84] 600 40 100 300 Thermoelectric
HPD [84] 500 45 30 120 Thermoelectric
MCP-PMT [84] 500 40 10 100 Thermoelectric
SSPD [85] 1550 90 100 50 Cryogenic
2.2.5 Detectors and optical components
The measurement of single photons requires very sensitive detection devices [81]. These
devices suffer from imperfect detection efficiency that must be taken into account in the per-
formance estimation. In addition to detection efficiency, the choice of detector is strongly
affected by dark counts rate, i.e. the number of false counts per second caused by thermal
processes. Two other important parameters are timing jitter (the uncertainty in the timing
information of the detection) and the maximum count rate of the detector (which should
be above the expected detection rate).
Single-photon detectors are an active area of research producing rapid improvements.
However, a satellite mission requires detectors that are well tested to mitigate the risk of
failure. For this overview, we focus on the currently available commercial single-photon
detector, which could be tested and space qualified before a satellite mission.
There are two main ranges of wavelength with commercially available detectors. Silicon
(Si) avalanche photodiodes (APD) technologies are typically used for the visible range
(400–1000 nm) while the near-infrared wavelengths (950–1650 nm) are typically detected
using Indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs) APD or, more recently, by superconducting single-
photon detectors. A summary of typical detector characteristics is shown in table 2.1.
Si APD is a mature technology capable of >50% detection efficiency with low dark
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counts, low timing jitter (<50 ps), and maximum count rates in the MHz range [9, 81, 86].
On the other hand, InGaAs APD currently suffer from lower detection efficiencies, higher
dark count rates, and low repetition rates [9] limiting their usefulness for satellite QKD.
This may change in the future as some new techniques, such as self-differencing [87], are
improving InGaAs detectors.
Photomultiplier tubes (PMT) are a well established technology that can provide an
alternative to APD [81, 84]. However, their detection efficiency is typically lower than Si-
APD and PMT can contribute additional noise due to afterpulsing. Hybrid photodetectors
(HPD) and micro-channel photomultiplier tubes (MCP-PMT) are promising technologies
that incorporates PMT in their design but they also suffer from the same drawback.
Superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPD) are a promising technology that has
made considerable progress over the last few years [85, 88–95], reaching high efficiency, low
dark counts, and broad-spectrum sensitivity. Despite this progress, current superconduct-
ing detectors are in the research stage, and all such devices require cryogenic cooling to
operate [9]. This makes them impractical for low cost satellite missions, particularly in
the case of an uplink, where the detectors (and their cooling system) are located on the
satellite.
Because of the current difficulties of measuring in the near-infrared ranged, we focus on
the visible range, taking advantage of Si APD that have low technological requirements for
a satellite mission and support wavelengths of multiple free-space transmission windows
(see Figure 2.7). Two types of Si APDs were studied: thin APD (from Micro Photon
Devices) detection efficiencies are used for wavelengths below 500 nm [82], and thick APD
(from Excelitas Technologies) efficiencies for 500 nm and above [83]. Typical detection
efficiency of these detectors are shown in Figure 2.8.
In addition to imperfect detection efficiency, there will also be various loss contribu-
tions from the various optical components of both telescopes. These include imperfect
filter transmission at the signal wavelength, non-ideal beam-splitter, lens and mirror trans-
mission and reflection, and imperfect coupling from the telescope to the detectors. These
are typically low individual contributions (often no more than a few percents in one given
component) but can add up to a non-negligible contribution. To ensure these extra contri-
butions are taken into account we include an extra 3 dB of loss (≈50% transmission) due
to optical components which is beyond what these various imperfections typically lead to.
The various non-geometric losses (atmospheric transmission, detector efficiency and
optical losses) are then added to the geometric losses by multiplying the received power (P )
with the atmospheric transmittance ηt, the detector efficiency ηd and the optical efficiency
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Figure 2.8: Detection efficiency curve for a thin Si APD (top) [82] and from a thick Si APD
(bottom) [83]. A thin APD is better suited for shorter wavelength (400–500 nm) while the
thick APD is better suited for longer wavelength (500–900 nm). Graphs taken from the
detector’s respective data sheets [82, 83]
.
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ηo.
Pfinal = Pηtηdηo. (2.10)
Finally the ratio of the final power to the initial power (P0) is converted into loss in dB
L = −10 log10
(
Pfinal
P0
)
. (2.11)
2.2.6 Effect of the initial beam shape and telescope design
The numerical nature of the simulation used to calculate loss allow us to model the impact
of the telescope design and the impact of the initial beam shape and size. Here we use this
feature of our model to determine the optimal beam size and the impact of an aperture
obstruction on in telescope design.
Optimal beam waist at the transmitter
The most common shape of laser beams is a Gaussian beam distribution of a certain beam
waist. This beam waist can be engineered by changing the curvature of the lenses/mirrors
of the telescope. This beam waist can therefore be optimize to reduce the loss. Using
our model, we evaluated the loss performance when varying the initial beam waist of a
Gaussian beam, measured as full width at half maximum (FWHM) of the intensity of the
beam.
The results, shown in Figure 2.9, reveal a significantly different behavior for an en-
tangled photon source compared to a weak coherent pulse (WCP) source. In a downlink,
(Figure 2.9 top), an entangled photon source is shown to have optimal loss with a beam
waist of half the diameter of the transmitter. This is consistent with existing literature [96]
for classical communication to and from a satellite. This is because a beam that is too
large will be clipped to the size of the transmitter telescope, while a beam that is too small
causes exaggerated diffraction.
This behavior is not exhibited by a WCP source, where we find that the loss due
to beam waist becomes effectively constant for any FWHM beam waist greater than the
transmitter telescope diameter. The reason for this unusual behavior comes from the fact
that the WCP source is attenuated to emit less than one photon per pulse (on average), and
the loss from clipping the outer portion of the beam can be utilized as attenuation towards
this end. Therefore, the clipping losses at the telescope can be compensated by increasing
the intensity because only the outgoing intensity counts. The beam waist may be made so
large, whilst increasing source intensity to compensate, that it essentially becomes a plane
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Figure 2.9: Loss at 40◦ from zenith as a function of the outgoing beam waist (FWHM) for
a downlink (top) and an uplink (bottom). The WCP performs better than the entangled
source at large beam waist because the loss from clipping can be included in realizing
the required attenuation. The optimum for a downlink is to have a beam waist as large
as possible for a WCP source and a beam waist of half the telescope diameter for an
entangled photon source. In an uplink, the best beam waist for both sources is smaller
then their corresponding value for a downlink because of atmospheric turbulence effects.
For downlink: wavelength, 670 nm; satellite transmitter diameter, 10 cm; ground receiver,
50 cm. For uplink: wavelength, 785 nm; satellite receiver, 30 cm; ground transmitter,
25 cm. In both cases, orbit altitude is 600 km with no pointing error. Atmosphere is rural
sea-level.
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wave where diffraction is entirely due to the transmitter’s size. Because the loss for large
beam waist approaches a constant, it is sufficient to increase the beam waist up to the
transmitter’s diameter to achieve close to minimal loss.
In an uplink, diffraction broadening is dominated by atmospheric turbulence, reducing
the advantage of a larger transmitting telescope. This limit on the effective telescope size
is reflected in the optimal beam waist shown in Figure 2.9 (right). The optimal beam waist
reflects the size of the beam where diffraction becomes negligible compared to turbulence,
and increasing the beam size further has almost no effect on the final beam broadening
from all sources. Because of this, it is actually better to keep the beam waist smaller,
with less clipping, even if doing so increases diffraction. For a small telescope or weak
turbulence, diffraction will dominate once more and we will enter the same regime as the
downlink, where the optimal FWHM beam waist is the transmitter diameter for the WCP
source and half of the transmitter diameter for the entangled photon source.
The influence of atmospheric turbulence depends on the propagation angle through
the atmosphere. Propagations at elevation angles further from zenith will have a longer
path through the atmosphere and will therefor experience more turbulence effects than
propagations at elevation angles closer to zenith. Because of this, the optimal ratio of the
beam waist to transmitter size in an uplink will be dependent on the elevation angle of the
satellite. Since this elevation angle changes continuously during a satellite pass, keeping an
optimal beam waist would also require continuous readjustment. Figure 2.9 (right) shows
that the improvement in using the optimal beam waist is less than 1 dB compared to the
performance of beam waists that were optimal without turbulence (FWHM equal to the
transmitter diameter for a WCP source and half the transmitter diameter for an entangled
photon source). Maintaining the optimal beam waist is therefore a significant complication
that is unlikely to return major improvements.
For this work, we use the same FWHM beam waist for uplink as the optimal values
for a downlink: a FWHM equal to half the transmitter diameter for an entangled photon
source and a FWHM equal to the transmitter diameter for a WCP source. In these
configurations the diffraction remains based on the telescope size and not on the beam
waist. This represents a design where one desires to achieve small losses without the
technically difficult re-optimization of beam waists with changing elevation angles.
Telescope design with an obstruction
There exists two main categories of telescope design: refractive telescopes, built using
one or more lenses, and reflective telescopes, built using mirrors [97]. Large refractive
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telescopes are difficult to manufacture because they require large high quality lenses with
precisely shaped surface on both sides. Large mirrors only require one reflective surface to
be precisely shaped making them much easier to manufacture. In addition, large lenses can
be considerably heavier than mirrors and can only be mounted at their edge, leading to
instability and the possibility of deformation. Mirrors however can be mounted using their
back surface, proving far better stability. Because of these factors, most modern telescopes
are typically made using a reflective design.
Telescopes with reflective designs use a primary mirror that reflect and focus the beam
on a secondary mirrors, which then redirect the light where it can be analyzed [97]. Many
such design have the secondary mirror placed in the path of the incoming beam, creating
an obstruction (see Figure 2.10, top). The likelihood of such a design provides motivation
to analyze the impact of such an obstruction on the loss performance. To analyze the
maximum impact of an obstruction, we use a design where the obstruction is placed at the
center of the beam, thus blocking the most intense part of the signal. This design then
provides a lower bound on the performance when using a reflective telescope.
The obstruction caused by a secondary mirror in the transmitting telescope has two
effects: it blocks a portion of the beam (Figure 2.10, bottom) and it alters the diffraction
(Figure 2.11, top). Our analysis show that the resulting performance from both effects
depends only on the ratio of primary and secondary mirror diameters. The additional loss
from such an impact is shown in Figure 2.11 (bottom). For reasonable primary/secondary
mirror ratios, the secondary obstruction has little impact. Just as was the case for the
beam waist, the impact of blocking the central part of the beam is smaller for the WCP
source than for an entangled source because the transmission power can be adjusted to
counteract the obstruction loss.
The size of the beam reaching the receiving telescope is typically on the order of 10 m.
This is much larger than any considered receiving telescope. In this regime, the part of the
beam entering the telescope has an almost constant intensity distribution. The loss due to
a reflective telescope design at the receiver is therefore almost entirely dependent on the
area of the obstruction in the telescope. The additional loss in this case is then proportional
to the ratio of the area with obstruction compared to the area without obstruction:
Lobstruction = L+ (−10 log10
(
Aobstruction
A
)
), (2.12)
where Lobstruction is the loss with obstruction, L is the loss without obstruction, Aobstruction
is the area of the telescope when there is an obstruction (equal to the total area of the
telescope minus the obstructed area), and A is the area of the telescope in the case with
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Figure 2.10: Cassegrain telescope design (top), which has a central secondary mirror block-
ing a portion of the outgoing beam, and the accompanying intensity profile at the trans-
mitter (bottom).
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Figure 2.11: Beam intensity profile at the receiving telescopefrom a transmitter with a
central secondary mirror blocking a portion of the outgoing beam (top) and the additional
loss due to this type of transmitting telescope was evaluated for both WCP and entangled
photon sources (bottom). The impact of this design is less than 1 dB for an obstruction of
up to 6.2% of the area (i.e., a secondary mirror with a diameter of up to 25% the diameter
of the primary mirror). Theses results are at a distance of 600 km, with a wavelength of
670 nm and a 20 cm transmitter. The additional loss (in dB) from this type of transmitter
is independent of distance, wavelength, receiver and transmitter size, provided that we are
in the regime where the received beam is larger than the receiver. In our case (distances
greater than 500 km and visible wavelengths), this condition is valid for receivers of up to
1–2 m (for any transmitter size).
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no obstruction.
2.2.7 Results of the loss analysis
Combining all loss mechanisms we can obtain the total loss expected from a satellite QKD
link at any given point of the satellite passes. Figures 2.12 and 2.13 shows the total
predicted loss (light blue) at various elevation angles (with the length of the transmission
adjusted to correspond to a satellite at a 600 km orbit appearing at the given elevation
angle). Also shown are the loss when we include only diffraction (dark blue), including all
geometric effects (in green) and including all channel effects (in red).
Values of the losses for the various contributors are shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 for
elevation angles of 90◦, 55◦ and 30◦ from the horizon. The contributions of the individual
geometric effects are shown as their contributions if they were the only geometric effect
present, allowing us to better compare them and identify the dominant effect. In a down-
link, the dominant effect is diffraction, which can be mitigated by increasing the size of the
transmitter. In first order, doubling the transmitter (from 10 cm to 20 cm) would reduce
the loss by a factor 4 (≈6 dB). Doing so would reduce the diffraction loss to less than
the pointing error, and would require improvements to the pointing accuracy to further
reduce the geometric loss. In an uplink, the geometric loss is dominated by atmospheric
turbulence, which can only be mitigated by choosing a location with better atmospheric
conditions or higher altitude, or by using an adaptive optics system to compensate the
effect of turbulence [75]. The increase in diffraction loss with an entangled photon source
is due to the smaller beam size (chosen to reduce loss from clipping). This reduced beam
size causes diffraction to be limited by the beam waist rather than the transmitter.
The full MATLAB code used used to estimate the loss is shown in Appendix A.
2.2.8 Confidence in the loss analysis
Here we briefly discuss the accuracy of the various loss calculations and how well they
represent an actual implementation. The transmitter clipping is based on the beam waist
at the transmitter which can be adjusted with proper choice of lenses and their position.
Therefore the beam waist can be manipulated to accurately match the desired value. In
the case on a WCP source, the 0 dB of clipping loss relies on proper characterization of the
output beam of the transmitter (to normalize the signal intensity). This may be difficult
in practice and a more conservative normalization may use the signal intensity before the
transmitter, thus causing the clipping loss to be non-zero and the optimal beam waist to
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Figure 2.12: Predicted transmission loss from a satellite to a ground station using a WCP
source (top) and an entangled photon source (bottom). Satellite transmitter telescope of
10 cm, ground receiver telescope of 50 cm, both circular with no obstruction. Wavelength
of 670 nm, pointing error of 2 µrad with a 600km orbit and rural (5 km vis.) sea-level
atmosphere.
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Figure 2.13: Predicted transmission loss from a ground station to a satellite using a WCP
source (top) and an entangled photon source (bottom). Ground transmitter telescope of
50 cm, satellite receiver telescope of 30 cm, both circular with no obstruction. Wavelength
of 785 nm, pointing error of 2 µrad with a 600km orbit and rural (5 km vis.) sea-level
atmosphere.
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Table 2.2: Contributions of loss for elevation angles of 90◦, 55◦ and 30◦ from the horizon
in a downlink. These elevation angles correspond to the maximum elevation angles of
the best, upper quartile and median pass respectively. To help compare the relative im-
portance of the geometric losses (diffraction, pointing error and atmospheric turbulence),
their individual values are given as if they where the only geometric loss present. The total
geometric loss is the loss when all geometric effects are properly combined to find the final
beam distribution from which loss is computed. Conditions are the same as in Figure 2.12.
WCP source Entangled photon
Source of loss loss [dB] source loss [dB]
90◦ 55◦ 30◦ 90◦ 55◦ 30◦
Transmitter clipping 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3
Diffraction 20.2 21.7 25.2 20.8 22.3 25.8
Pointing error 16.4 17.9 21.5 16.4 17.9 21.5
Atmospheric turbulence 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Geometric 21.8 23.3 26.8 22.1 23.6 27.1
Atmospheric transmittance 3.4 4.1 7.0 3.4 4.1 7.0
Optical losses 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Detector efficiency 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Total 30.1 32.3 38.7 30.7 33.0 39.3
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Table 2.3: Contributions of loss for elevation angles of 90◦, 55◦ and 30◦ from the horizon in
a uplink. These elevation angles correspond to the maximum elevation angles of the best,
upper quartile and median pass respectively. To help compare the relative importance of
the geometric losses (diffraction, pointing error and atmospheric turbulence), their individ-
ual values are given as if they where the only geometric loss present. The total geometric
loss is the loss when all geometric effects are properly combined to find the final beam
distribution from which loss is computed. Conditions are the same as in Figure 2.13.
WCP source Entangled photon
Source of loss loss [dB] source loss [dB]
90◦ 55◦ 30◦ 90◦ 55◦ 30◦
Transmitter clipping 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3
Diffraction 12.2 13.7 17.1 12.8 14.3 17.7
Pointing error 18.6 20.1 23.7 18.6 20.1 23.7
Atmospheric turbulence 23.4 26.6 34.5 23.4 26.6 34.5
Total Geometric 24.9 27.6 34.9 24.9 27.6 34.9
Atmospheric transmittance 3.4 4.1 7.0 3.4 4.1 7.0
Optical losses 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Detector efficiency 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Total 33.6 37.0 47.2 33.9 37.3 47.5
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decrease to the same value as the entangled photon source. In such a case, the WCP source
would suffer the same losses as the entangle source.
Diffraction is a well studied phenomena, and is modeled with high accuracy. The
average loss of pointing error is also very accurate, but the actual effect of pointing error
will result in fluctuations of the loss around the average value. Since QKD is based on the
transmission of single pulses rather than a continuous data stream, the variation induced
by pointing error does not negatively impact QKD beyond the increase in average loss.
However, the variability can cause similar passes to have different performance based on
the fluctuations of the pointing error (some will perform better than expected, others will
perform worse), decreasing the reliability of the performance.
Atmospheric turbulence is based on a complex but well studied model, providing good
accuracy. However, the model depends strongly on the parameters that characterize the
atmosphere, which can vary significantly over different locations and time of year. For
example, a study that measured the parameters at the Canary Islands [98] found that
the monthly average values of the parameters A and v of Equation (2.4) varied by up
to 68% and 39% respectively from their average value. The average values were found
to be A = 9.75 × 10−15 m− 23 and v = 17.47 m/s, compared to the sea-level values of
A = 1.7 × 10−14 m− 23 and v = 21 m/s used in our analysis. Using these measured values
of atmospheric turbulence parameters we find atmospheric turbulence contributions (in an
uplink) of 21.2 dB, 24.4 dB and 32.3 dB for 90◦, 55◦ and 30◦ respectively, corresponding to
2.2dB less loss for each angles. The best month of the year (June, A = 3.09× 10−15 m− 23
and v = 17.1 m/s) reduce the losses by an additional 3.2 dB (18.0 dB, 21.2 dB and 29.1 dB
for 90◦, 55◦ and 30◦ respectively). It is thus clear that while atmospheric turbulence is
likely to remain the dominant source of geometric loss in an uplink, it’s impact can vary
significantly based on location and time of year. In addition to increasing the average loss,
atmospheric turbulence will increase the variation of the link loss due to the beam wander
and scintillation effect of atmospheric turbulence. In the same way as pointing error, this
variability can decrease the reliability of the performance.
Atmospheric transmittance is another well studied model that provide good accuracy
but can vary significantly over locations, air composition and atmospheric conditions. For
example, a maritime model yields losses of 1.2 dB, 1.5 dB and 2.4 dB for 90◦, 55◦ and
30◦ respectively, corresponding to 2.2 dB, 2.6 dB and 4.6 dB less loss compared to our
modeled rural atmosphere. Atmospheric transmittance is thus another parameter that can
vary widely based on location.
Optical losses depend on the chosen optical components. The optical loss of the free
space receiver used in Chapter 5 was measured to be 2 dB (see section 5.2.1). Our chosen
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value of 3 dB is therefore likely to be an overestimate and better efficiency can and have
been achieved. Finally, the detector efficiency is based on existing Si APDs and is therefore
very accurate. However, the final detector model may be different and can thus have a
different detection efficiency.
In summary, our model provides high accuracy in determining the average loss but
some components, particularly atmospheric turbulence and transmittance, can have loss
contributions that vary significantly from those in our current estimates. In addition,
pointing error and atmospheric turbulence could add variations to the link, causing some
passes to behave better or worse than expected, reducing the reliability of the expected
performance.
2.3 Estimating the background counts
Having a good signal to noise ratio is crucial for QKD because there is no way to distinguish
between noise and errors introduced by an eavesdropper. All noise must therefore be
attributed to the presence of an eavesdropper. By revealing parts of the received signal
the two parties performing QKD are able to estimate the number of errors, caused by
either noise or an eavesdropper, and place a limit on the amount of information that an
eavesdropper may have acquired. To ensure security, QKD can only proceed if this limit
is below a certain threshold. It is therefore crucial for the noise of a QKD system to be
small enough for this limit the be below the threshold when there is no eavesdropper. In
addition, security requires to reduce the size of the key to wash out any information that
may have been learned by an eavesdropper. More noise will then lead to a greater reduction
in the size of the key, thus reducing the performance.
For these reasons, it was crucial to develop a program to estimate the amount of
background light received. This program is a modified version of a background counts
program developed by Bassam Helou.
2.3.1 Sources of background noise
Most background noise comes from background light originating from both natural and
artificial sources. Natural sources come from the Sun, reflected by the Moon, and from
stars. Artificial sources consist of light pollution from human activities. The light pollution
was characterized over the surface of the Earth during 1996 and 1997 by the Defence Me-
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Figure 2.14: Light pollution from human activities in North America, data from World
Atlas of Artificial Sky Brightness (Ref. [100]). The inset shows a closer view of the location
of the simulated ground site, marked with a cross, approximately 20 km outside Ottawa.
teorological Satellite Program’s (DMSP) Operational Linescan System (OLS) [99]. Light
pollution data is partly shown in Figure 2.14.
The location used for calculating the artificial light pollution was 20 km from the city
of Ottawa, Canada, with a latitude of approximately 45◦ North. This location, at the the
edge of the city, represents a scenario where the ground station may be linked to a city’s
ground-based secure QKD network, with the satellite acting as a trusted node to establish
global quantum-secured links. We also assume a half-moon at 45◦ elevation, representing
a worst case for most night that are considered, and a receiver field of view (FOV) of
50 µrad. Finally a 1 nm bandwidth filter is assumed to eliminate background not at the
signal wavelength.
From our choice of orbit (sun-synchronous noon/midnight LEO orbit), and our choice
of ground location (latitude around 45◦ North), the satellite will always be in the Earth’s
shadow during nighttime passes. We can therefore ignore all contribution to the background
light that would arise from the satellite being illuminated by the sun.
Other contributions to the noise are from detector count rates and polarization mis-
alignment between the source and the receiver. In this work, we used a detector dark count
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rate of 20 cps per detectors, in line with the capabilities of the Si APD detectors [82, 83].
The polarization misalignment will be considered in Section 2.4.
The full MATLAB code used to estimate the background counts is shown in Ap-
pendix B.
2.3.2 Background for a downlink
In a downlink, the receiver will be on the ground pointing towards the sky. The natural
brightness of the sky has been well characterized by astronomers for various different
locations [101–103]. Similarly, the contribution of the Moon to the night sky brightness
has also been studied [104]. There also exists theoretical models and computer algorithms
to predict the night sky brightness. We use one of these computer algorithms [105] to
determine the natural sky brightness (Hnat).
A ground receiver will also receive artificial light contribution from scattered light
originally emitted by human activities. This nighttime sky brightness due to light pollution
can be calculated from the DMSP-OLS data which specifies the measured upward flux
emitted at a given ground location [106]. This data, reproduced in Figure 2.14 can be used
to directly determine the upward flux at the location of interest which can be converted to
artificial sky brightness (Hart).
The overall sum of these contributions amounts to the total number of background
counts per second:
Ntot =
1
Eν0
{
(Hnat +Hart)× pi(FOV)2 × pir2 ×Bfilter
}
+Ddark, (2.13)
where ν0 is the mean frequency of the laser emitted towards the receiver, Eν0 is the energy of
a single photon of frequency ν0, r is the telescope’s radius (assumed circular, alternatively
pir2 can be replaced by the total area of the receiver). FOV is the angular field of view of
the receiving telescope, Bfilter is the bandwidth of the filter an Ddark is the summed dark
counts from all detectors. Figure 2.15 shows the predicted total background counts (red)
at various elevation angles and the contributions from natural (blue) and artificial (green)
light sources.
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Figure 2.15: Predicted background light at a ground station 20 km from the city of Ottawa.
Ground receiver telescope of 50 cm, circular with no obstruction, wavelength of 670 nm,
600 km orbit and rural (5 km vis.) sea-level atmosphere. Filter bandwidth of 1 nm,
half-moon at 45◦ elevation and FOV of 50 µrad. Detector dark counts are not included.
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2.3.3 Background for an uplink
In an uplink, the receiver is on a satellite pointing towards the ground. In this configuration,
reflected light from stars is negligible. The main source of natural light is the light from the
Sun reflected first off the Moon, and then off the surface of the Earth towards the satellite.
The amount of light emitted by the Sun (to be reflected by the Moon) is obtained using
Planck’s law for blackbody radiation [107],
I(ν, T ) =
2hν3
c2
(exp(hν/kT )− 1)−1 , (2.14)
where ν is the frequency of the emitted radiation, h is the Planck constant, c is the speed
of light, k is the Boltzmann constant, and T is the temperature of the emitter. Using this
equation at the temperatures of the surface of the Sun (about 5778 K on average [107]) we
obtain an accurate estimate of the spectrum of emitted light.
The Moon’s albedo (quantifying how strongly its surface reflects light) depends pri-
marily on the lunar phase. For this work, we assumed a moon half illuminated and used
empirical data to obtain the amount of light reflected at a certain lunar phase [108]. The
average Earth albedo is 30% [107]. We assumed Lambertian diffusion [74], meaning the
radiance of reflected light is independent of angle. The number of photons reflected by the
Moon NM is given by
NMoon = aMoon
I (ν0, TSun)
Eν0
piR2Moon, (2.15)
where aMoon is the Moon’s albedo, TSun is the Sun’s temperature and RMoon is the Moon’s
radius. If the Moon is at normal incidence, the solid angle to the area on Earth Λ seen
from the Moon is Λ/d2EM, where dEM is the distance between the Earth and the Moon. The
number of background photons reaching the telescope after Lambertian reflection from the
surface of the Earth is then
NSun = Bfilterηtη
Moon
t
[
aEarthNMoon
(
Λ
d2EM
)
Ω
]
, (2.16)
where ηt is the atmospheric transmittance from the ground to the satellite, η
Moon
t is the
atmospheric transmittance from the moon to the ground, aEarth is the Earth’s albedo and
Ω is the solid angle from which the telescope can be seen from the Earth. ηt and η
Moon
t
are both required to take into account the traversal of light through the atmosphere twice:
First, light reflected from the Moon reaches the surface of the Earth. Then, this light is
reflected into the receiving telescope.
The number of background counts due to light pollution is estimated using the DMSP-
OLS data [99]. This data takes the form of a high-resolution image, with each pixel
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coordinates of the image correspond to physical locations on the surface of the Earth,
and the pixel values denote the nighttime radiance. With this we can obtain the average
radiance L¯ emitted by a certain location due to nighttime activities. We can then directly
obtain light pollution emitted into the receiver:
Nnight = Bfilterηt
(
L¯
Eν0
ΛΩ
)
. (2.17)
One limitation with this result is that the artificial light contribution is based on data
taken almost a decade ago, and its accuracy varies seasonally due to changes in composition
of the atmosphere. In addition, because there is little data on the composition of the
types of lamps used in a certain region, we assume that the radiance L¯ is constant at all
frequencies. Some information about the composition of lighting types is expected to arrive
in the future when the Nightsat mission becomes operational [109]. Nevertheless this data
is accurate enough to give a reasonable estimate of the expected magnitude of background
counts.
The total number of background counts is then obtained by summing the contributions
from all sources:
NBG = NSun +Nnight +Ddark. (2.18)
Figure 2.16 shows the predicted total background counts (red) at various elevation angles
and the contributions from natural (blue) and artificial (green) light sources.
2.3.4 Wavelength considerations
The choice of wavelength can greatly influence the background counts experienced by
our system. Notably, the spectrum of the Sun is affected by the absorption lines of the
molecules in the solar atmosphere. These cause regions of lower solar spectrum, called
Fraunhofer bands [110]. Taking advantage of such bands for QKD systems, such as the
H-α band [111], has been proposed and showed a reduction of ≈50% in the solar back-
ground. Using a wavelength in such a line could significantly reduce the background in a
downlink, which is mainly due to solar background reflected off the moon. Despite this pos-
sible improvement, typical QKD downlink will not be significantly affected by background.
The predicted losses of a downlink (around 30–40 dB, see Section 2.2.7) correspond to
a signal detection probability of 10−3–10−4 while the predicted background contribution
(200–300 cps, see Figure 2.15) corresponds to a background detection probability on the
order of only 10−7–10−6 with a typical detection window of 1 ns. Reducing the background
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Figure 2.16: Predicted background light for a satellite pointing to a ground station 20 km
from the city of Ottawa. Satellite receiver telescope of 30 cm, circular with no obstruction,
wavelength of 785 nm, 600 km orbit and rural (5 km vis.) sea-level atmosphere. Filter
bandwidth of 1 nm, half-moon at 45◦ elevation and FOV of 50 µrad. Detector dark counts
are not included.
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counts by choosing a wavelength in one of the Fraunhofer bands is thus unlikely to yield
significant improvements.
In an uplink, the main background contribution comes from artificial lights. These
lights have their own spectrum that can included regions of low emission. For example,
high pressure sodium lamps, which are often used as streetlight, have a significant spectral
emission drop around 595 nm [112]. Artificial light sources vary greatly between loca-
tions, choosing a wavelength that reduces artificial light pollution therefore requires good
knowledge of the artificial light sources at potential locations. In our analysis, we chose
not to make assumptions on the artificial light spectrum to ensure our predicted perfor-
mance would not be limited to specific locations. We also chose to ignore the Fraunhofer
bands because the background from the solar spectrum is much smaller than the artificial
spectrum.
2.4 Estimating the key generation and the performance of funda-
mental experiments
To comprehensively evaluate the performance of a quantum link between the ground and
a satellite we developed a realistic, numerical, quantum optics simulation. This allows
us to accurately predict effects such as multi-photon emissions, optical losses and non-
ideal detection [113]. Figure 2.17 illustrates the system we simulate, consisting of source,
quantum channel, and detection.
In these simulations, polarization states are represented by modes, one for |H〉 and
one for |V〉 with |D〉 and |A〉 represented as linear combination of |H〉 and |V〉 as shown in
equations 1.1 and 1.2. This leads to two modes with a WCP source and four modes with an
entangled source (two for Alice and two for BOB). Each mode contains its photon number
distribution expressed in a Fock space of finite dimension. Fock space is a orthonormal
Hilbert space in the photon number basis [114]. These basis states, called Fock states (|n〉),
are fixed photon number states, i.e. |0〉 is the vacuum state (no photons), |1〉 is the one
photon states, |2〉 is the two photon states, etc. [115].
The dimension of the Fock space used in the calculations determines the maximum
number of photons we can simulate in each modes. To limit the computation time we
chose a dimension of 7 when using a WCP source, allowing us to perform the simulation
with 0–6 photons in each mode considered, and 4 when using an entangled photon source,
allowing 0–3 photons in each mode considered. The difference in the number of dimensions
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Figure 2.17: Devices considered in the quantum optics simulation. Each source is modelled
separately using the appropriate quantum unitary operator. Optical losses are added in
the quantum channel, accounting for atmospheric losses, and finally the polarization state
of the photons is analysed and the photon detection probability evaluated. For the WCP
source, Alice chooses the polarization to send for each pulse, whereas for the entangled
photon source, Alice measures one photon of the pair to determine its polarization state.
Bob’s polarization analysis consists of four detectors in a passive polarization analysis
apparatus arranged for QKD states.
considered is because the WCP source only needs to consider 4 modes (two outcomes in
two bases) while the entangled photon source requires 8 modes (two outcomes in two bases
for each of the two users). Using a dimension greater than 2 allows us to incorporate the
effects of multi-pair emission from Poissonian statistics in weak coherent pulses and from
down-conversion in entangle sources.
Imperfect source and polarization analysis components are simulated by adding a rota-
tion to the polarization modes. Realistic non-number resolving detector models are used
to estimate the probability of a detection based on the photon state, loss and background
counts. Finally, total key length is calculation based on the total number of detection events
and the correlation between Alice and Bob (to estimate the probability of an eavesdropper).
This is done for both prepare-and-measure (using WCP source) and entanglement-based
schemes.
In addition, we simulate the performance of two fundamental quantum experiments
that could be performed using a quantum link between the ground and a satellite: Bell
test [24] and quantum teleportation [116]. Both experiments utilize an entangled photon
source, with quantum teleportation also utilizing a WCP source. Our model allows us to
determine, for various telescope sizes, the maximum ground-satellite distance over which
these experiments are possible. The dimension of the Fock space used for teleportation
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is 5, allowing us to simulate up to 4 photons in each mode. The Bell test is based on an
entangled photon source and uses the same simulation to calculate visibility (Fock space
of dimension 4).
The programs described in this section were written by Evan Meyer-Scott with some
simulations modified from programs written by Thomas Jennewein. [113]. Some addi-
tional modifications to the programs were done in collaboration with Evan. Some of these
simulations use the quantum optics and computation toolbox by Sze Tan [117].
The full MATLAB code used to estimate the key generation, and the performance of
Bell test and teleportation experiment, is shown in Appendix C.
2.4.1 QKD with a WCP source
A WCP source emits laser pulses with a Poissonian distribution of photon number. The
photon number in each pulse can be representy by using the coherent state (|α〉) [114]. The
coherent state produces a state with a Poissonian distribution of photon number where the
mean photon number values is α2:
|α〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉 . (2.19)
This state can be simulated by applying the displacement operator to the vacuum state:
|α〉 = D(α) |0〉 , (2.20)
with the displacement operator defines as
D(α) = exp(αa† − α∗a). (2.21)
Here, a and a† are the annihilation and creation operators [114] and |α|2 = µ is the aver-
age photon number per pulse. The annihilation and creation operator are non-Hermitian
operators that add or remove a photon [118]. Their effect on the photon number states is
thus:
a |n〉 = √n |n− 1〉 , with a |0〉 = 0, (2.22)
a† |n〉 = √n+ 1 |n+ 1〉 . (2.23)
Both polarization based QKD and the single-photon counting detectors are insensitive to
the phase factor e−|α|
2/2. This is because the phase information is only accessible using
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interference with a reference. Since polarization measurements do not employ interfer-
ence, it is insensitive to global phases. We note that some implementation can cause a
polarization dependent phase which could be used by an eavesdropper. It is therefore
important for security to either ensure the phase is constant for all polarization states (so
the phase cannot be used to extract any information), or to randomize the phase for each
pulses [9]. The coherent states therefore also describes the incoherent Poissonian photon
number distribution assumed in security proofs [119].
The security of QKD relies on its ability to detect the presence of an eavesdropper
by comparing the correlations between the state prepared by one party, Alice, and the
state measured by the other, Bob. These correlations are characterized by the polarization
visibility:
VPolarization =
NE −NU
NE +NU
. (2.24)
Here, NE is the number of detections with polarization parallel to the state that Alice sent
(the expected counts), and NU is the number of detections with perpendicular polarization
(the unexpected counts). The polarization visibility relates to the more commonly used
quantum bit error ratio (QBER) with the following relation:
QBER =
NU
NE +NU
=
1− VPolarization
2
. (2.25)
To account for imperfections in the source and in Bob’s polarization analyzers we
simulate the effect of a small polarization misalignment by applying a unitary rotation to
Bob’s photon, leading to some “unexpected” counts and hence to degraded visibility. We
chose this unitary rotation to limit the polarization visibility to 98% in the ideal case, i.e.
without loss or background. This is a pessimistic case, as better alignments have already
been achieved experimentally [120].
To obtain the correlation we use realistic photon counting detectors [113]. Our simu-
lated detectors do not resolve photon number, in line with current commercial detectors.
The detector models use the total link loss, described Section 2.2, as their detector effi-
ciency. The total received background counts, described in Section 2.3, is divided by the
number of detectors used and serves as the detector dark count. From this the polarization
visibility is obtained as well as the total number of counts received (including expected and
unexpected detection events). This allows us to obtain the correlations between Alice’s
prepared states and the results of Bob’s measurement.
Some examples of the calculated polarization visibility and count rate for a WCP source
QKD system are shown in Figure 2.18. The drop in visibility from the ideal VPolarization =
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100% is due to the signal to noise ratio in the detectors, to multi-photon emissions, due
to the Poissonian distribution of photon number produced, and to the slight polarization
misalignment. The reduction in visibility from the multi-photon emissions is caused by
the increased probability of multiple detector clicks, in which case the result is randomly
assigned, causing an average of 0% visibility for multiple detection events.
Because laser pulses have Poissonian photon number statistics, some pulses will possess
more than one photon. This makes WCP source QKD vulnerable to the photon number
splitting attack [122, 123], where an adversary (Eve) splits off one photon from the pulse
and stores it (in a quantum memory) to measure only after Bob reveals his measurement
basis. Eve can then measure the stored photon in the same basis, thereby gaining full
information about multi-photon pulses in an undetectable manner. This vulnerability
reduces the performance of WCP source QKD by requiring the average photon number to
be low, thereby reducing to multi-photon probability below a certain threshold, while also
reducing the single-photon probability, thereby reducing the key generation rate. The key
rate can be given as [124]
R ≥ q{Qµ [1− ηECH2(Eµ)]− (R1I1(D1) +Rmulti}, (2.26)
where q = 1/2 is the basis reconciliation factor, Qµ is the signal gain (i.e. the ratio of Bob’s
detections to pulses sent by Alice for average photon number µ), Eµ is the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) for signal pulses. ηEC is the error correction efficiency for practical error
correction codes (we assume 1.22, achievable with cascade and low density parity check
codes [125]), H2(x) is the binary entropy function, R1 (Rmulti) is the rate of single-photon
(multi-photon) detection events that are detected by bob and I1(D1) is the information
an eavesdropper can gain on single-photon events while introducing a disturbance D1
(which increases the QBER Eµ). Intuitively, the first term (qQµ) represents the rate of
received photons, the second (qQµηECH2(Eµ)) represents the information lost during error
correction and the final term R1I1(D1) + Rmulti represents the amount of information
gathered by an Eavesdropper which must be removed during privacy amplification. An
eavesdropper will gain partial information from single-photon events (while disturbing the
state, introducing errors) and full information on multi-photon events. In this model, the
optimal average photon number for a WCP source is approximately the transmission of
the channel [124], requiring lower average photon number when the channel transmission
decreases. This typically limits WCP source QKD to channel losses of 10–20dB [124].
One way to combat this attack is for Alice to change the average photon number µ
of randomly interspersed pulses (decoys) which are not utilized in generating the secure
key. This method, called the decoy pulse method, enforces a much stricter bounds on how
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Figure 2.18: Weak coherent pulse photon polarization visibility and count rate as a function
of channel loss in Bob’s arm, for various background count rates (BG/s) per detectors. The
source operates at a repetition rate of 300 MHz, with an average photon number per pulse
of 0.5. The count rate here includes only detections that arrive within 1 ns of an expected
laser pulse from Alice. Multi-photon emissions and the slight polarization misalignment
lead to imperfect entanglement visibility at low loss. At high loss, the visibility goes to
zero, and the count rate approaches the product of background count rate per detector, the
number of detectors (four), and the ratio of the detection window (1.0 ns) to the repetition
period (3.3 ns). The detection window is limited by the sources pulse width (typically 1–
100s of ps), the timing jitter of the detectors (typically 100s of ps) the timing jitter of the
electronics (typically 100s of ps or better) and the uncertainty in the variation of time of
flight due to GPS uncertainty (typically 100s of ps) and atmospheric transmission through
the atmosphere (typically on the order of a few ps [121]).
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much information can be gained from multi-photon signals; since Eve cannot know a priori
whether a given pulse is a signal or decoy. This strengthens the security of WCP source
QKD and reduces the amount of privacy amplification that must be performed. The lower
bound on asymptotic (i.e. in the limit of an infinite key generation time) key rate per laser
pulse using the decoy pulse method is [126]
R ≥ q{−QµηECH2(Eµ) +Q1 [1−H2(E1)]}, (2.27)
where Q1 and E1 are the estimated gain and error rate for single-photon pulses. The
key rate is then the gain of signal pulses (qQ1), minus the information leaked from error
correction on all signal pulses (qQµηECH2(Eµ)), minus the privacy amplification on signal
pulses (qQ1H2(E1)). This key rate is multiplied by the system clock rate or laser pulse
rate to obtain secure key bits per second. The use of decoy state allows the average photon
number to be independent of the transmission loss (typically with an optimal value around
0.5), allowing WCP source QKD at losses of up to 40–60dB [126].
In our calculations we considered the one-decoy protocol from [126]. In this protocol,
Alice randomly chooses to send either a signal pulse with average photon number µ or
a decoy pulse with average photon number ν < µ. In this protocol, Q1 and E1 can be
estimated from measurable quantities as
Q1 =
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2
(
Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
)
, (2.28)
E1 =
EνQν
Q1
. (2.29)
Here, Qµ and Qν are the gains of signal and decoy pulses, respectively. In this protocol, a
factor Nµ/(Nµ +Nν), where Nµ and Nν are the number of Bob’s received signal and decoy
counts, must multiply the key rate in Equation (2.27) since only signal pulses contribute
to the final key.
Equation (2.27) quantifies the asymptotic key rate over an infinitely long key generation
time, but in actual implementations the key generation time will be finite. To account for
this finite time, and allow the generation of a key on a single pass, finite-size statistics of the
observed parameters must be incorporated. A rigorous finite-size analysis for WCP QKD
is still incomplete, but an ad hoc version can be developed as follows. Firstly, We assume
no bits are required for error rate estimation as the error correction algorithm identifies
the number of errors precisely [127]. Secondly, the parameters used to calculate Q1 and
E1 must be modified to account for the chance of statistical fluctuation in their values.
Specifically, 10 standard deviations [128] are incorporated into Qµ, Qν , Eµ and Eν such
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that the worst case scenario is considered, and the probability that the actual values fall
outside this range is less than 10−25. Finally, the following security parameter, described
in [129] must be added to the secure rate equation (Equation 2.27):
∆ = 2 log2 1/[2(− − EC)] + 7
√
Nµ log2[2/(− ′)], (2.30)
where  is the total allowable probability that the final key is insecure, chosen to be
 = 10−9, EC = 10−10 is the error correction failure probability, and  and ′ can be
optimized numerically with the constraint  − EC >  > ′ ≥ 0. The first term of this
security parameter is due to the fact that, in the non asymptotic case, the error correction
and the privacy amplification may fail. The second term comes from the smooth min-
entropy, a conditional entropy that characterizes an Eavesdropper’s uncertainty.
The final key rate for a WCP source with finite-size effects is then lower-bounded by
R ≥ q Nµ
Nµ +Nν
{−QµηECH2(Eµ) +Q1 [1−H2(E1)]−Qµ∆/Nµ}. (2.31)
Given the known µ, ν, Nµ, Nν , , EC, bounded Qµ, Qν , Eµ, Eν and estimated Q1, E1 from
our quantum optics simulations, a secure key length can be calculated for each satellite
passage. In our simulations we used µ = 0.5 and ν = 0.1.
2.4.2 QKD with an entangled photon source
Entangle photon sources used for QKD are typically created using spontaneous parametric
down-conversion (SPDC). The state produced by this process is known as a two-mode
squeezed state (|ε〉) [118].
|ε〉 = 1
cosh r
∞∑
n=0
(−1)neinθ tanhn r |n〉1 |n〉2 , (2.32)
where ε = reiθ contains the pump power and probability of down-conversion. The |n〉1
and |n〉2 are the photon number states in mode 1 and 2 respectively. In the two-mode
squeezed state photons in modes 1 and 2 always exist in pairs. This state can be simulated
by applying the two-mode squeezing operator to the vacuum state:
|ε〉 = S(ε) |0〉1 |0〉2 , (2.33)
with the squeezing operator defined as
S(ε) = exp
(
ε(a†1a
†
2 − a1a2)
)
, (2.34)
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where a†m and am are the creation and annihilation operators respectively for mode m. To
create an entangled state we use two squeezed states (with the same ε) to represent the
two polarizations of each modes. The first two modes arise from the first squeeze state and
the last two from the second squeezed state. This creates the state:
1
cosh2 r
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
(−1)n+mei(n+m)θ tanhn+m r |n〉1 |n〉2 |m〉3 |m〉4 . (2.35)
In modern SPDC sources of entangled photon pairs, the entangled state is created directly,
but here we achieve this entanglement by permuting the photons from mode 2 and 4
creating the state
1
cosh2 r
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
(−1)n+mei(n+m)θ tanhn+m r |n〉1 |m〉2 |m〉3 |n〉4 . (2.36)
The four modes correspond to H in channel one, V in channel 1, H in channel 2 and V in
channel 2. This permutation trick achieves the polarization entanglement in a way that is
computationally much simpler. The variable ε is chosen so that there is a low probability
of n and m being both greater than zero (and therefore a very low probability of either
being greater than one). In the special case where n or m is 1 and the other is 0, this state
approximates the |ψ+〉 maximally-entangled Bell state∣∣ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉1 |V〉2 + |V〉1 |H〉2). (2.37)
As is the case for a real SPDC source, Equation (2.36) shows the possibility of multiple
uncorrelated photon pairs being created simultaneously, leading to errors. This model can
be applied to both a pulsed or continuous wave pumping scheme, with the former having
detection probabilities defined per pulse, and the latter per coincident detection window
of the detectors. The pumping scheme was modeled in our simulations because it is easier
to simulate, requiring only to analyze the coincidences during pump pulses.
When using entanglement-based schemes, the correlations between Alice and Bob are
characterize using the entanglement visibility,
VEntangled =
CE − CU
CE + CU
. (2.38)
Here, CE is the coincident photon counts detected possessing the expected polarization,
and CU is the coincident counts detected with unexpected. For the maximally entangled
|ψ+〉 state used, the expected polarizations are perfect correlation in the H–V basis and
perfect anti-correlation in the A–D basis, leading to visibility of VEntangled = 100%. Again,
the entanglement visibility can be related to the QBER:
QBER =
CU
CE + CU
=
1− VEntangled
2
. (2.39)
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Similarly to the case of a WCP, we simulate realistic degradation in entanglement
visibility due to imperfect sources and polarization analyzers by applying a unitary rotation
to Bob’s photon (but not Alice’s), leading to some “unexpected” coincident counts and
hence to degraded visibility. We again chose an entanglement visibility of 98%, with better
alignment previously achieved experimentally [130].
The correlations are again obtained using realistic detector models with Bob’s detectors
using the calculated loss and background counts as detector efficiency and dark counts. On
Alice’s side, the photons do not travel the free-space link and are assume to be measured lo-
cally. The detection apparatus is assumed to be the same as Bob’s, shown in Figure 2.17,
consisting of four detectors with passive polarization analysis. The total efficiency on
Alice’s side is then the efficiency of the detectors and optical components described in
Section 2.2.5. This total efficiency (ηdηo) is then used as the modeled detector’s efficiency.
For simplicity, the detector efficiency is taken at the same wavelength as the photon trans-
mitted to Bob. In addition, Alice will also not receive the background counts from natural
and artificial light sources. The dark counts in the detector models for Alice is the simply
the dark counts Ddark of her detectors. Because Ddark as defined in Section 2.3 is the
summed dark counts from all detectors, it must once again be divided by the total number
of detectors.
Some examples of the calculated polarization visibility and count rate for an entangled
source QKD system are shown in Figure 2.19. Similarly to the case of a WCP source, the
ideal entanglement visibility, VEntangled = 100%, is reduced by the signal to noise ratio in
the detectors and by the slight polarization misalignment. However, this visibility is also
reduced by multi-pair emission, i.e. the simultaneous emission of multiple uncorrelated
pairs. The probability of multi-pair emission can be reduced by reducing the probability of
emission, thereby also reducing the single pair production and thus the count rate. There
thus exists a trade-off between maximizing the pair production rate and reducing the
entanglement degradation due to double-pair emissions to a minimum. In our simulations
we use ε = 0.22 (the strength of the SPDC operator in Equation 2.34, corresponding to
an average number of pairs per pulse of 0.1 [131]). This value has been experimentally
demonstrated in the pass [132] and gives a probability of double pair emission of 0.01.
The entangled source is slightly more resilient against background noise than the WCP
source, i.e. the entangled source produces better visibility at high loss. This can be seen
by comparing Figure 2.19 with Figure 2.18, which show a shift in the visibility curves of
≈3 dB, with the entangled source dropping at later losses than the WCP source. This
is because a noise count must arrive in coincidence with a detection on Alice’s side to
be considered in an entangled scheme, whereas for a WCP source every noise count that
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Figure 2.19: Entangled photon visibility and coincidence count rate as a function of loss
in Bob’s channel, for various background count rates (BG/s) per detectors. The entangled
source operates at a pair production rate of 100 MHz; double-pair emissions and the slight
polarization misalignment lead to imperfect entanglement visibility at low loss. At high
loss, the visibility goes to zero, and the count rate approaches the product of background
count rate per detector, the number of detectors (four), the ratio of the detection window
(1.0 ns) to repetition period (10 ns), and Alice’s detection efficiency (0.25), i.e. only back-
ground counts that arrive in coincidence with a photon detected by Alice are included in
the rate.
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arrives in coincidence with a laser pulse time-slice is accepted.
The secure key rate, based on the count rate and entanglement visibility, can be calcu-
lated following [129]. The final key rate per detected coincident pair is
R = q [1−H2(E + ξ)− f(E)H2(E)−∆/N ] , (2.40)
where q = 1/2 is the basis reconciliation (sifting) factor, E is the QBER, ξ is a security
parameter from [129], H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy
function, f(E) = 1.22 is the error correction efficiency, and N is the length of raw key.
Similarly to Equation 2.30, The security parameter ∆ given in by
∆ = 2 log2 1/[2(− − EC)] + 7
√
N log2[2/(− ′)], (2.41)
where we again chose  = 10−9 and EC = 10−10 with  and ′ optimized numerically with
the constraint  − EC >  > ′ ≥ 0. The key rate in (2.40) can then be used, when
combined with the output of the link analysis, to calculate the secure key length for each
satellite passes.
2.4.3 Bell tests
Entangled states have the peculiar property of being linked. When one particle is mea-
sured, all particles of the entangled state are projected onto a new state based on the
measurement outcome of the first particle. This phenomenon occurs instantaneously even
when the particles are space-like separated. This paradoxical action at a distance of en-
tangled states [18] led to the introduction of hidden variable theories. In these theories,
the measurement outcome of any particle is predetermined by certain variables which we
do not have access to.
There are two classes of hidden variable theories: local and non-local. In local hid-
den variable theories, the measurement outcome of one particle cannot affect space-like
separated particles faster than the speed of light. In 1964, John Bell mathematically for-
mulated the idea of local hidden variable theory and showed that they lead to inequalities
that contradict the results of entangled states measurement predicted by quantum mechan-
ics [25]. These inequalities have later been shown to be experimentally violated [21–24],
thus proving no local variable theories can be used to explain quantum mechanics.
Non-local hidden variable theories, while removing the indeterminism of quantum me-
chanics, allow the paradoxical faster than light correlations between particles. These theo-
ries can lead to predictions that are always identical to the predictions of quantum mechan-
ics. It was recently shown that, under the assumption that measurements can be chosen
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freely, any hidden variable theories cannot give more information about the outcomes of
future measurements than quantum theory itself [133].
The Bell inequalities have to date been violated experimentally up to a separation of
144 km [134]. The separation of these Bell inequality tests suffers from the same limitations
as QKD. A quantum satellite platform therefore has the potential to greatly extend this
distance, thereby testing the validity of quantum mechanics in a new regime [135].
A Bell test is performed in a similar fashion as entanglement base QKD, with one
photon of the entangled pair measured locally at the source, while the other is sent to
the receiver. The main difference lies in the measurement settings, which can be obtained
from the QKD polarization analyzer (see Figure 2.17) by adding wave plates to change the
measurement basis. The correlations are then compared and used to violate a Bell type
inequality. Experimental implementations typically use the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
(CHSH) inequality [136] as the Bell type inequality:
SCHSH = |E(φA, φB)− E(φA, φ′B)|+ |E(φ′A, φB) + E(φ′A, φ′B)| ≤ 2, (2.42)
where
E(φA, φB) = (N++ −N+− −N−+ +N−−)/Nmeas (2.43)
is the joint correlation at Alice and Bob’s measurement angles φA and φB, respectively.
The Nij are the number of coincident counts between Alice’s i and Bob’s j detectors, where
i, j ∈ {+,−} and the + detectors are set to the measurement settings (φA, φB) and the −
detectors are set orthogonally to those measurement settings. Nmeas is the total number of
measured counts for the measurement settings φA and φB.
Entangled states may violate this inequality, in particular for the set of polarization
angles (φA, φ
′
A, φB, φ
′
B) = (0
◦, 45◦, 22.5◦, 67.5◦), which result in a maximal violation of
SCHSH = 2
√
2 for any of the four maximally entangled Bell states (Equation 1.3 and 1.4).
This violation is significantly greater than the classical limit of 2.
Because the CHSH inequality is a measure of the correlations of an entangled pair, the
violation of the inequality can be estimated with the entanglement visibility as defined
in Equation 2.38. A reduction in the entanglement visibility will produce an equivalent
reduction in the maximal violation of the inequality [137]:
SExperiment = SCHSH × VEntangled = 2
√
2VEntangled. (2.44)
The minimum entanglement visibility that is required to achieve violation of the Bell-
inequality, in the asymptotic assumption that an infinite number of photons can be col-
lected, is then
min(VEntangled) =
2
2
√
2
= 70.7%. (2.45)
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To include statistical fluctuations we consider a Bell test successful only if it violates
the classical bound by at least three standard deviations, i.e. the experimental value must
be larger than the classical value by at least three times the uncertainty:
SExperiment − 3∆SExperiment ≥ 2, (2.46)
where ∆SExperiment is the uncertainty in the Bell parameter SExperiment. The validity of
this choice of 3 standard deviation (or even the validity of quantifying a bell violation using
the number of standard deviations) is debatable [138]. We chose this method of standard
deviations because it has been widely used in the past and provides a good bound to
analyze while demonstrating our model. Our model is not limited to this method and a
different method to quantify the deviation can be incorporate in our model if desired.
As photon pairs are created randomly, they follow Poisson statistics and the uncertainty
of an average counts N¯ is ∆N¯ =
√
N¯ . Applying this uncertainty in Equation 2.43 and
using error propagation for independent variables [139] yields
∆E(φA, φB) =
2
√
(N++ +N−−)(N+− +N+−)
Nmeas
√
Nmeas
. (2.47)
The effect of a decrease in visibility can be seen as the states transitioning to a com-
pletely mixed state due to a depolarizing channel [140]:
|ψ′〉 〈ψ′| = (1− p) |ψ〉 〈ψ|+ pI
4
, (2.48)
where |ψ〉 〈ψ| and |ψ′〉 〈ψ′| are the density matrix [17] of the state before and after depolar-
ization, I is the sum over all two photon states (corresponding to 4 times the mixed state)
and p is the probability of depolarization. Comparing this to the definition of visibility
(Equation 2.38), the first part (1 − p) |ψ〉 〈ψ| will lead to perfect correlations while the
second part p I
4
will lead to equal distribution of coincidence counts:
VEntangled =
CE − CU
CE + CU
=
(1− p+ p1
2
)− (p1
2
)
(1− p+ p1
2
) + (p1
2
)
, (2.49)
VEntangled = 1− p. (2.50)
Using Equation 2.48, the number of measured coincidence when using the initial state
|ψ+〉 will be:
N++ = N−− = Nmeas
(
1− p
2
sin2(φA + φB) +
p
4
)
, (2.51)
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N+− = N−+ = Nmeas
(
1− p
2
cos2(φA + φB) +
p
4
)
, (2.52)
where φA and φB are the measurement settings of the detectors. The uncertainty in the
joint correlation is then
∆E(φA, φB) =
2
√(
(1− p) sin2(φA + φB) + p2
) (
(1− p) cos2(φA + φB) + p2
)
√
Nmeas
. (2.53)
For our measurement settings (φA, φ
′
A, φB, φ
′
B) = (0
◦, 45◦, 22.5◦, 67.5◦), this leads to:
∆E(φA, φB) =
√
1
2
+ p− p2
2
Nmeas
, (2.54)
or written in terms of the visibility:
∆E(φA, φB) =
√
1− V
2
Entangled
2
Nmeas
. (2.55)
Using error propagation we obtain the uncertainty in the bell parameter:
∆SExperiment = 2
√
1− V
2
Entangled
2
Nmeas
, (2.56)
where the number of measured counts in each measurement settings is assumed to be the
same, i.e. Nmeas = Ntotal/4, giving
∆SExperiment = 4
√
1− V
2
Entangled
2
Ntotal
. (2.57)
Using Equation 2.57 and 2.44 into Equation 2.46 we obtain the success criteria for
violating a Bell test of at least three standard deviations:
2
√
2VEntangled − 12
√
1− V
2
Entangled
2
Ntotal
≥ 2. (2.58)
Figure 2.20 shows the total number of counts necessary to violate a Bell test, which is
given by
Ntotal >
(
12
2
√
2VEntangled − 2
)2(
1− V
2
Entangled
2
)
. (2.59)
The entanglement visibility and count rates can be calculated in the same way for QKD
with an entangled photon source (Section 2.4.2). Equation 2.58 is then used to verify if
the Bell test can be succesfully violated based on the visibility and counts.
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Figure 2.20: Required number of measured photon pairs to violate the CHSH inequality
by three standard deviations with non perfect visibility. The number increases rapidly as
we approach the minimum visibility of VEntangled = 1/
√
2.
63
2.4.4 Quantum teleportation
Quantum teleportation allows one to instantly transfer a quantum state from one loca-
tion to another [44]. This process, impossible classically, takes advantage of the unique
properties of quantum entanglement and requires both parties to share an entangled state.
By interfering one part of the entangled pair with the single state to be teleported and
performing the right measurement, the single state can be teleported to the other part of
the entangled pair.
The protocol can be explained as follow: take any maximally entangled Bell state, such
as |ψ+〉, and a general single-photon state to be teleported,
|ψ〉 = α |H〉+ β |V〉 . (2.60)
The full three-photon state is then
|ψ〉1
∣∣ψ+〉
23
= (α |H〉1 + β |V〉1)(
1√
2
(|H〉2 |V〉3 + |V〉2 |H〉3)), (2.61)
Which can be rewritten as
|ψ〉1
∣∣ψ+〉
23
=
1
2
(
1√
2
(|H〉1 |V〉2 + |V〉1 |H〉2))(α |H〉3 + β |V〉3)
+
1
2
(
1√
2
(|H〉1 |V〉2 − |V〉1 |H〉2))(α |H〉3 − β |V〉3)
+
1
2
(
1√
2
(|H〉1 |H〉2 + |V〉1 |V〉2))(α |V〉3 + β |H〉3)
+
1
2
(
1√
2
(|H〉1 |H〉2 − |V〉1 |V〉2))(α |V〉3 − β |H〉3),
(2.62)
or equivalently
|ψ〉1
∣∣ψ+〉
23
=
1
2
∣∣ψ+〉
12
(α |H〉3 + β |V〉3) +
1
2
∣∣ψ−〉
12
(α |H〉3 − β |V〉3)
+
1
2
∣∣φ+〉
12
(α |V〉3 + β |H〉3) +
1
2
∣∣φ−〉
12
(α |V〉3 − β |H〉3).
(2.63)
If one then measures the first two photons in the Bell state basis, thereby measuring which
Bell state the first two photons are in, the third photon is then projected into one of four
states. Each of those states can then be transformed into the original state of the first
photon by using, at most, a phase flip (inversing phase between H and V) and a bit flip
(switching H and V polarizations). The state of the first photon is thus teleported onto
the third photon. The projected state of the third photon and the operation needed to
transform it to the original state of the first photon is shown in Table 2.4 for all four Bell
measurement outcomes.
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Table 2.4: Projected state of the third photon after a Bell measurement on the first two
photons and the operation needed to transform the this third photon into the original state
of the first photon, thus completing the teleportation.
Measured Bell state Projected state of the
third photon
Operation needed
|ψ+〉 α |H〉+ β |V〉 Nothing
|ψ−〉 α |H〉 − β |V〉 Phase flip
|φ+〉 α |V〉+ β |H〉 Bit flip
|φ−〉 α |V〉 − β |H〉 Phase flip and bit flip
It is noteworthy that the quantum state is only transfered, not copied, therefore quan-
tum teleportation does not violate the no-cloning theorem [11]. Any information about
the state of the first photon is destroyed in the process of the Bell measurement, leaving
the information in the third photon only. In addition, this cannot be used to transmit
information faster than light because the teleported state requires correction, based on the
measured Bell state, and the information on the specific correction cannot be sent faster
than light.
Quantum teleportation has been performed in full, with the entangled pair distributed
before the Bell measurement, up to 550 m [141]. A simplified version, with the Bell
measurement done at the entanglement source, before the third photon is fully transfered,
has also been performed up to 143 km [142, 143]. In both cases the correction is made
after the teleported state is transfered. The use of satellites could potentially extend this
distance by an order of magnitude (beyond 1000 km).
The choice of using the simplified version comes from the high quality mode overlap
required for the Bell measurement. Both of the two photons measured in the Bell analyzer
must be indistinguishable in spatial, temporal and spectral modes. This requires very pre-
cise alignment and filtering, which is made more difficult when one photon is transfered
over a long distance. In addition, the full version will have the transmission attenuation
on one of the photons in the Bell measurement reducing the success rate of the Bell mea-
surement. The performance will then be limited by the double pair emission of the other
photon in the Bell measurement (which can lead to false Bell measurement, where two pho-
tons from the same source are measured instead of one from each source as intended). In
the simplified version, the attenuation will reduce the detection efficiency of the teleported
photon while the success rate of the Bell measurement will remain the same, limiting the
rate of teleportation with a false Bell measurement.
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The first limitation is purely experimental, there are no fundamental effects that limit
the quality of the mode overlap. In the interest of finding the limit of quantum teleportation
to a satellite with current technologies, we focus on the performance with perfect mode
overlap. In addition, we consider the more interesting full teleportation protocol, where
the entangled pair is distributed before the Bell measurement.
In the case of a downlink, the entangled source is located on the satellite, with one
photon being transmitted to the ground where the Bell measurement is performed, tele-
porting the state from the ground to the satellite. In an uplink, the situation is reversed,
with the entangled photon source on the ground and the Bell measurement on the satellite,
teleporting the state from the satellite to the ground.
The hallmark of teleportation is that the visibility of the final state (which was tele-
ported) averaged over all signal states should be higher than that possible with an optimal
quantum cloner, i.e. the maximum visibility achievable by quantum cloning (VPolarization
> Vcloner = 2/3) [144]. Here, V is defined as in (2.24) with NE being the number of
detections with polarization parallel to the polarization of the original state (that was tele-
ported), and NU being the number of detections perpendicular. Similarly to the Bell test,
statistical fluctuations are included by requiring that the visibility violates the optimal
quantum cloner bound by at least three standard deviations:
VPolarization − 3∆VPolarization ≥ 2/3. (2.64)
Using the uncertainty of an average count ∆N¯ =
√
N¯ and error propagation for inde-
pendent variables [139] in Equation 2.24 we obtain:
∆VPolarization =
√
4NENU
(NE +NU)3
=
2
√
NE(Ntotal −NE)
Ntotal
√
Ntotal
. (2.65)
From Equation 2.24, NE = Ntotal(VPolarization + 1)/2, leading to
∆VPolarization =
√
1− V 2Polarization
Ntotal
. (2.66)
The success criteria is then, from Equation 2.64 and 2.66,
VPolarization − 3
√
1− V 2Polarization
Ntotal
≥ 2/3. (2.67)
One flaw of Equation 2.67 is that when VPolarization approaches 1, the success criteria is
always met, even when Ntotal is very small. In experimental implementations, a very low
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count rate will cause an inaccurate estimate of the average value of both VPolarization and
Ntotal, making Equation 2.67 invalid as it is based on an accurate mean value of these two
variables. This imposes a restriction on the minimum number of counts for a successful
quantum teleportation experiment
In our simulations, the estimate of the mean value of VPolarization is based on the prob-
ability of detection, making it valid even in the regime of low detections. We note that
the results of the performance of teleportation when taking into account orbit, loss and
background, show a total number of counts of Ntotal > 100 for each satellite passes that
were deemed successful.
Figure 2.21 shows the total number of counts necessary for a successful teleportation,
which is given by
Ntotal > 81
1− V 2Polarization
(3VPolarization − 2)2 . (2.68)
The simulations for quantum teleportation require both an entangled photon source and
a single-photon source to produce the photon state to be teleported. The single-photon
source can be a WCP source, an heralded photon from a spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) source (an SPDC source where one photon from the pair is measured
to confirm the presence of the other), or a sub-Poissonian source (such as the single-
photon emission from a quantum dot). All three sources were simulated, with both the
WCP source and heralded SPDC source yielding performances too low for most satellite
experiments. This low performance is due to the double emission rates (two photons
or two photon pairs emitted in the same time window). The sub-Poissonian source was
based on recently published results of a single-photon source based on a quantum dot in a
photonic nanowire [145]. The results reported a second-order quantum correlation function
of g(2)(0) < 0.008. The second-order quantum correlation function is proportional to the
probability that, when a photon is emitted, a second photon is also emitted [118]. This
function is defined by:
g(2)(0) =
〈ψ| a†a†aa |ψ〉
(〈ψ| a†a |ψ〉)2 . (2.69)
The single-photon state is represented by a mixture of Fock states:
|ψ〉 =
√
1− p1 − p2 |0〉+√p1 |1〉+√p2 |2〉 , (2.70)
where p1 is the probability of a single-photon emission, p1 is the probability of a two photon
emission, and all other multi-photon emissions have been ignored. Using this state in the
definition of g(2)(0) yields:
g(2)(0) =
2p2
(p1 + 2p2)2
. (2.71)
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Figure 2.21: Required number of measured photon for a successful teleportation accounting
for three standard deviations with non perfect visibility. The number increases rapidly as
we approach the minimum visibility of VPolarization = 2/3. This relation is only valid when
used with accurate estimates of VPolarization and Ntotal and therefore cannot be used in
experimental implementations if the total number of counts is too low to produce accurate
estimates.
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From this the probability of two photon emission is:
p2 =
1−
√
1− 4p1g(2)(0)√
8g(2)(0)
. (2.72)
In the simulations, one photon from the entangled photon source (Equation 2.36) is
sent through the optical link before being measured, along with the photon from the
single-photon source (Equation 2.69), in the Bell basis. The Bell analyzer consists of a
non-polarizing beam splitter, with each of the two photons going to one input, one polariz-
ing beam splitter at each output of the non-polarizing beam splitter (two in total) and one
detector at each output of the polarizing beam splitters (four in total). This arrangement
allows for the measurement of two of the Bell states (leaving the other two indistinguish-
able), thereby reducing the efficiency to half. This is the maximum achievable efficiency
of a Bell analyzer when using linear optics [146]. The result of the measurement dictates
the correction on the last photon before its measured. We note that higher teleportation
success probabilities can be achieved by increasing the number of modes of the prepared
entangled state [147], at the cost of increased complexity.
The prediction of the measurement outcome is again done using realistic detectors with
the link loss applied to the transmitted photon (using a lossy non-polarizing beam splitter)
before the Bell analyzer. The detection efficiency of the two non-transmitted photons
(photons 1 and 3) is taken to be the efficiency of the detector and optical components
(ηdηo). Finally the received background is distributed among all four detectors of the Bell
analyzer and the detector dark counts (Ddark) is included in the detection of the final
teleported state (photon 3).
The performance of the teleportation is strongly dependent on the strengths of the
SPDC (ε) and single-photon source (p1) states, as shown in Figure 2.22. The optimal value
of ε tends to increase with loss, while the optimal value of p1 decreases. This is because
the number of photons from the entangled photon source that reaches the Bell analyzer
decreases with higher loss. This increase in ε mitigates this reduction while the reduction
in p1 reduces the number of double pair emission which cause false Bell measurement. A
successful teleportation requires both high visibility (high number of true Bell measurement
compared to false Bell measurement) and high count rates (to minimize the uncertainty).
For our simulations, two representative sets of parameters were chosen: ε = 0.15 and
p1 = 0.007 for downlink simulations (where the usable part of a pass is typically around
35–40 dB of total loss with 180–200 background counts) and ε = 0.3 and p1 = 0.0045 for
uplink simulations (usable part possessing around 40–45 dB loss and 250–750 background
counts). The parameters lead to entangled pair production rates of ≈22.5 MHz in a
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downlink and ≈90 MHz in a uplink with single-photon emission rates of ≈7 MHz and
≈4.5 MHz respectively.
Some examples of the calculated teleportation polarization visibility and count rate
for the optimized parameters are shown in Figure 2.23 and 2.24. Similarly to the case of
QKD, the ideal polarization visibility, VPolarization = 100%, is reduced by the signal to noise
ratio in the detectors, the slight polarization misalignment and the multi-pair emissions.
A unique feature is that the polarization visibility drops significantly at low losses. This
drop is due to the multi-pair emissions of the entangled source. In the low loss regime, the
false Bell measurement caused by these multi-pair emissions becomes comparable to the
true Bell measurements, limited by the low rate of the single-photon source (optimized for
higher loss regimes).
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Figure 2.22: Optimized parameters ε and p1 for teleportation as a function of channel loss,
for various background counts per second per detector (BG/s). Here p1 is the probability
of a single-photon emission from the single-photon source, (2.69), whose polarization is
teleported. Similarly, ε is the strength of the entangled photon state from SPDC, (2.34),
with average number of pairs per pulse 2 sinh2 ε. As the loss increases, the optimal value
ε increases while the optimal value of p1 decrease. Above 43 dB (grey vertical line) the
teleportation is no longer able to produce the required visibility of V ≥ 2/3. Both sources
are pumped at a frequency of 1 GHz, leading to an entangled pair production rate of
≈ε2×109 Hz and a single-photon emission rate of ≈p1×109 Hz.
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Figure 2.23: Teleportation polarization visibility and count rate as functions of channel loss,
for various background count rates (BG/s) per detectors, using the parameters optimized
for a downlink (ε = 0.15 and p1 = 0.007). Both sources are pumped at a frequency of
1 GHz. In addition to the reduction from background and polarization misalignment,
visibility is reduced at low loss because of double-pair emissions in the entangled source.
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Figure 2.24: Teleportation polarization visibility and count rate as functions of channel loss,
for various background count rates (BG/s) per detectors, using the parameters optimized
for a an uplink (ε = 0.3 and p1 = 0.0045). Both sources are pumped at a frequency of
1 GHz. Once again visibility is reduced by background and polarization misalignment,
and double-pair emissions in the entangled source at low loss. The visibility suffers more
degradation at low loss compared to the visibility in the downlink optimized parameter
because the strength of the SPDC (ε) is higher. This causes more double-pair emissions
which lead to a higher rate of false Bell measurement, where the Bell measurement is due to
two photons from the entangled source rather than one photon from the entangled source
and one photon from the single-photon source.
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2.5 Results of the performance analysis
Each parts of the performance analysis (orbit, loss, background, quantum optical simu-
lations, and calculation of the key rate or performance of the fundamental experiment),
comes together to give a realistic estimate of the performance. With the orbit (Section 2.1),
loss (Section 2.2) and background (Section 2.3), we obtain the the total loss and projected
background counts for each nighttime satellite passes in one year. The loss and background
for some example passes are shown in Figure 2.25. Even with an increase of the satellite
telescope’s diameter by a factor of 3, the atmospheric turbulence causes the uplink to ex-
periences more loss (by ≈5 dB) than a downlink. The artificial light pollution also causes
the background count rate for an uplink to be almost an order of magnitude higher than
a downlink.
In both cases, the loss decreases as the satellite approaches zenith, mainly due to the
decrease in atmospheric transmission (and turbulence) but also because of the shorter
distance between the satellite and the ground (reducing diffraction and pointing error
losses). This also means lower loss for background photons, thus leading to an increase
in background counts. In an uplink however, the ground area imaged by the satellite also
reduces near zenith, reducing the background photons collected overall.
The loss and backgound for each passes is then used in the simulation of photonic
quantum communication (Section 2.4) to calculate the QBER and raw key rate for QKD,
and the visibility and count rate for fundamental experiments. Examples of the QBER
and raw key rate for different passes are shown for a WCP source in Figure 2.26 and for an
entangled photon photon source in Figure 2.27. A WCP source can have a higher repetition
rate than an entangled photon source, on the order of GHz [148, 149] compared to MHz
for the entangled photon source [150]. For our simulations, we use a source rate for the
WCP of 300 MHz and an entangled photon source pair production rate of 100 MHz.
The polarization visibility and count rates of teleportation are shown in Figure 2.28.
Because of the similarity between a Bell test and entanglement-based QKD, they will
produce the same visibility and count rates, with VEntangled = 1− 2 QBER (Equation 2.39)
and the count rate equal to the raw key rate.
With the QBER (visibility) and raw key rate (count rate) we can finally calculate the
final key length (success of fundamental experiment) for each nighttime passes in our one
year orbit analysis. Before proceeding to the final results we first look at determining the
optimal wavelength that will yield the best performances.
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Figure 2.25: Loss and detected background count rate during the best pass, upper quartile
pass, and median pass for a downlink (top) and an uplink (bottom). The uplink background
is mainly due to artificial light and is lower at high elevation angle, when the satellite has
a smaller field of view area on the ground. Orbit altitude is 600 km. For downlink,
wavelength is 670 nm and satellite transmitter telescope diameter is 10 cm. For uplink,
wavelength is 785 nm and satellite receiver telescope diameter is 30 cm. In both cases, the
receiver applies an optical filter with 1 nm bandwidth on the background. The possible
extra loss from this filter is assumed to be contained in the optical losses of the polarization
analyzer (see 2.2.5). Ground telescope is 50 cm with pointing error of 2 µrad and rural
sea-level atmosphere. The range and elevation of these passes are shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.26: QBER and raw key rate during the best pass, upper quartile pass, and median
pass for a downlink (top) and an uplink (bottom) utilizing a WCP source. The QBER
is significantly higher at low elevations, preventing the generation of secure key from the
raw key for most protocols when the QBER is above 11%. Altitude, wavelength, telescope
and atmospheric conditions follow Figure 2.25. Source rate: 300 MHz; detector dark count
rate: 20 cps; detection time window: 0.5 ns.
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Figure 2.27: QBER and raw key rate during the best pass, upper quartile pass, and median
pass for a downlink (top) and an uplink (bottom) utilizing an entangled photon source.
The entangled photon source has a higher intrinsic QBER than the WCP source, primarily
because of multi-pair emissions and a lower source rate. Altitude, wavelength, telescope
and atmospheric conditions follow Figure 2.25. Source rate: 100 MHz; detector dark count
rate: 20 cps; detection time window: 0.5 ns.
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Figure 2.28: Polarization visibility and count rate of teleportation during the best pass,
upper quartile pass, and median pass for a downlink (top) and an uplink (bottom). Al-
titude, wavelength, telescope and atmospheric conditions follow Figure 2.25. A successful
teleportation requires a visibility of at least 2/3 and the part of the pass below this mini-
mum visibility will be unable to contribute positively to the success of teleportation. Pump
rate: 1 GHz with the optimized parameters obtained from Figure 2.22; detector dark count
rate: 20 cps; detection time window: 0.5 ns.
78
2.5.1 Determination of the optimal wavelength
Several effects are influenced by wavelength: Longer wavelengths will increase diffraction
losses, whereas atmospheric transmittance and turbulence losses will be reduced. As the
magnitudes of these depend on transmitter and receiver telescope sizes, so too will the
wavelength that minimizes the total loss from both effects. For a satellite incorporating
a downlink, it is preferable to use a robust and space-qualified laser either as a WCP
source or as part of an entangled photon source. Ideally this would consist of a diode
laser module, capable of producing a certain wavelength or wavelengths within a very
small bandwidth range. However, diode lasers exist only for certain specific wavelengths,
limiting the choices available (wavelengths we considered are shown in Figure 2.7). Finally,
the detector efficiency will also be wavelength dependent.
To properly determine the optimal wavelength, we examine the secure key length that
can be obtained during an upper quartile pass. The results (Table 2.5) suggest that the
common 670 nm laser line is a highly suitable wavelength for a downlink, be it using a WCP
or an entangled photon source. The optimal wavelength for the uplink is higher, closer
to the laser line at 785 nm, owing to the reduction of atmospheric turbulence. Table 2.5
also shows that ≈800 nm, typical of spontaneous parametric down-conversion entangled
photon sources, would work well in both cases. The examples presented so far have used
the optimal wavelengths of 670 nm and 785 nm.
2.5.2 Performance of satellite quantum communication
The performance of QKD is obtained by accumulating key rate statistics for the full one-
year set of satellite passes, with various transmitter and receiver telescope sizes, to deter-
mine the expected number of secure key bits generated each month. Each pass generates
a secure key independently—gradual accumulation of cryptographic key bits from each
satellite pass ensures these bits are available for use when required.1
We further assume that only half of the nights have clear skies, automatically rendering
half the passes unusable due to cloud coverage. Actual cloud coverage will depend on the
ground station location ultimately chosen. The average global cloud coverage on land is
between 50–90%, with over 25% of clouds having a thin density [151]. Many areas, partic-
ularly in drier or more elevated regions, experience less than 20% cloud cover, some having
1One could obtain a larger monthly secure key by combining the raw keys of several passes, thereby
reducing finite-size effects, at the cost of a reduction in the frequency of key accumulation/usage.
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Table 2.5: Calculated length of distributed cryptographic key for various wavelengths with
a WCP (left) and an entangled photon (right) source. Of the laser-line wavelengths studied,
670 nm produces the longest key for a downlink, while 785 nm produces the longest key
for the uplink. Downlink is with a 10 cm transmitter and a 50 cm receiver; uplink is with
a 50 cm transmitter and a 30 cm receiver. Simulations are of the upper quartile satellite
pass (in terms of pass duration) with a 600 km orbit, pointing error of 2 µrad, and rural
atmosphere (5 km visibility) at sea-level. Source rate: 300 MHz for WCP and 100 MHz for
entangled photon source; detector dark count rate: 20 cps; detection time window: 0.5 ns.
Secure key length obtained for the upper
quartile satellite pass [kbit]
Wavelength
[nm]
Downlink,
WCP
source
Uplink,
WCP
source
Downlink,
entangled
photon source
Uplink,
entangled
photon source
405 236.8 8.0 10.8 0
532 914.7 88.5 128.1 12.1
670 1606.4 235.1 306.7 57.4
785 1582.2 301.0 269.9 68.5
830 1090.5 215.8 146.9 39.5
1060 604.6 187.0 32.6 12.4
1550 415.9 254.5 20.2 20.6
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near 0% cloud cover [152]. A location with 50% cloud coverage would likely represent a
worst case of any site that would be reasonably considered.
The results, illustrated in Figures 2.29 and 2.30, show that a downlink can generate more
secure key bits than an uplink for the same ground and satellite telescopes. Furthermore,
the WCP source outperforms the entangled photon source, due in part to the higher source
rate for WCP, and in part to the inefficiency of detecting the transmitter’s photon in the
entangled pair.
From these results, a downlink with a satellite transmitter telescope as small as 10 cm
and a receiver of 50 cm could be used to successfully exchange a key of 4.3 Mbit per month
with an entangled photon source, and 23 Mbit per month with a WCP source. In an uplink,
a 30 cm receiver telescope on the satellite and a ground transmitter of at least 25 cm could
produce 0.4 Mbit key per month with an entangled photon source and 2.2 Mbit per month
with a WCP source.
In addition, varying the size of the ground transmitter telescope in an uplink has little
effect on the number of key bits generated. This is because, for a transmitter telescope
of 25 cm or more, turbulence dominates the beam divergence, limiting any gains that
could otherwise be found by reducing diffraction via increasing the transmitter telescope
diameter. This behavior was shown in Figure 2.5.
In the long-distance performance of fundamental quantum experiments (Bell tests and
quantum teleportation), we analyse each satellite pass independently to determine which
pass can perform a successful Bell test or teleportation with 3σ certainty. Since data from
an entire pass is needed for success, we calculate the minimum ground-satellite distance
of each successful pass. Finding the greatest of these minima from all passes gives the
longest distance test achievable with our parameters. That is, at least one pass from our
simulated year of orbits will be capable of performing the experiment with a 3σ violation
while maintaining, for the entire experiment, a distance at least the “maximum distance”
reported. These maximum distances are shown in Figures 2.31 and 2.32.
These results show that a downlink with a satellite transmitting telescope of 10 cm and a
receiver of 50 cm reaches a distance of 1650 km in a Bell test and 1080 km for teleportation.
In an uplink, a 30 cm receiver telescope on the satellite and a ground transmitter of 25 cm
would be capable of performing a Bell test at 1225 km and teleportation at 745 km. Both
are significantly beyond that which can be achieved on the ground alone.
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Figure 2.29: Estimated key per month with a WCP source for various telescope sizes,
assuming half the passes are unobstructed by cloud cover. Top: downlink; bottom: uplink.
A downlink with a satellite transmitter telescope of 10 cm and a receiver of 50 cm could
be used to successfully exchange a key of 23 Mbit per month, while an uplink with a 30 cm
receiver telescope on the satellite and a ground transmitter of 25 cm could produce 2.2 Mbit
per month. In an uplink, the size of the ground transmitter has little importance because
atmospheric turbulence dominates diffraction. Conditions are as in previous figures, with a
downlink wavelength of 670 nm, uplink wavelength of 785 nm, and source rate of 300 MHz.
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Figure 2.30: Estimated key per month with an entangled photon source for various tele-
scope sizes, assuming half the passes are unobstructed by cloud cover. Top: downlink;
bottom: uplink. A downlink with a satellite transmitter telescope of 10 cm and a receiver
of 50 cm could be used to successfully exchange a key of 4.3 Mbit per month while an
uplink with a 30 cm receiver telescope on the satellite and a ground transmitter of 25 cm
could produce 0.4 Mbit per month. Again, the size of the ground transmitter in the uplink
has little importance because atmospheric turbulence dominates diffraction. Conditions
are as in previous figures, with a downlink wavelength of 670 nm, uplink wavelength of
785 nm, and source rate of 100 MHz.
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Figure 2.31: Maximum distance of a complete Bell test in a downlink (top) and an uplink
(bottom) for various telescope sizes. A downlink with a satellite transmitter telescope of
10 cm and a receiver of 50 cm could be used to successfully violate the CHSH inequality
at 1650 km, while an uplink with a 30 cm receiver telescope on the satellite and a ground
transmitter of 25 cm could violate it at 1225 km. Jagged contours are an artifact of the
finite sample of passes for the one year duration, leading to a discrete spectrum of possible
distances. Conditions are as in previous figures for an entangled photon source (100 MHz).
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Figure 2.32: Maximum distance of a complete teleportation experiment in a downlink
(top) and an uplink (bottom) for various telescope sizes. A downlink with a satellite
transmitter telescope of 10 cm and a receiver of 50 cm could be used to successfully perform
teleportation at 1050 km, while an uplink with a 30 cm receiver telescope on the satellite
and a ground transmitter of 25 cm could perform it at 675 km. For small telescope sizes,
teleportation cannot be performed with sufficient statistical certainty for any satellite pass
studied. Again, jagged contours are due to the finite sample of passes. Other conditions
are as in previous figures using the optimized teleportation parameters (Figure 2.22).
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2.5.3 Effect of detector degradation in space
For experiments involving detectors on the satellite, the exposure to radiation in the space
environment is expected to lead to an increase in the dark count rate over time [153, 154],
the degree to which can be mitigated by appropriate shielding. To account for these effects
we performed a preliminary analysis of the effect of increased detector dark counts on the
performance of satellite quantum communication.
For QKD with a WCP source, only the receiver contains detectors and this detector
degradation will only occur in an uplink. For both QKD with an entangled source and Bell
test, the detection of one photon from the pair must be performed at both the transmitter
and the receiver, leading to the same effect of detector degradation in both uplink and
downlink.
Finally, in teleportation, the transmitter performs the measurement of the final telepor-
tated state (using two detectors) while the receiver performs the Bell measurement on the
other two photons (using for detectors). Because of the loss suffered by the transmitted
photon used in the Bell test, the Bell measurement will be much more sensitive to noise.
Therefore, in all considered experiments, the uplink will suffer from detector degradation
at least as much (if not more) than the downlink. It was thus sufficient to limit our analysis
to the uplink, placing an upper bound on the effects for a downlink.
The results of this preliminary analysis are summarized in Table 2.6. These show
that a dark count rate on the order of 1000 cps would only cause a major effect on the
performance of QKD when using a WCP. All other experiment only suffer small degradation
in performance. This is because they rely on coincidence counts with the ground, which
is far more robust to noise. Unfortunately, a dark count rate on the order of 10000 cps
prevents all experiment from being performed successfully. These results provide important
guidelines for determining the requirement of radiation hardening.
2.5.4 Advantages of an uplink
It is evident from our analysis that a downlink outperforms an uplink in general, and
would thus be the preferred option for global QKD implementation. However, it should be
recalled that a downlink requires finer pointing of the satellite than an uplink. In addition,
a downlink would require the (complicated) quantum source to be on the satellite while
the uplink only requires the (simpler) detectors to be on the satellite. These factors make
an uplink technologically simpler.
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Table 2.6: Effect of higher dark counts in the detectors on the key generation and on the
maximum distances of fundamental experiments. QKD (with either a WCP source or an
entangled photon source), Bell tests and teleportation are resistant to detector dark count
rate increase of up to 1000 cps. Wavelength 785 nm, 50 cm transmitter and a 30 cm
receiver. Orbit 600 km, pointing error 2 µrad, and rural atmosphere (5 km visibility) at
sea-level. Source rate: 300 MHz for WCP and 100 MHz for entangled photon source;
detection time window: 0.5 ns.
Detector
dark
[cps]
WCP
source key
[Mbit/-
month]
Entangled
source key
[Mbit/-
month]
Max. Bell
test
distance
[km]
Max. tele-
portation
distance
[km]
20 2.431 0.417 1225 747
100 2.161 0.396 1162 747
1000 0.695 0.241 918 700
10000 0 0 0 0
An uplink also allows the source to be easily interchangeable, permitting a wider range
of experiments and tests. With these considerations in mind, a strong argument can be
made that an uplink is the better choice to scientifically study global-scale QKD imple-
mentations (and other experiments) prior to implementing a full-scale (possibly downlink)
global QKD system.
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Chapter 3
Demonstration of QKD at High losses
To show the experimental feasibility of satellite QKD we performed full QKD protocols
at the high losses expected for a satellite uplink. A similar experiment was performed in
2011 where the feasibility of QKD was demonstrated at up to 57 dB of loss [59]. While
this was a great step toward demonstrating high loss QKD, this demonstration did not
perform the necessary QKD protocols, such as error correction and privacy amplification
to extract any secure key from the system. In addition, the quantum receiver consisted
of only one measurement basis (H/V or D/A). The measurement basis could be manually
changed between data collection using a half-wave plate but remained fixed during each
runs, making the system insecure. Finally the analysis was done in asymptotic limit (see
Equation (2.27)) and did not take any finite-size statistics into account, making the 57 dB
result impractical in real life applications where the key generation time is finite. Because
of these shortcomings, the initial demonstration was insufficient in demonstrating high loss
QKD in a realistic regime. This investigation focuses on high average loss, a future investi-
gation could explore the effect of a varying channel loss by simulating turbulence [155], but
since QKD is only dependent of the total received signals, a varying loss will not negatively
impact the performance.
The experiment described in this chapter aims to improve over the initial 2011 demon-
stration by correcting these shortcomings. We implemented a two-basis measurement with
passive basis choice, full decoy state QKD protocols and finite-size effects. While these
improvements represent an important and necessary milestone in demonstrating secure
QKD at high loss, further improvements will still be necessary in the future. Notably, we
do not implement a fully random sequence of polarization and intensity states, instead
implementing a repeating sequence of 128 bits. A truly random sequence would be require
to ensure an eavesdropper cannot gain any information on the states. We also do not
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implement true vacuum pulses, instead measuring the background between pulses, which
could be manipulated by an eavesdropper. While the security flaws do not affect the lab
demonstration of QKD at high loss (where we know there where no eavesdropper present),
they will need to be addressed before deployment to ensure a truly secure system.
The experimental setup used for this demonstration includes a weak coherent pulse
(WCP) source, a free-space quantum channel with adjustable loss and a quantum receiver.
These components are described in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 details the software used to
perform the full QKD protocols and its performance under the limited computing power of
a satellite receiver. Lastly, in Section 3.3 we show the capabilities of our system to extract
secure key both at fixed high loss communications and when simulating the varying loss of
a satellite pass.
Author contributions
Nikolay Gigov developed the QKD software and analysed its performance. Evan Meyer-
Scott built the WCP source. Zhizhong Yan built the intensity and polarization modulator.
Brendon Higgins designed and built the automated polarization compensation system,
analyzed its predicted performance, as well as designed and built the quantum receiver.
Thomas Jenewein, Brendon Higgins and Norbet Lu¨tkenhaus provided advice on the secu-
rity analysis for QKD. I aligned the optical systems. Nikolay Gigov and I performed the
experiment. Nikolay Gigov, Brendon Higgins, and I analyzed the results.
3.1 Experimental setup
Our high-loss QKD system is composed of a WCP source, a quantum channel with ad-
justable loss and a quantum receiver. The source generates photon states at a wavelength
of 532 nm using up-conversion of a pulsed 810 nm laser and a continuous-wave 1550 nm
laser. The pulsed laser allows for short pulses with good timing while the intensity and
polarization states are set using fast modulators on the continuous-wave 1550 nm laser.
The loss of the system is adjusted using a movable lens and the signals are detected using
4 avalanche photodiodes in two bases with a passive basis choice. Each sent and received
pulse is time tagged and recorded using signals from a Global Positioning System (GPS) to
synchronize both clocks. These tags are then processed with our QKD software to extract
a key. A schematic overview of the setup is shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Schematic overview of the high-loss QKD system. A WCP source produces
photons at 532 nm and transmits them to a quantum receiver via a free-space quantum
channel that includes a movable lens to adjust the loss. Computational performance of the
tagging, processing and driving in Bob is limited to simulate the available resources of a
satellite-based QKD receiver payload.
91
Mode%locked)
(810)nm))
Con2nuous)wave)
(1550)nm))
)
)
Single)mode)ﬁber)
Fiber)polariza2on)
controller)
Fiber)to)free)space)
coupler) Dichroic)mirror)
)
)
Orthogonal)
PPKTP)crystals)
Up%converted)
light)(532)nm))
Birefringent)wedges)
Bandpass)ﬁlter)
Polarizer)
Intensity)and)
polariza2on)
Modulators)
Figure 3.2: Schematic of the WCP source. A pulsed laser at 810 nm is combined with
a continuous-wave 1550 nm laser using up-conversion to create photons at 532 nm. The
photons produced will have the short pulse and timing of the 810 nm laser while the
intensity and polarization will be that of the modulated continuous 1550 nm laser.
3.1.1 WCP Source for 532 nm photons
The WCP source used was originally built by Evan Meyer-Scott [156] and produces photon
pulses at 532 nm. While 532 nm is not the optimal wavelength for a quantum transmission
to a satellite (as shown in Table 2.5), it was chosen to take advantage of the peak efficiency
of silicon avalanche photodiodes (APD) available at the time. The detectors where chosen
because they are capable of high timing accuracy, low dark counts and high count rates
without the requirement of cryogenic cooling. Recent technological advances are allowing
the detectors to operate with high efficiency in the 600–800 nm rage while maintaining low
dark counts and low timing jitter [157, 158]. The proof of concept of operating in high loss
regime can therefore be applied to the 600–800 nm rage which is better suited for satellite
QKD. A schematic diagram of the source is shown in Figure 3.2 and a photo of it is shown
in Figure 3.3.
The 532 nm pulses are generated by combining a mode-locked titanium sapphire laser
at 810 nm, operating at a pulse repetition rate of 76 MHz, with a continuous-wave 1550 nm
laser by using up-conversion in two orthogonally oriented type-I periodically poled potas-
sium titanyl phosphate (PPKTP) crystal. The 810 nm laser is diagonally polarized (|D〉)
and birefringent wedges are used to precompensate for temporal walkoff in the PPKTP
92
Figure 3.3: Photo of the WCP source. Colored lines show the path of the lasers (red for
850 nm, yellow for 1550 nm and green for 532 nm).
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crystals. Efficient telecommunication waveguide modulators [159] are used to modulate
the polarization and intensity of the 1550 nm laser.
Because the PPKTP is a type-I crystal at our wavelength, up-conversion will only occur
for one polarization. One crystal will allow for up-conversion of horizontally polarized light
(|H〉1 |H〉2−> |H〉3) while the other, being turned orthogonally, will allow for up-conversion
of vertically polarized light (|V〉1 |V〉2−> |V〉3). By having both crystal following each
other we can allow for diagonal (|D〉) and antidiagonal (|A〉) polarizations to be created.
Having the 810 nm laser set to diagonal allows the polarization of up-converted 532 nm
pulses to be completely determined by the polarization of the 1550 nm laser:
|D〉1 |H〉2 =
1√
2
|H〉1 |H〉2 +
1√
2
|V〉1 |H〉2−>
1√
2
|H〉3 , (3.1)
|D〉1 |V〉2 =
1√
2
|H〉1 |V〉2 +
1√
2
|V〉1 |V〉2−>
1√
2
|V〉3 , (3.2)
|D〉1 |D〉2 =
1
2
|H〉1 |H〉2 +
1
2
|H〉1 |V〉2 +
1
2
|V〉1 |H〉2 +
1
2
|V〉1 |V〉2
−> 1
2
|H〉3 +
1
2
|V〉3 =
1√
2
|D〉3 ,
(3.3)
|D〉1 |A〉2 =
1
2
|H〉1 |H〉2 −
1
2
|H〉1 |V〉2 +
1
2
|V〉1 |H〉2 −
1
2
|V〉1 |V〉2
−> 1
2
|H〉3 −
1
2
|V〉3 =
1√
2
|A〉3 .
(3.4)
This up-conversion method allows us to obtain short pulse of the same duration (≈3 ps)
and pulse rate (76 MHz) as the 810 nm laser, while setting both the polarization state and
the intensity with waveguide modulators at 1550 nm, which are faster and more efficient
than modulators in the visible range. The intensity of each pulses, set using the modulators,
average 0.5 photons/pulse for the signal states and 0.1 photons/pulse for the decoy states.
These were chosen to optimize the secure key rate generation at high loss [126]. One last
advantage of using up-conversion is that the shorter coherence time of the continuous-wave
1550 nm laser (compared to the pulsed 800 nm mode-locked laser) insures that the phase
of the 532 nm pulses are randomized. This is necessary to ensure security and certain
pulse laser, such as the mode-locked 810 nm laser used, have non-random phase difference
between pulses which could potentially leak information to an potential eavesdropper. The
coherence-time was measured to be <6 ns [156], significantly below the ≈13 ns between
pulses.
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Figure 3.4: Schematic of the telecommunication waveguide intensity and polarization mod-
ulator based on a balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer configuration. Two interfero-
metric arms, each containing an electro-optical phase modulator, are used to control the
relative phase between horizontal and vertical polarizations. A polarization controller is
then used to rotate the polarizations into the rectilinear polarization basis used for the
QKD protocol. Figure reproduced with permission from [159].
3.1.2 Telecommunication waveguide intensity and polarization modulator
The intensity and polarization of the 1550 nm continuous-wave laser is controlled using
an intensity modulator followed by two phase modulators in a Mach-Zehnder interferom-
eter configuration. This modulator was initially built by Zhizhong Yan [159] and uses
customized off-the-shelf LiNbO3 electro-optical telecommunication waveguide phase and
intensity modulators from EOSpace [160]. Figure 3.4 shows a schematic diagram of the
modulators. For simplicity, our implementation uses a fixed sequence of randomly chosen
states which are repeated instead of a continuous random sequence. The sequence contains
128 states and is composed of 92% signal and 8% decoy states.
The input of the polarization state is set to diagonal with respect to the first beam split-
ter by using a fiber polarization controller. This ensures that equal beam intensities enter
each interferometric arms at the polarization beam splitter. Each interferometric arms
contain an electro-optical phase modulator used to control the relative phase between H
and V polarizations. The phase difference is set using four different voltage combinations
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so that when they recombine at the output polarization beam splitter we obtain either di-
agonal, antidiagonal, right-handed circular or left-handed circular polarizations. Diagonal
and antidiagonal polarizations are defined in Equation (1.1) and (1.2) while right-handed
(|R〉) and left-handed (|A〉) circular polarizations are defined as:
|R〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ i |V〉), (3.5)
|L〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − i |V〉). (3.6)
After the two paths have recombined, a second fiber polarization controller is used
to rotate the polarizations into the rectilinear polarization bases, leaving diagonal and
antidiagonal polarizations unchanged while changing right-handed circular and left handed
circular polarizations to horizontal and vertical polarizations, respectively. This system is
therefore able to produce any of the four polarizations states by adjusting the voltages of
the two phase modulators.
Finally, an intensity modulator is used to adjust the intensity for either a signal or a
decoy state (controlled by setting the voltage sent to the intensity modulator). The voltage
applied to each modulators are set using a field programmable gate array (FPGA) circuit
board and a driver interface circuit. The modulation show high stability and switching
contrast. The switching speed is currently limited to a few hundreds of MHz by the
FPGA and driver interface circuits, with the modulators themselves capable of reaching
a switching speed of a few GHz. The switching speed could be increased by upgrading
the FPGA and driver interface circuits which are both commercially available in the GHz
range [161, 162].
This implementation of the polarization modulation is advantageous because it intrin-
sically ensures that all distinct polarization states are identical in all other aspect (such as
frequency, bandwidth, and intensity), a difficulty in designs incorporating multiple laser
diodes [37] or multiple optical amplifiers [163]. Having all non-polarization aspects identical
is necessary to ensure security, as any distinguishable characteristic can leak information
to a potential eavesdropper. We note that while the intensity of the 1550 nm laser is inde-
pendent of polarization, the intensity of the up-converted 532 nm can become polarization
dependent if the efficiency of the PPKTP crystals is not matched. These efficiency can
be manually adjusted by changing the alignment or by changing the polarization of the
pulsed 810 nm laser (typically 810 nm).
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3.1.3 Quantum channel with variable loss
Once produced, the 532 nm photon pulses are coupled into a single-mode fiber. A fiber
splitter is used to sends ≈0.3 % of the photons to a thick-silicon avalanche photodiode
(Excelitas SPCM-AQ4C) in order to measure the average photon number per pulse. This
enables the average photon number of the signal pulse to be adjusted to the desired 0.5 pho-
tons/pulse by adjusting the power of the 1550 nm laser before the modulators, leaving the
modulators to automatically set the decoy state to the desired value (0.1 photons/pulse)
based on the ratio of the decoy state to the signal state. The fiber splitter sends the re-
maining photons to a free-space quantum channel consisting of a bare fiber output followed
by a 3-inch-diameter lens. The lens is placed on a longitudinal translation stage allowing
the loss to be adjusted by varying the position of the lens, making the beam more or
less divergent, thus altering the amount of light collected by the receiver. A photo of the
quantum channel is shown in Figure 3.5.
3.1.4 Free-space quantum receiver
Detections of the quantum signals are done using a free-space receiver implementing a two-
basis passive choice measurement. The receiver was designed to be robust, integrated, and
portable, while using commercial technologies, providing an initial design for a quantum
receiver on a satellite platform. The frame of the receiver is built using Thorlabs 30 mm
and 60 mm cage system [164] supported on an small optical breadboard. Figure 3.6 shows
a schematic diagram of the receiver and a photo is shown in Figure 3.7.
Photon signals are collected using a 2-inch diameter lens with a 250 mm focal length.
A second lens, of 6.5 mm diameter and 11 mm focus length, is used to collimate the beam.
A combination of three wave plates consisting of one half-wave plates (HWP) and two
quarter-wave plate (QWP), one before and one after the HWP, are used to compensate
any unitary polarization rotations that may have been introduced by the quantum channel.
The passive basis choice is done using a custom-built pentaprism beam splitter, which
allows us access to three ports—two of which to be used for quantum measurements (with
each port outputting of 47.5% of the signal). The third port (with the remaining 5% of
the signal) is currently unused but could potentially serve for beacon detection or as a
port for an alternative source in the reverse direction, making it advantageous in a satellite
implementation. The output diagram of the pentaprism are shown in Figure 3.6. The
effect of the pentaprism on the polarization was tested and no significant degradation to
the measured polarization was measured.
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Figure 3.5: Photo of the quantum channel. The 3-inch lens allows the divergence of the
beam to be adjusted, thereby modifying the loss of the channel.
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Figure 3.6: Schematic of the quantum receiver. Photon signals are captured by a 2-inch
lens and measured in one of two orthogonal bases. Three motorized rotating wave plates
are used to correct any unwanted polarization rotations in the quantum channel.
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Figure 3.7: Photo of the quantum receiver. Thorlabs cage system is used as the frame of
the receiver which is mounted on a small 6-inch by 12-inch breadboard.
In each of the two used ports, the polarization measurement is performed using a
5 mm polarizing beam splitter cube. The reflected port is used for measurements in the
H/V basis while the transmitted port is used for the D/A basis. The assembly in the
transmitted port is rotated 45◦. This was done in order to perform the measurement in
the D/A basis with the same polarizing beam splitter cube (which transmits horizontal and
reflects vertical polarizations). The 45◦ rotation of the polarizing beam splitter cube causes
diagonal polarization to be transmitted while the antidiagonal polarization is reflected. An
additional polarizing beam splitter cube, rotated 90◦ so as to transmit vertical polarization
(antidiagonal in the case of the rotated assembly in the transmitted port), is added in each
reflection ports of the measurement polarizing beam splitter cubes. This is done to suppress
noise as the reflected port of the polarizing beam splitter cubes have lower polarization
visibility than the transmitted port (≥99% visibility in the reflected port compared to
≥99.9% visibility in the transmitted port).
The detection is performed using four silicon avalanche photodiodes from Micro Photon
Devices [82]. These detectors feature good detection efficiency (≈50 %), low dark counts
(≈20 cps) and low jitter (≤50 ps). Photons are focused onto the 50 µm active area of the
detectors with 1-inch diameter, 60 mm focal length lenses (one before each detector). Each
detector is attached to an X-Y translation stage for fine positional adjustment. Finally, a
2 nm band-pass filter is placed in front of each detectors to suppress background noise.
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3.1.5 Automated polarization alignment
Our system uses optical fiber both to transmit the unconverted 532 nm signal from the
source to the quantum channel, and to transmit the modulated 1550 nm laser. A common
problem with optical fibers is that they do not preserve the polarization state. An optical
fiber will modify the polarization states by applying a unitary rotation to state. Further-
more, temperature drift and mechanical stress on the fiber will cause the unitary induced by
the fiber to change, causing polarization drift over time. The unitary can be compensated
either in free-space, using wave plates, or in directly in the fiber, by manually inducing
mechanical stress on the fiber to change the unitary to the identity. Both approaches can
be tedious if done manually, particularly when trying to align multiple polarization states
simultaneously. To overcome this difficulty, we designed and implemented a polarization
compensation software that performs quantum state tomography [165] and calculates the
optimal compensation to restore the polarization states, which is implemented using free-
space wave plates located at the receiver.
A set of three wave plates are included in the quantum receiver, two quarter-wave
plates (QWP) on either side of a half-wave plate (HWP), which can be used to correct any
unitary polarization misalignment between the source and the receiver. A custom software
(written by Brendon Higgins) is used to characterize the polarization misalignment and
calculates the position of the wave plates required to compensate it. The wave plates, which
are mounted in motorized rotation stages, are then automatically adjusted accordingly. A
largely similar strategy has been implemented in the context of QKD previously utilizing
an independent strong laser signal [166]. The scheme we explore here differs in that we
wish to use the quantum signals themselves.
The minimum complete set of measurements requires only four outcomes, in the three
basis, to be measured (such as horizontal, vertical, diagonal and right-handed circular po-
larizations). Four measurement in the rectilinear bases (i.e. horizontal, vertical, diagonal
and antidiagonal polarizations) do not form a complete set, because no circular polariza-
tion component is represented. At least two non-orthogonal input polarization states are
required for complete characterization. There are an infinite set of rotations that may
take a single input polarization state to the one that is ultimately measured, and thus the
characterization of the unitary using only one input state cannot be well defined. Both
of these input states can all be in the rectilinear bases (such as horizontal and diagonal
polarizations), provided they neither be equal nor orthogonal. For our characterization,
all four rectilinear bases states are used as input, allowing the source operation to remain
unchanged.
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The characterization of the unknown unitary polarization rotation is done by first accu-
mulating statistics in the rectilinear bases (horizontal, vertical, diagonal and antidiagonal
polarizations), using the quantum signal and single-photon detectors while the three wave
plates are in their optical axis positions (no effect on rectilinear states). After sufficient
statistics are accumulated, the last QWP is rotated by 45◦ to allow measurements in the
circular basis (right-handed and left-handed circular polarizations). The measurement in
all six polarization states are then used to characterize the unitary. These six outcomes
form an overcomplete set, i.e. they are more than is strictly necessary, however within
experimental contexts this overcompleteness aids statistical robustness of the characteri-
zation. Because all information on the detections must be revealed, any counts obtained
during this characterization process are insecure and thus not used for key generation.
Once enough statistics have been accumulated, the software performs quantum state
tomography [165] to determine the measured states after the unitary. From this, the
operation needed to return these states to the desired ones is computed and implemented
using the wave plates. This operation should, in theory, be the inverse of the unitary.
The performance of the polarization compensation software was theoretically predicted
using a Monte Carlo type test which calculates the visibility degradation after the compen-
sation. The test randomly generated a unitary operation and simulated the compensation
based on a certain number of received signal and received background counts. The program
then applied the compensation and calculated the remaining reduction in polarization vis-
ibility (with 0 being no reduction and 1 reducing the polarization visibility to 0%). This
was performed with 20000 randomly generated unitary (uniformly distributed), for various
values of received signal and received background counts. An example of the results of these
simulations is shown in Figure 3.8. This shows that polarization visibilities of at least 99%
(10−2 or less in visibility reduction) can be achieved with less than a thousand received
signal photons. In addition, the compensation is robust against background counts as high
as the signal, far beyond the maximum noise level for QKD.
3.1.6 Data collection and time-tagging
Data is collected using two time-tagger units [167] (see Figure 3.9), one collecting the signals
from the intensity and polarization modulators and the other collecting the signals from
the single-photon detectors of the quantum receiver. These units use a field programmable
gate array board, and time-stamp the signal with a precision of 78 ps. The two units are
synchronized using a GPS receiver providing a 1 Hz signal, used to identify the start of the
current second, and a 10 MHz signal, used to stabilize the internal clock of the time-tagger.
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Figure 3.8: Theoretically predicted polarization visibility reduction remaining after apply-
ing the automated polarization compensation algorithm. A few thousand received signal
is sufficient for good characterization and compensation even when the background counts
are as high as the signal. In a typical satellite uplink (see Figure 2.26 and 2.27), this would
correspond to less than 0.1% of the counts received in an upper quartile pass.
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Figure 3.9: Photo of the Time-tagger units used for data collection.
The data is sent to two x86-64 computers which are connected together using a local-
area network, where the data can be analyzed to extract secure key. Alternatively, a low
power Freescale IMX53 ARM board [168] can be connected to the computer at the receiver
and used to perform the processing required for the QKD protocol, thus simulating the
limited processing power of the satellite.
3.2 QKD software for limited computational resources
The analysis of the quantum signals and the QKD protocols necessary to extract secure keys
are implemented using custom software designed to operate with the limitations of a satel-
lite receiver platform. Computationally intensive tasks are, as much as possible, performed
at the transmitter (Alice) which would be located on the ground, allowing for greater com-
putational power. This ensures that the receiver platform (Bob) can operate efficiently
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despite limited computational resources. In addition, the amount of classical communica-
tion is reduced to a minimum to operate in the limited communication rates available for
a small satellite platform. This software was written in C# by Nikolay Gigov [169]. An
overview of the software design is shown in Figure 3.10.
The time-stamp of the counts collected at Bob are sent, along with the basis they
were measured in, to Alice by using the local-area network. For a small fraction of the
counts (≈5%), the measured state is also sent. These revealed states are used to estimate
the quantum bit error ratio (QBER). Alice performs the timing analysis by minimizing the
QBER of the revealed counts. The positions of the counts where the basis matched are then
communicated to Bob which discards the rest of the counts. A one-way error correction
algorithm, based on low-density parity-check codes [170], is used to correct the errors in
the key. Alice performs the more computationally intensive decoding algorithm while Bob
only runs a linear algorithm to compute his syndromes. Finally, privacy amplification
is performed using a Toeplitz-matrix-based [171] routine suitable for low-power hardware
implementation.
Both the error correction and the privacy amplification procedures are done oﬄine (i.e.
after the quantum signals are exchanged). In a satellite implementation, it can be done
either at the end of the quantum transmission or during a later pass, possibly using a
different ground station that does not require any quantum capabilities.
Bob’s software consists of a driving control environment and an embedded processing
component. The driving control environment is responsible for loading the time-tagger
operating system drivers, configuring and reading out the time-taggers, and displaying live
statistics. The embedded processing component uses a efficient C program to perform all
the processing required at Bob. The driving control environment is executed on a x86-64
desktop computer while the embedded processing component can be executed either on
the same computer or on a low-power ARM board.
3.2.1 Timing analysis
The first task of the software is to match Bob’s received counts with the counts sent by
Alice. A few factors make this process challenging. The initial 1 Hz signal of the GPS,
which is used to signal the start of each second, is only accurate to 100 ns. In addition,
the internal clock of each time taggers may drift, and require a 10 MHz signal from the
GPS to help align the internal clocks of each time tagger. Lastly, our data acquisition
hardware is not capable of operating at the high pulse rate of the laser source (76 MHz).
This limitation is a fundamental memory and bandwidth limitation due to our device
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Figure 3.10: Overview of the software design. Alice’s software consists of an integrated
solution written in C# and is designed to perform as much of the computationally intensive
operations as possible. Bob’s software is designed to run on modest low-power hardware
and consists of a small C# layer and an efficient C program that performs the necessary
portions of the QKD protocol at the receiver side. Figure reproduced with permission
from [169].
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recording a time-stamp for each counts. It is thus necessary to reduce the information load
by only time-tagging a subset of the laser’s output pulse signals. This requires the software
to interpolate the time-stamps of the signal pulses by assuming that the laser’s period is
stable over several microseconds.
The timing analysis process, performed at Alice, begins with an initial synchronization
using the timing information from both time-tagger and the known optical an electronic
delay between the time the pulses are sent and received (measure before the experiment).
An histogram-based optimizing coincidence search is then performed based on the count
rates. This is done to identify the signal peaks. The highest count rate for each laser
period is identified, after which the coincidence search identifies the correct one based on
QBER estimate from a fraction of received counts revealed by Bob (≈5%). The software
does this search by calculating the QBER for each identified peaks to find the minimum
QBER, thus finding the likeliest delay. This approach is valid because any delays other
than the correct one would produce random correlations, leading to a QBER approaching
50%. If the delay is off by a multiple of the laser period, the high QBER would be caused
by the randomness of the sequence, whose period (a few microseconds) is much greater
than the uncertainty in the initial synchronization. Figure 3.11 shows the user interface at
Alice which includes the histogram showing the location of the optimal delay, yielding an
average QBER of 3.33%.
Once the counts are successfully matching, Alice identifies which of Bob’s counts where
in the correct basis and sends this information to Bob (publicly). All counts where the
basis did not match are discarded and both parties are left with what is called the sifted
key.
3.2.2 Error correction
The sifted key will contain some errors due to background noise, dark counts, and im-
perfection in the source and receiver alignments. To reconcile Alice and Bob’s key we
perform error correction using low-density parity-check codes [170]. These codes require
low communication overhead and are inherently asymmetric in therms of computational
complexity (i.e. Alice can perform most of the computation). These advantages make these
codes highly suitable for satellite-based QKD.
Alice begins by preparing an irregular parity-check matrix based on the QBER estimate
obtained during timing analysis. This is done using a modified progressive-edge growth
software [172, 173] and employs known optimal degree distribution profiles [125, 174]. This
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Figure 3.11: User interface at Alice showing the histogram-based optimizing coincidence
search. The light blue area shows the counts captured with the optimal delay for the
current second. This optimal is determined by idetifying the signal peaks by finding the
maximum count rates in each laser period, and then moving the delay across the peaks
and optimizing the QBER. The width of the capture counts (light blue are) is determined
by the coincidence window.
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matrix is then transmitted to Bob, in a compact form, where an efficient linear algorithm
is used to compute a syndrome from the sifted key. The syndrome is a vector defined by
s = Mx(mod(2)), (3.7)
where s is the syndrome, M is the parity-check matrix and x is Bob’s sifted key. For long
sifted keys (typically 100000 bits or more), the sifted key is divided in blocks and the
same parity-check matrix is used to determine the syndrome for each block, thus reducing
computational time and communication.
The syndromes of each blocks are sent to Alice where it is used, along with the parity-
check matrix an the estimate of the QBER, to reconcile Alice’s sifted key with Bob’s. This
is accomplished using belief propagation, an iterative message passing decoding algorithm,
also known as the sum-product algorithm [175, 176]. Our sum-product LDPC decoder is
written in C# and is based on that found in [177].
The reconciliation step may fail if the number of rows of the parity-check matrix is too
small. If this happens, the key block can either be discarded or the algorithm can be retried
using an augmented parity-check matrix containing all the rows of the previous matrix,
similar to the “nested” LDPC codes proposed in [178]. In a satellite mission, the choice can
be based on the availability of the classical communication channel. Our implementation
exhibits a 2% failure rate with typical efficiencies (ηEC) around 1.2.
3.2.3 Privacy amplification
Once the sifted key has been successfully error corrected, privacy amplification is used to
reduce the amount of information that may have leaked to an eavesdropper. To ensure
security, all error in the key (observed by the QBER estimate) are assumed to be caused
by an eavesdropper. The QBER estimate can thus give us an estimate of the amount of
information that may have leaked to an eavesdropper. In addition, all parity information
revealed during the error correction step are public and this information must also be
removed from the final key.
The privacy amplification process uses a two-universal hash function [9, 179] applied
to the sifted key to produce a provably secure key with reduced length L. This process
is a symmetric operation that needs to be performed by both Alice and Bob. The com-
putational complexity and the amount of classical communication required depend on the
choice of hash function.
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Our implementation employs the Toeplitz matrix [179, 180] construction implemented
using a linear feedback shift register. A Toeplitz matrix is a two-universal hash func-
tion [171] that has constant descending left-to-right diagonal elements. An L×N Toeplitz
matrix can be written as
Tr =

rL rL+1 · · · · · · rN+L−1
rL−1 rL rL+1 · · · · · · rN+L−2
...
. . .
...
r2 · · · rL−1 rL rL+1 · · · · · · rN+1
r1 r2 · · · rL−1 rL rL+1 · · · rN
 . (3.8)
A Toeplitz matrix Tr is completely defined by the (N + L − 1)-bit vector r = (r1, r2,
. . . , rN+L−1), making its storage and transmission requirements considerably reduced. These
requirements can be further reduced by employing a L×N matrix of the form Ur = (IL|Tr),
i.e. a concatenation of an L-dimensional identity matrix IL and an L × (N − L) Toeplitz
matrix Tr:
Ur =

1 0 · · · 0 rL rL+1 · · · · · · rN−1
0 1 · · · 0 rL−1 rL rL+1 · · · · · · rN−2
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 r2 · · · rL−1 rL rL+1 · · · · · · rN−L+1
0 0 · · · 1 r1 r2 · · · rL−1 rL rL+1 · · · rN−L
 . (3.9)
This Ur = (IL|Tr) matrix is also a two-universal Toeplitz matrix, but requires only N − 1
bits to define [181, 182].
Alice generates such a matrix by constructing a random binary string r = (r1, r2, . . . , rN−1)
of length N − 1, and then transmits r to Bob over the classical channel. She and Bob then
use r and a linear feedback shift register to effect the application of the Toeplitz matrix
Ur, computing the final secure key.
The identity portion of each row of Ur uses no space and can be accounted for with
a simple AND operation. We represent Tr as an (N − L)-bit logical linear feedback shift
register. Initially, the linear feedback shift register contains the last N − L bits of r,
(rL, rL+1, . . . , rN−1). The remaining bits from r are used as input for the LFSR. In this
way, we conserve memory by never needing to store full matrices.
The logical LFSR is broken up into multiple 32-bit LFSR blocks, each of which is
designed to fit inside a register on a processing unit. The register size of 32 bits is chosen
for the support of multiple platforms, including our low-power ARM test board. 64-bit
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platforms are also available, and with single instruction, multiple data (SIMD) extensions,
the register can be as large as 128 bits.
The number of column in the Toeplitz matrix (N) is determined by the length of the
sifted key block on which the privacy amplification is applied to, while the number of row
(L) corresponds to the length of the final secure key. L is calculate using QKD security
proofs to determine what length of key can be obtained while ensuring security. We use
Equation (2.31) in combination with the measure background contribution (in the form of
the vacuum yield Y0) to obtain a better key rate while maintaining security [126].
3.2.4 Vacuum yield
The key rate equation presented in Chapter 2 (Equation (2.31)) assumed all noise was
caused by an eavesdropper. In an experimental implementation we can measure the level
of noise received by the system during the QKD exchange, allowing us to place a better
bound on the possible contribution of an eavesdropper to the QBER. To assure secu-
rity, it is important that this measure be done during the QKD exchange, and monitored
throughout, instead of being characterized separately, as an eavesdropper may manipulate
the characterization.
The measured noise is implemented using the vacuum yield (Y0), defined as the cu-
mulative probability of detector dark counts and background noise within the coincidence
window. This parameter is measured by using the timing analysis to find the peaks and
then adding an offset to move between the peaks. This offset gives an estimate of the back-
ground and dark count rates. The vacuum yield is then simply the measured count rate
in this offset, divided by the pulse repetition rate (76 MHz), and multiplied by the ratio
of the QKD coincidence window to the coincidence window of the background estimate
(typically 3 ns).
We note that this approach is insecure, as an eavesdropper could manipulate the back-
ground counts between pulses by injecting additional light. Proper measurement of the
vacuum yield would require a source that can produce true vacuum pulses (no signal light),
which our current system is incapable of producing. These vacuum pulses could be ob-
tained by using a laser that can be momentarily switched off (or a triggered pulsed laser
where one can skip a pulse by not triggering), or by using a intensity modulator capable
of high intensity contrast to approximate a vacuum pulse.
For our experimental implementation, all parameters used to determine the final key
rate are measured quantities. The lower bound, give by Equation (2.31), can then be used
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as an exact equation:
R = q
Nµ
Nµ +Nν
{−QµηECH2(Eµ) +QL1
[
1−H2(EU1 )
]−Qµ∆/Nµ}. (3.10)
where, as previous, q is a basis reconciliation factor (1/2 for BB84), Nµ and Nν are the
signal and decoy detections respectively and Qµ is the gain for signal states (the gain is
calculated as the ratio of the number of photons received by Bob to the number of pulses
sent by Alice). ηEC is the efficiency parameter of the error correction algorithm, H2 is the
binary entropy function, Eµ is the QBER estimate for signal states, and Q
L
1 and E
U
1 are
the lower bound of the gain and the upper bound of the QBER for single-photon pulses.
∆ is a security parameter as defined in Equation (2.30).
The lower bound of the gain for single-photon pulses (QL1 ) can be calculated using an
improved version of Equation (2.28) which includes the measure of noise [126]:
QL1 =
µ2 e−µ
µν − ν2
(
Qν e
ν −Qµ eµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0
)
, (3.11)
where µ = 0.5 and ν = 0.1 are the average photon number for signal and decoy states
respectively and Qν is the gain for decoy states.
The upper bound on the QBER for single-photon pulses (EU1 ), given by Equation (2.29),
can also be improved using the vacuum yield term [126]:
EU,µ1 =
EµQµ
QL1
− E
µ
0 Y0
QL1 e
µ
, (3.12)
where Eν is the QBER estimate for decoy states, and E
µ
0 is the measured vacuum error
rate for the signal states. There also exist another upper bound for EU1 [183]:
EU,ν1 =
EνQνe
ν − Eν0Y0
νQL1
µ e−µ, (3.13)
Eµ0 is the measured vacuum error rate for the decoy states. Since both upper bounds are
valid, one can use the smallest of the two to get the best upper bound in all cases:
EU1 = min
{
EU,µ1 , E
U,ν
1
}
. (3.14)
3.2.5 Overhead and performance
One of the concerns in satellite communication is the limited power availability, computa-
tional processing speed, on-board memory, and communication speed with the ground [184].
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It is therefore crucial that our QKD software performs as efficiently as possible. To verify
this we characterized the computational processing time, memory usage and communi-
cation requirements of our software. In addition, our software was implemented on a
low-power embedded system to show its capability to function on a system with limited
resources and power availability. The characterization of the software was performed by
Nikolay Gigov [169].
Unlike the transfer of the optical quantum signals, which must be transfered during the
limited flyby time of the satellite, the classical communication can be performed either in
parallel with the optical link or at a later time, using a ground station with a radio fre-
quency link (but not necessarily with optical capabilities). In the case where the classical
transfer occurs in parallel with the optical link, the processing time and communication
bandwidth will be the limiting factor. Using a separate ground station for the classical
communication (or combining some classical communication at the original ground station
with classical communication at a second one) would alleviate this processing and com-
munication bandwidth requirement. The main concern with using such an approach is
memory restrictions on the satellite.
If the classical communication occurs after the optical link, the satellite will be required
to store all time-tags accumulated during the optical link, along with the measurement
basis and result. In addition, the satellite must also store the LDPC matrix used for error
correction and the privacy amplification Toeplitz matrix shift register.
In contrast, real-time classical communication would allow most of these tags to be
filtered through sifting and temporal filtering, while reducing the amount of data of the
remaining tags by removing the need for exact time-stamps (since the time-tags are already
matched) and measurement basis (obsolete after sifting). The error correction step is more
efficient when performed after the transfer of optical quantum signal because is efficiency
increases with large sifter key size. This is because the sum-product algorithm [170] used
in the error correction operates optimally on blocks as larger as possible [169]. If the
classical communication where to be done in real-time, the error correction and privacy
amplification could be performed at the end of the satellite flyby, when the elevation angle
of the satellite is too low to allow quantum signal to be exchanged (due to high loss),
but still allowing radio frequency communication (which is more robust to loss due to the
higher signal intensity).
For our implementation, the block size for the error correction was artificially limited
to 600000. This artificial limit was implemented because longer block sizes require more
processing time, especially in terms of creating the error correction matrix. There are no
block size limit to the privacy amplification, which can be implemented efficiently and the
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memory required is minimal. Having no limit on the block size on the privacy amplification
is important because the finite-size effects should be based on the block size used in privacy
amplification, meaning a limit would require the finite-size statistics to be applied on the
block size limit rather than the full key size (or the smallest of the two), leading to worst
results.
Memory requirements
The time-tags produced by our current time-tagging hardware have a size of up to 64 bits.
This can be reduced significantly to allow reduced memory requirement and reduced clas-
sical communication traffic, but at the cost of additional computational steps. One of the
simplest way to achieve this is to group the time-tags in 1 s chucks and only store the
full information of the first time-tag, truncating the other tags to only the sub second
information. The 1 s grouping was chosen because our GPS receiver outputs a data packet
once every seconds (the GPS data is required for initial synchronization). We can thus
group the time-tags with the GPS data for each 1 s intervals. This truncation of time-tags
reduces the size of each tags (except the first) to 40 bits. The measurement basis and
result are included in these 40 bits time-tags.
The error correction requires a M by N sparse parity check matrix to be applied to a
N bits block of sifted key to produce the syndrome vector of size M . We can deduce an
estimate of the size of the LDPC matrix, based on the channel QBER (Eµ), by applying
Shannon’s channel coding theorem [185] to the binary symmetric channel [186]. Using this
approach, we obtain an estimated matrix size of [187]
M = NηECH2(Eµ), (3.15)
giving us a matrix size that varies based on the size on the block N , the estimated error
correction efficiency (ηEC), and the estimate of the QBER. If the decoding step fails one can
simply retry with a larger matrix (rather than discard the block of sifted key), allowing
to still extract secure key. The new matrix must consists of the original matrix with
additional lines appended to it. Because of the linear relationship between the number
of line M and the error correction efficiency ηEC, a larger matrix will imply a worst error
correction efficiency (higher ηEC).
Both the LDPC matrix and syndrome vector must be stored. For typical block sizes,
error correction efficiencies and QBER, the total memory requirements for this is on the
order of 100 bits per sifted bit. For privacy amplification, Bob only needs to store a random
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binary sting of, at most, the same length as the sifted key. The total memory requirement
is thus 40 bits per time tags and an additional ≈101 bits per sifted bits.
The total raw key length for the best pass of an uplink with a 300 MHz WCP source
(calculated in Section 2.5) is ≈300 kbits, with the sifted key being, at most, half of this
value. Therefore the expected maximum memory usage during a single pass is ≈27 Mbits,
or ≈3.4 Mbytes. In a downlink, the expected raw key length is ≈1.6 Mbits, leading to
a maximum memory usage of ≈18 Mbytes. These are well within the feasible realm of
memory capacities for space qualified technologies, with some recent space missions, such
as the mars rovers, having memory capacities as high as 256 MBytes [188].
Computational requirements
The computational resource requirements were tested on an inexpensive (≈ $150), low-
power (2 W) Freescale i.MX53 QSB single-board computer which used a single-core 1 GHz
ARM processor with 1 GB of volatile RAM [168]. The requirements were estimated by
accumulating 300 s of data at a receiver detection rate of ≈150 kHz. Each one second
chuck of data was then truncated to various detection rates within the expected range of
detection rates of satellite QKD (based on the raw key rates calculated in Section 2.5).
The full QKD protocol is then implemented on the data subsets at these various raw key
rates.
The memory and CPU usage on the embedded processing system is shown in Table 3.1.
The processing time was found to scale quadratically due to the quadratic scaling of the
matrix multiplication process in the privacy amplification, while all other post-processing
steps scaled linearly. These processing times represent worst case scenario as the lowest
testes raw key rate, 10 kHz (corresponding to a total of 3 Mbit for the 300 s), is still
more than the expected raw key length of the best pass in a satellite downlink when using
a 300 MHz source rate (≈1.6 Mbits), and almost an order of magnitude more than the
expected maximum raw key length in an uplink (≈300 kbits).
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Table 3.1: Measured performance of the satellite-side QKD process running on a Freescale
i.MX53 embedded ARM board processing 300 seconds of QKD data.“OS” is the time taken
by operating system facilities invoked by the QKD process. The processing time was found
to scale quadratically with the raw-key rate—a least-squares quadratic fit to the data gives
a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9995. The processing time, OS overhead and memory
usage of the satellite-side QKD process have been measured with the Linux time command.
Raw key Sifted key QBER Processing OS RAM used
rate [Hz] rate [Hz] [%] time [sec] [sec] [Mbyte]
10 000 3538 4.4 46.7 14.4 25.98
20 000 7186 4.8 65.4 16.2 43.06
30 000 10 586 4.6 86.7 18.3 59.11
40 000 13 833 4.9 115.9 18.4 75.63
50 000 17 512 5.0 157.1 21.5 93.74
60 000 21 145 4.9 206.1 21.8 110.30
70 000 24 552 4.8 257.7 23.5 125.38
80 000 28 276 4.7 323.5 24.6 141.92
90 000 32 489 4.8 408.3 26.6 158.44
100 000 35 527 5.1 481.9 29.2 175.04
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3.3 Results of the high loss QKD demonstration
3.3.1 Stability and polarization compensation
The stability of the high loss QKD system was tested by measuring the QBER for ≈6 h.
The results, shown in Figure 3.12, show that the system was, on average, stable for 1 h
before significant increase to the QBER occured. However, the duration of the stability
varied greatly, from as little as 0.5 h to over 2.5 h. The drift is mostly due to temperature
drifts which affect the polarization in the fibers going from the modulators to the up-
conversion source, and from the up-conversion source to the quantum channel.
The automated polarization compensation was used when the QBER began to signifi-
cantly increase (at ≈2.1 h and ≈3.3 h). In both instances, the QBER was returned to it
optimal value, showing its effectiveness. This also shows that the QBER drift is due to
polarization misalignment rather than optical misalignment (which the automated polar-
ization compensation system cannot compensate). No forms of alignment, other than the
automated polarization compensation, were performed on any part of the system during
the measurement.
3.3.2 Fixed loss results
The experiment was performed for losses ranging from 29 dB to 56 dB. 5% of the sifted
detections (chosen randomly) were compared to estimate the QBER. These compared
detections are discarded from the final key to maintain security. The measured QBER,
raw key rate and background count rate are shown in Figure 3.13.
The measured signal QBER ranged from 1.97% to 8.12%. The QBER at lower losses
was limited by the intrinsic QBER of the source (which varied aroun 2–3%). At higher
losses, the QBER increased due to lower signal to noise ratio. The raw key rate varied
between 37336 bits/s at 29.5 dB and 35.3 bits/s at 56 dB, while the background count
rate varied between 1–140 cps. Both raw key rate and background count rate are based on
the counts within the coincidence window, which was reduced at higher loss to maximize
the secure extraction. The coincidence window was adjusting based on the loss following
Table 3.2. This coincidence window adjustment accounts for a large portion of the increase
in background count rate at lower loss, with the rest of the increase being due to signals
from the 1550 nm laser and some continuous wave component remaining in the pulsed
810 nm laser.
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Figure 3.12: Stability of the QBER over time in the high loss QKD system. The system
was shown to be stable over an average of ≈1 h. The automated polarization compensation
system was used at ≈2.1 h and ≈3.3 h, returning the QBER to its optimal value.
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Figure 3.13: Raw key rate, background detection rate and QBER obtained in different loss
regimes. The raw key and background rates include only detections that fall within the
coincidence window. The background rate (the product of the vacuum yield Y0 and the
pulsed laser frequency, 76 MHz) is determined by measuring the counts received between
laser pulses. At lower loss, the background term is dominated by signal from the 1550 nm
laser and some continuous wave component remaining in the pulsed 810 nm laser. Since
these background signals are produced by the source, they are reduced (along with the
raw key rate) as the loss is increased. Variations in QBER between runs are mainly due
to temperature fluctuations that affected the birefringence of the optical fiber and the
performance of the 1550 nm modulators.
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Table 3.2: Coincidence window used for the different losses. The coincidence window is
chosen to maximize the secure key rate. At low losses the coincidence window is larger
to increase the raw key rate. As the loss increases the increased signal-to-noise ratio is
partially compensated by reducing the coincidence window, thus reducing the background
counts (which is evenly distributed in time) at the cost of reducing,to a lesser degree, the ray
key rate (which has a distribution that is closer to a Gaussian). For comparison, the period
between to pulses is 13 ns. The width of the signal peak (typically ≈1 ns) is determined
by the combined contributions of the laser pulse width (≈3 ps, negligible), the drift in the
repetition rate of the pulsed laser (typically a few 100s of ps), the detector timing jitter
(≈50 ps), the electronic jitter in the detector (adding ≈200 ps to the detector jitter), the
timing accuracy of the time-tagger (156.25 ps) and the delay of the four detectors compared
to each other (typically aligned withing 100–200 ps).
Loss [dB] <25 25–
29
29–
40
40–
45
45–
52
52–
53
53–
54
>54
Coincidence window [ns] 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1 0.6 0.4 0.2
120
Figure 3.14: Example of the location of the background coincidence window (shown in
red). The location of the background coincidence window is a constant time offset from
the signal coincidence window (shown in light blue) and was chosen to avoid the regions
of increased rates (the small peaks that are visible next to the background coincidence
window). These regions of increase are rates likely due to optical ghosting effects, which
are correlated to the source and therefore should not be counted as background.
The background count rate is measured by measuring the background between the
pulses using a 3 ns coincidence window. An example of the background window location is
shown (in red) in Figure 3.14. The 3 ns width was chosen to ensure an accurate estimate
of the background. The location is chosen to avoid the regions of increased rates between
the peaks. These regions of increased rates are likely due to optical ghosting, where light
is reflected from one optical surface (meant to transmit), propagates backward, and is
reflected from a second optical surface (also meant to transmit). This results in optical
signals from the signal states but with a temporal delay. Since these are correlated with
the signal they should not be attributed to background contributions. The background
rate of the 3 ns background window is adjusted to the coincidence window used in the
experiment and divided by the number of pulse to obtain the vacuum yield (Y0).
The measured QKD parameters, needed for Equation (2.31), Equation (3.10), Equa-
tion (3.11), Equation 3.12, Equation 3.13 and Equation 3.12, are shown in Table 3.4. The
experimental data was recorded over periods of ≈300–600 s. For 29.5–45.6 dB, the exper-
imental data was sufficient to extract secure keys in both the asymptotic limit and while
accounting for finite-size statistical fluctuations. For 50 dB and 52.7 dB, the duration of
the experiment was artificially increased to allow secure key extraction under finite-size
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Figure 3.15: Secure key rate (lower bound) obtained in different loss regimes. At low loss
the detection rate at the receiver is sufficiently high for the finite-size results to converge
with the infinite limit. At high loss we were unable to extract secure key with finite-size
statistics using the 300-600 s of experimental data.
statistics. This was done by appending the existing data at the specific loss and appending
it to itself until the data was sufficiently long to allow secure key. For 53.9 dB and 56 dB,
secure key was only extracted in the asymptotic limit as the duration necessary to extract
secure key with finite-size statistics was deemed impractical.
Full error correction and privacy amplification were implemented in our experimental
results. The error correction achieved efficiencies of 1.1–1.4, with better efficiencies at
higher QBER. This is in line with other studies that have found better achievable error
correction efficiencies at higher QBER [189]. After error correction, privacy amplification
reduced the probability of an insecure key to  = 10−9. The extracted secure key rate, both
for the asymptotic limit and finite-size statistics, are shown in Figure 3.15. The secure key
with finite size statistics for 50 dB and 52.6 dB are not included because they require data
to be acquired over a longer duration that was actually performed, and thus are based on
the assumption that similar quality signals can be exchange over long periods.
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Table 3.3: Experimentally measured QKD parameters during the fixed loss demonstrations.
The parameters corresponds to those in Equation (2.31), Equation (3.10), Equation (3.11),
Equation 3.12, Equation 3.13 and Equation 3.12. For losses of 50 dB and 52.7 dB we had
to increase the duration to allow secure key extraction while accounting for finite-size
statistics. This was done artificially using data taken at the given loss over a duration of
≈600 s and appending it to itself (i.e. 3030 s of data is obtained by combining 5 sets of
the original 606 s of data). At 53.6 dB and 56 dB the system was no longer capable of
extracting any secure key while accounting for finite-size statistics. The finite-size statistics
is based on a worst case statistical fluctuation of 10 standard deviations.
Parameter Measured value
Loss [dB] 29.5 35.5 40.7 45.6 50.0 52.7 53.9 56
Duration [s] 288 606 599 593 5×606 300×682 301 315
µ 0.506 0.490 0.506 0.502 0.441 0.504 0.466 0.466
ν 0.0397 0.0422 0.0519 0.0633 0.0424 0.0489 0.0461 0.0475
Eµ [%] 3.55 1.97 2.60 2.94 5.09 6.07 8.12 6.89
Eν [%] 39.3 13.0 19.3 7.73 12.7 14.8 22.2 21.8
Eµ0 [%] 50.8 51.9 50.4 50.6 50.3 50.4 50.6 50.6
Eν0 [%] 42.0 38.0 49.3 44.7 47.2 47.1 47.7 47.5
Qµ [×10−6] 536 132 40.8 13.2 4.26 2.06 0.554 0.506
Qν [×10−7] 469 154 44.3 18.9 5.61 2.61 0.853 0.853
Q1 [×10−6] 345 107 23.9 8.24 3.04 1.23 0.468 0.414
QL1 [×10−6] 331 101 21.5 6.56 2.60 1.19 0 0
E1 [%] 5.35 2.21 4.04 4.06 4.50 4.98 8.64 6.82
EU1 [%] 5.69 2.42 4.78 5.40 7.40 6.49 0 0
Y0 [×10−7] 18.7 7.39 3.13 1.71 1.15 0.652 0.143 0.208
ηEC 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.35 1.15 1.115 1.1 1.1
Raw rate [bits/s] 37336 9178 2845 917 297 144 38.6 35.3
Sifted rate [bits/s] 18910 3688 1411 459 147 71.2 19.0 17.4
Secure rate [bits/s] 2681 2233 289 100 28.8 4.22 0.774 2.26
(asymptotic)
Secure rate [bits/s] 1926 1954 155 24.4 0.430 0.240 0 0
(finite-size)
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Our system is able to extract secure key at up to 56 dB in the asymptotic limit (ex-
tracting 2.26 bits/s) and up to 45.6 dB with finite size statistics on 600 s of experimental
data (extracting 24.4 bits/s). These results compare well to a previous high loss demon-
stration [59] that achieved secure key in the asymptotic limit at 57 dB of loss without
performing any post-processing and using only one manually changeable measurement ba-
sis (reducing dark counts and elimination double clicks between bases).
3.3.3 Simulating the loss of satellite passes
We further showed the capability of our system to function in the demanding loss regime
of a satellite uplink by simulated the varying loss of satellite passes. The varying loss was
obtained by moving the lens of the quantum channel during a 45 min experimental run.
The initial position of the lens provided a loss of ≈65 dB. The loss was the progressively
lowered to ≈30 dB over the course of 20 min, and then increased back to ≈65 dB over the
following 25 min. The measured loss during the experiment is shown in Figure 3.16.
Each side of the loss curve (split at the lowest loss point) is then fitted with two cubic
curves. These fits are used to match the experimental loss to the average loss of a satellite
uplink during a pass. The loss (calculated in Chapter 2) is from a 600 km low Earth orbit
satellite uplink using a 785 nm wavelength, 25 cm transmitter, 30 cm receiver and 2 µrad
pointing error, and assumes a rural (5 km vis.) sea-level atmosphere. Both the best and
upper quartile passes are experimentally simulated.
For each passes, the theoretical losses of each 1 s of the pass is matched to a 1 s point
on the curve fits of the varying loss by progressively scanning from the the center (lowest
loss) to either edges. Each theoretical point is matched with the closest loss point on the
fitted curve that exceeds the theoretical loss. If the closest fitted point is already matched
to another theoretical point, the next higher fitted loss point is used instead.
This method ensures that the interpolated loss points are both unique and strictly
greater than the theoretical loss points. By matching the loss points using curve fits we
ensure that the data samples are not biased by the fluctuations in the measured losses.
Figure 3.17 and 3.18 show the theoretically predicted losses, the curve fit value, and the
experimentally measured loss, of teach 1 s points of the passes. The estimated QBER is
also shown, along with a 95% central credible interval (shaded region).
The measured losses closely match the theoretical predictions while maintaining realistic
fluctuations. The QBER fluctuates more at higher loss due to the reduced sample size.
This reduction in sample size is due in part to the reduction in received signals (due to the
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Figure 3.16: Experimentally measured loss over the 45 min data collection used to simulate
the varying loss of a satellite pass. The data is fitted with two cubic curves that are then
used to match the experimental data with the theoretical average loss of a satellite pass,
without being biased by experimental loss fluctuations.
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Figure 3.17: Theoretically predicted losses of the best satellite pass, the matched fit losses,
and the corresponding measured losses and QBER. The QBER includes a 95% credible
interval (shaded region). The theoretical loss is based on an uplink with a 600 km circular
Sun-synchronous low Earth orbit satellite at a wavelength of 785 nm, with a receiver
diameter of 30 cm, a 2 µrad pointing error and a rural sea-level atmosphere.
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Figure 3.18: Theoretically predicted losses of the upper quartile satellite pass, the matched
fit losses, and the corresponding measured losses and QBERs. The QBER includes a 95%
credible interval (shaded region). The theoretical loss is based on an uplink with a 600 km
circular Sun-synchronous low Earth orbit satellite at a wavelength of 785 nm, with a
receiver diameter of 30 cm, a 2 µrad pointing error and a rural sea-level atmosphere.
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Figure 3.19: Theoretically predicted losses of the upper quartile satellite pass, the matched
fit losses, and the corresponding measured losses and QBERs. The QBER includes a 95%
credible interval (shaded region). The theoretical loss is based on an uplink with a 600 km
circular Sun-synchronous low Earth orbit satellite at a wavelength of 785 nm, with a
receiver diameter of 30 cm, a 2 µrad pointing error and a rural sea-level atmosphere.
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high loss), and in part to the reduced coincidence window at high losses (see Table 3.2)
which temporally filters out more of the detections at high loss. The instances where the
measured QBER was zero had low sample sizes of only 66 cps or less (averaging 16.1 cps),
sometimes as low as only 1 cps. Since the average QBER is around 4%, the average 16.1 cps
have (statistically) 51.8% chance of producing 0% QBER. The confidence in the QBER
measurement is quantified by the credible interval (shaded region).
The credible interval is obtained using Bayesian statistics [190, 191], given the bino-
mial distribution of the measurement results (each measured counts will yield either the
expected or unexpected polarization result) and assuming a uniform prior distribution
over the range of 0–1 (the possible values of QBER). The credible confidence interval is
obtained by computing the inverse of the beta cumulative distribution function, with the
beta cumulative distribution function given by
p =
1
β(a, b)
∫ x
0
t(a−1)(1− t)(b−1), (3.16)
with p = (1± c)/2 (where c is the desired confidence, 0.95 in our case), a = 1 +NE (where
NE is the number of counts giving the expected polarization result), b = 1+NU (where NU
is the number of counts giving the unexpected polarization result), and β(a, b) is the beta
function. Taking the inverse will yield x which corresponds to the value at the confidence
point (maximum value for p = (1 + c)/2 and minimum value at p = (1− c)/2).
Performing full post post-processing on these data sets we were able to extract 8578 bits
out of the best pass while accounting for finite-size statistics. Both the upper quartile and
median passes required multiple passes to extract secure key with finite-size statistics.
The upper quartile produced 349 bits of secret key out of 2 passes while the median pass
produced 765 bits out of 35 passes. This shows that passes with insufficient statistics to
produced a key do not need to be discarded, but can instead be kept and added to a later
pass to create a larger key. In addition, the success of 2 upper quartile passes strongly
suggest that a system with twice the source rate (152 MHz instead of 76 MHz) would be
sufficient to extract secure key from a single upper quartile pass (as it would produce as
much statistics from a single pass as our system does with two). The QKD parameters
extracted from the passes are shown in Table 3.4
This demonstration of secure key extraction from simulated satellite passes (with finite-
size statistics), as well as the demonstration of secure key extraction from up to 56 dB
(asymptotically), shows that QKD can be successfully performed in the demanding regime
of a satellite uplink. Our system is capable of performing all post processing steps, including
full error correction and privacy amplification, with reduced computational resources at
the receiver. These achievements are important milestones towards satellite QKD.
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Table 3.4: Experimentally measured QKD parameters of the experimentally simulated
passes. The parameters corresponds to those in Equation (2.31), Equation (3.10), Equa-
tion (3.11), Equation 3.12, Equation 3.13 and Equation 3.12. The best pass was able to
produce 8578 bits of secure key while accounting for finite-size statistics. Both the upper
quartile and median passes required multiple passes (2 and 35 respectively) to extract any
secure key while accounting for finite-size statistics (resulting in a total of 349 bits and
765 bits total secure key respectively). The finite-size statistics is based on a worst case
statistical fluctuation of 10 standard deviations.
Parameter Best pass Upper
quartile pass
Median pass
Duration [s] 388 363 294
µ 0.506 0.506 0.514
ν 0.0576 0.0574 0.0581
Eµ [%] 3.04 3.42 4.35
Eν [%] 13.9 14.6 16.3
Eµ0 [%] 50.7 50.6 50.7
Eν0 [%] 45.3 45.6 44.6
Qµ [×10−6] 24.3 12.4 2.51
Qν [×10−7] 28.9 15.3 3.44
Q1 [×10−6] 14.2 7.36 1.46
QL1 [×10−6] 11.9 6.15 1.31
E1 [%] 4.83 5.25 6.09
EU1 [%] 6.27 6.85 7.17
Y0 [×10−7] 1.70 1.24 0.671
ηEC 1.28 1.24 1.15
Raw key [bits/pass] 656746 314371 51444
Sifted key [bits/pass] 326823 155318 25253
Number of passes 1 2 35
needed for finite-size
Secure key [bits/pass] 8578 174.5 21.86
(finite-size)
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Chapter 4
QKD using a diffusive screen
Light scattered by a diffusive material has been extensively studied in the context of classi-
cal imaging [192–200]. In the context of quantum applications, single-photons, encoded in
polarization, were recently used to show secure imaging of an object [201]. The polarization
encoding allows the user to detect if the image was altered, much in the same way as QKD
allows the detection of an eavesdropper. This technique therefore allows secure imaging
where the system is able to detect if the photons producing the image were tampered with.
In this chapter we explore the concept of using a diffusive screen to enable multi-user
QKD. A QKD source is pointed at a diffusive screen which scatters the light in a large
angle (either in transmission of reflection) while maintaining the polarization states. A
quantum receiver is then used to capture light and extract a secure key. In the future, such
a diffusive screen could be used to create QKD hot-spots where users could exchange, with
little or no pointing required, a secure key using a mobile quantum receiver device, ideally
embedded in devices such as mobile phones or portable computers. This would allow these
devices to accumulate keys when in range of these hot spots which can then be used to
secure online activities (such as online banking, shopping, etc.). This approach could be
used to implement a wireless quantum key distribution system to complement fiber based
quantum networks [202–207]. While the technology is still far from providing the necessary
efficiency for such a hot-spot, a proof of concept demonstration is currently possible.
In the first part of this chapter, Section 4.1, we describe the characteristics of the
diffusive screens. Section 4.2 then explores the improvements needed to our quantum
receiver in order to make this experiment possible. Finally, Section 4.3 briefly discusses
the future plans for performing this proof of concept demonstration.
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Author contributions
Thomas Jennwein and Brendon Higgins conceived the experiment and provided advice.
I designed and built the transmitter and redesigned and modified quantum receiver. I
performed the characterizations and analyzed the data.
4.1 Diffusive screens characteristics
To enable polarization-based QKD using a diffusive screen, we need a screen that preserves
the polarization state of the diffused photons. Three screens were tested to determine their
potential for QKD: one transmissive screen and two reflective screens [208]. The screens
were mounted on a rotation stage to allow control over the angle of measurement (see
Figure 4.1).
A set of three wave plates (two quarter-wave plates on either side of a half-wave plate) is
placed before the screen and is used to compensate any polarization misalignment from the
source to the screen using an automated polarization alignment software (see Section 3.1.5).
This assumes polarization is maintained by both the screen and free space propagation,
a reasonable assumption since the screen should preserve the polarization state, and free
space propagation has negligible effects on the polarization [68]. Placing the wave plates
before the screen instead of in the quantum receiver (as in Section 3.1.4) allows us to
compact the receiver, reducing the loss from non-collimated beams (as is the case for the
divergent light diffused by the screens).
4.1.1 Loss of the diffusive screen
After hitting the screen, the light is diffused (either in transmission or reflection) over a
large angle. For a 1 mm collimated beam, the diffused light is visibly granulated by the
screen (see Figure 4.2). This effect is caused by the granularity of the screen itself, causing
a granular diffusion when the incoming beam is of similar size as the granularity of the
screen. The granularity of the screen, shown in Figure 4.3, is on the order of 0.1-1 mm. The
granular effect increases if the beam is more tightly focused (an thus smaller) (Figure 4.4),
and decreases when the beam is defocused (Figure 4.5).
To determine the feasibility of the experiment, we measured the angular distribution of
the intensity. The intensity, shown in figure 4.6, was measured 30 cm after the screens with
a 1 mm collimated input beam at normal incidence. The angular intensity distribution is
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Figure 4.1: Transmitter for QKD with a diffusive screen (here a reflective diffusive screen).
The breadboard is mounted on a rotation stage to adjust the measurement angle and three
wave plates are used to automatically correct polarization misalignment.
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Figure 4.2: Photo of the light 30 cm after a (reflective) diffusive screen. The beam being
diffused is a 1 mm collimated beam. Granularity on the order of 0.1 mm can be seen in
the diffusion. The image in the photo is ≈20 cm in width.
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Figure 4.3: Photo of the reflective diffusive screen showing its granularity to be on the
order of 1 mm. Smaller granularity on the order of 0.1 mm can also be seen. The other
diffusive screens do not show the larger granularity but still have the smaller granularity
on the order of 0.1 mm. All screens show similar granularity in the diffusion, suggesting
the smaller granularity dominate the effect.
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Figure 4.4: Photo of the light 30 cm after a (reflective) diffusive screen when the input
beam is focused on the screen. The input beam is focused to ≈0.1 mm by a 5 cm lens,
creating a large amount of granularity (on the order of 1 mm) in the diffusion. The image
in the photo is ≈20 cm in width.
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Figure 4.5: Photo of the light 30 cm after a (reflective) diffusive screen when the input
beam is larger (and divergent) on the screen. The input beam is ≈1 cm when hitting the
screen. Some fine granularity, on the order of 0.01 mm, can still be seen. The image in the
photo is ≈20 cm in width.
137
−80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
Detector position [°]
In
te
ns
ity
 (n
orm
ali
ze
d t
o i
nit
ial
 po
we
r) 
[W
/cm
2 ]
 
 
Transmissive screen
Reflective screen 1
Reflective screen 2
Figure 4.6: Intensity profile of the diffusive screens at 30 cm. The measurement for the
reflective screens begins at 15.4◦ because it could not be measured at normal incidence
(0◦). The second reflective screen offers significantly less attenuation than the other two
screens.
shown to have a Gaussian profile. The power meter used had an active detection area of
9.7 mm by 9.7 mm [164], much larger than the 0.1 mm granularity.
The input lens of our receiver (Section 3.1.4) is 2-inch in diameter, leading to an area
of 20.4 cm2. The power received, given if first order by the measured intensity multiplied
by the ratio of the areas (20.4/0.94≈26), should therefore vary between ≈ 8× 10−3 W and
≈ 5×10−5 W, or 21–43 dB of attenuation. This is well withing the capabilities of our high
loss QKD system (Section 3.1) was shown to be capable of operation at over 50 dB of loss
(Section 3.3).
Since the intensity decreases quadratically with distance, the near normal incidence
diffusion of the best reflective screen should remain below 50 dB at up to 8.5 m. This
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makes the concept of QKD with a diffusive screen theoretically possible with our system
when considering only loss limits, as our system (described in Chapter 3) is capable of
operation at up to 56 dB in the asymptotic limit and up to 50 dB with finite size statistics.
4.1.2 Visibility of the diffusive screen
Another important consideration in the feasibility of QKD using a diffusive screen is the
effect of the screen on the polarization state. This effect is characterized using the polar-
ization visibility (Equation (2.24)). This was measured by sending polarized light, either
|H〉, |V〉, |D〉 or |A〉, and measuring the power received after diffusion in both the original
polarization and its orthogonal polarization. This was done for all four input states.
The average polarization visibility for each screen is shown in Table 4.1. All screens
exhibit a significant drop in polarization visibility when measured at a large angle, limiting
their use for QKD to less than 45◦. In addition, the first reflective screen suffers from poor
polarization visibility even at near 0◦. This poor visibility, combined with the screen’s
higher attenuation, makes the first reflective screen unsuitable for QKD. The other two
screens both show good polarization visibility near (or at) 0◦. The lower visibility of
the second reflective screen can be attributed to the non-zero angle (15.4◦) where it was
measured.
In addition to measuring the intensity of the diffused light for the initial and the or-
thogonal polarizations, we also measure the intensity of the polarizations in the other basis
(i.e. |D〉 and |A〉 for inputs |H〉 or |V〉; |H〉 and |V〉 for inputs |D〉 or |A〉). We found that,
for all screens and angles, the intensities were approximately the same in both of the two
polarizations regardless of the input states. This suggests that the screen depolarizes light
at larger angle, rather than applying an unitary to the state, i.e. the change is not a simple
rotation around the Bloch sphere [140]. While this does not rule out a transformation of
the polarization towards right-handed and left-handed circular polarizations, such a trans-
formation would be non-unitary as the non-orthogonal basis remains balance in all input
cases. Any unitary that would transform the input polarization |H〉 or |V〉 while main-
taining |D〉 and |A〉 balanced would not keep |H〉 and |V〉 balanced when the input state
is |D〉 or |A〉. Since the transformation cannot be a unitary, there no way to compensate
the effect of the screen using our automated polarization alignment (Section 3.1.5).
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Table 4.1: Diffusive screen visibility at 0◦ and 45◦ with a transmissive screen and for 15.4◦
and 45◦ with a reflective screens. The initial visibility without screen is also included (only
at 0◦ because the is no diffusion to send light at 45◦)
Average polarization
visibility near 0◦ [%]
Average polarization
visibility at 45◦ [%]
No screen 96.0 NA
Transmissive screen 95.1 86.2
Reflective screen 1 88.8 66.1
Reflective screen 2 93.3 82.9
4.2 QKD receiver requirements
While the loss and polarization visibilities of the screen is theoretically sufficient for our
system, the receiver design shown in Section 3.1.4 proved to be unsuitable for non colli-
mated light input. In addition, degradation of the detectors caused an increase in dark
counts, leaving us unable to perform the experiment without significant improvements to
our receiver.
4.2.1 Optical components and alignment
Our original quantum receiver (Section 3.1.4) consisted of a 2-inch input lens with a 250 mm
focus followed by a 6.5 mm lens with a 11 mm focus to collimate the beam inside the
receiver. Using geometrical optics [209] one can determine, to first order approximation,
the distance needed between the two lenses to leave a collimated beam after the second
lens:
d =
f1s0
s0 − f1 + f2 (4.1)
where d is the distance between the two lenses required to colimate the beams, s0 is the
object distance (distance from the first lens to the focal point of the object), and f1 and
f2 are the focal length of the first and second lens respectively. Because the size of the
beam when hitting the diffusive screen is much smaller than the size of the lens, we can
approximate the screen as a point source. The object distance s0 is then the distance
between the screen and the first lens. When using a collimated input beam, the object
distance tends to infinity. The distance required between the lenses (d) is then simply be
the sum of the two focus lengths (261 mm).
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Figure 4.7: Theoretical propagation of the light from the diffusive screen in the modified
quantum receiver using a 100 mm focal length input lens (L1). Even with the improvements
to the receiver, the theoretically predicted intensity reaching the 50 µm detector (D) active
area is only ≈30% of the light captured by the input lens. The screen is located 30 cm
from the input lens and the spot size on the screen is 1 mm. L2 has a 11 mm focal length
and L3 has a 30 mm focal length.
Using Equation (4.1), we find that when the screen is at 30 cm from the input lens,
the distance between the lenses should be 1511 mm, far beyond any reasonable length. To
reduce this distance it was necessary to change the input lens of the receiver. A 100 mm
focal length lens would require a much more modest 161 mm of separation. The quantum
receiver was further improved by replacing the 60 mm focal length lenses, used to focus the
incoming light onto the detectors, with 30 mm focal length lenses. This shorter focus lens
helps maximize the amount of light reaching the 50 µm detector active area by focusing
to roughly half the size that was possible with the 60 mm lens. In addition, the 5 mm
polarizing beam splitters cubes were replaced with 10 mm cubes, reducing the possibility
of stray light being detected without having passed through the polarizing beam splitters.
The theoretical performance of the system can be estimated more accurately using a
ray tracing software [210]. Figure 4.7 shows the predicted performance of the modified
receiver, revealing that much of the light still misses the active area of the detector. The
optimal performance was obtained with a lens separation (d) of 15 cm, where ≈30% of the
light captured by the input lens reaches the active area of the detector. Combined with the
measured intensity profile of the diffusive screens (Figure 4.6), the theoretical attenuation
at 30 cm from the screen should vary from ≈27–50 dB. Factoring in the detector efficiency
of ≈50% and a conservative optical transmission of 50%, we are left with a minimum
attenuation of ≈33 dB.
When the modifications were implemented, we found the minimum attenuation (using
the reflective screen with an angle near 0◦) to be closer to 42–45 dB. This may be due to
imperfect optics and limited alignment precision. We also found better results when the
input beam was more tightly focused on the screen, thus better approximating a point
source, despite the increase in granularity. At 1 m this yields a minimum attenuation of
52–55 dB, at the limit of our QKD system (which able to extract key at up to 56 dB in
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the asymptotic case) .
4.2.2 Detector
A crucial factor in enabling high loss QKD is to have very low background noise. This
not only requires good background shielding but also detectors with low dark counts. Our
free space detectors originally had very low dark counts (5–20 Hz). Unfortunately, these
detectors degraded over time, reaching dark counts closer to 50 Hz when the diffusive screen
QKD experiment was attempted. This significantly reduced the high loss capabilities of
our system. The increased dark counts resulted in a total noise increase of approximately a
factor 2, reducing the signal to noise ratio by half. Since the maximum attenuation where
a QKD system can function is directly proportional to the signal-to-noise ratio (in the
asymptotic case), this increase in background reduced the maximum loss capability of our
system from 56 dB to 53 dB. This results in a system barely capable of performing QKD
at a distance near 1 m, and an angle of 0◦.
The reduced capabilities of our system left us only capable of performing the experi-
ment at very low angles and close distances, making the demonstration considerably less
interesting. Instead of pursuing the experiment with the limited capabilities of the current
system, it was decided to postpone the experiment until new, low dark detectors could be
acquired.
4.3 Future steps of the diffusive screen QKD demonstration
Further improvements to the receiver could be obtained by replacing the free space detec-
tors with fiber couplers and using a fiber coupled detector. This would allow better control
over background noise and, since most fiber coupled detectors function with 100 µm core
fiber, could increase the area of the collected light by a factor 4. In addition, using a fiber
coupler would allow us to significantly reduce the distance between the second lens (used
to collimate the beam) and the fiber coupler. Alternatively, it may be more beneficial to
add an extra lens between the collimating lens and the fiber coupler to help collect the
light. While these improvements could render QKD with a diffusive screen feasible, the
reduced visibility at high angles will limit the range of the diffusive screen to withing 45◦
unless a better diffuser is found.
Due to time constraints, we were unable to implement all of these necessary improve-
ments, leaving us unable to complete the proof of concept demonstration. These improve-
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ments are still planned to be implemented, and we expect to perform this demonstration
in the near future. This demonstration is expected to be performed in collaboration with
Elena Anisimova, a PhD student working on new single-photon detectors with ultra-low
dark counts.
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Chapter 5
QKD with a moving receiver platform
In this chapter we discuss an experimental demonstration of QKD using a moving receiver
platform. Similar experiments where recently performed demonstrating QKD using a mov-
ing transmitter platform [54, 55, 211, 212]. In line with our goal of a satellite QKD uplink,
we designed and implemented our own system capable tracking a moving QKD receiver
and performing a successful key exchange while the receiver is moving at an angular speed
similar to a low Earth orbit satellite.
The experimental components of our system are detailed in Section 5.1. Section 5.2
discusses the experimental conditions of the experiment. The results are then presented
and discussed in Section 5.3. Finally, Section 5.4 presents the future improvements planned
for the system.
Author contributions
Brendon Higgins improved the pointing at tracking software and integrated the automated
polarization compensation system with the QKD software to allow active polarization com-
pensation. Catherine Holloway developed the initial pointing at tracking software. Nikolay
Gigov developed the QKD software. Thomas Jenewein and Brendon Higgins provided ad-
vice on the various parts of the experiment. I designed and built the transmitter and the
receiver platforms. I aligned the optical systems. Thomas Jennewein, Brendon Higgins,
Catherine Holloway, Christopher Pugh, Sarah Kaiser, Miles Cranmer, Christian Barna,
Sasha Chuchin, Jennifer Fernic and I performed the experiment. I analyzed the results
and performed the theoretical modeling of the intrinsic QBER of the source. Thomas Jen-
newein and I designed the new high rate QKD source that will be built in the near future
to improve the system.
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5.1 Experimental components
5.1.1 Pointing and tracking system
Our pointing system consists of two 80mm diameter RV Series Rotation Stage from New-
port [213]. These offer full 360◦ of travel range, fast rotation speed (20◦/s), and good
positioning accuracy (≤ 0.02◦). The motors are mounted using custom-built adapters,
with one motor turned 90◦. Both the transmitter and the receiver are mounted on such
systems, allowing them to be pointed towards each other. A custom-built counterweight
is added to ensure the weight is balanced on the motor’s axis. Each motors can function
with up to 91.8 kg when horizontal (axis of rotation is vertical) and up to 45.9 kg when
vertical (horizontal axis of rotation).
Figure 5.1 shows the pointing system with our quantum receiver mounted to it. The
horizontal motor, at the bottom, allowed us to set the azimuthal angle while the vertical
motor sets the elevation angle. The motors are controlled using a XPS Series Motion Con-
trollers [213] at the transmitter (which also controls three wave plates used for polarization
alignment, see Section 5.1.3), and a more compact ESP301 Motor Controller [213] at the
receiver.
The tracking system uses a Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) cam-
era measuring the position offset of incoming beacon lasers at 850 nm. This position
information is then used to adjust the pointing to match the incoming direction of the bea-
con lasers. One camera and three lasers are mounted together on both the transmitter and
on the receiver, using a custom-built holder, as shown in Figure 5.2. The camera has a field
of view of 4.73◦ in one axis and 5.91◦ in the other axis, and an accuracy of 0.0046◦/pixels.
This accuracy, along with the positioning accuracy of the motors (≤ 0.02◦), are the limiting
factor in the total pointing accuracy of the system.
Both the transmitter and the receiver are also equipped with an accelerometer and
gyroscope which can be used to determine the heading and motion of the system. At
the moment, the pointing software reads and record the data from the accelerometer and
gyroscope but does not make use of it. In a future improvement one could use of this data
to implement an initial acquisition system (before the beacon lasers are acquired by the
camera).
The motor positions are controlled by a custom tracking software (written in C#)
initially written by Catherine Holloway and improved by Brendon Higgins. The software
uses the position offset measured by the camera, based on the center of mass of the beacon
laser’s spot, to calculate the angular deviation of the spot and its angular speed. This
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Figure 5.1: Photo of the pointing system with the quantum receiver mounted to it. The mo-
tors allow us full range of motion for the pointing direction of the telescope. A custom-built
counterweight is used to balance the weight on the motors, ensuring proper performance
of the motors.
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Figure 5.2: Photo of the camera and beacon laser system used for tracking. Three lasers
are used for extra power and for redundancy should one fail during the experiment. Both
the transmitter and receiver are equipped with this camera and laser system, allowing
each camera to track the other’s lasers. The camera has a field of view of 4.73◦ in one axis
(1024 pixels) and 5.91◦ in the other axis (1280 pixels), corresponding to an accuracy of
0.0046◦/pixels.
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approach allowed for smooth, continuous motion, which is better for the motors, and more
appropriate for pointing with moving targets.
The spot velocity estimation uses the change in offset compared to the last frame,
taking into account the motor velocity, to estimate the angular speed. The velocities of
the motors are then set to match the angular speed of the spot plus a corrective velocity to
correct the spot offset. As the deviation of the spot is reduced the corrective velocity is also
reduced until the spot matches the desired position and the motor velocity matches the
angular speed of the spot. Both the spot velocity estimation and spot deviation correction
use an exponentially decaying weighting factor on its previous estimates to smooth out
the change and thus wash out the high frequency jitter. The system can operate at up to
25 Hz, limited by the frame rate of the camera. On the receiver, the system is limited to
12 Hz due to limitations of the software interface with the ESP301 Motor Controller.
The user interface is shown in Figure 5.3. From this user interface one can select the
camera, adjust the gain, the exposure time, and the minimum threshold for a pixel to be
considered (values below the threshold are assume to be background count by the program;
this threshold helps reduce the background interference when centering the spot from the
beacon lasers). The optimal position of the spot on the camera may not be at the center
due to imperfect collinearity of the beacon and camera compared to the quantum signal.
This is compensated by adjusting the X and Y offset which determine where on the camera
the spot will be centered. The user interface also allows one to input an initial tip and tilt
guess for initial acquisition.
Our pointing software is capable of achieving pointing accuracies on the order of 0.01◦.
5.1.2 Receiver platform
The original quantum receiver (Section 3.1.4) had a very narrow field of view of≈0.04 mrad,
or 0.002◦. Because this narrow field of view is significantly smaller than the pointing
accuracy of our system (on the order of 0.01◦) it was necessary to modify the receiver to
increase the field of view. We used a ray tracing software [210] to determine how these
modifications would affect our receiver. From this we found we could increase the field
of view by using an input lens (L1) with a tighter focus, and using a lens with a tighter
focus for the last lens (L4). We also found that adding an extra lens (L3) between the
collimating lens (L2) and the last lens (L4) would help collect light.
Our modified receiver design, shown in Figure 5.4, consists of a 2-inch diameter input
lens with a 100 mm focal length (L1) followed by a 6.5 mm diameter, 11 mm focal length
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Figure 5.3: Pointing system user interface. The program measures the position of the spot
seen on the camera and sets the motors velocity based on the angular velocity and position
offset of the spot.
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Figure 5.4: Photo of the modified receiver. A 2-inch diameter, 100 mm focal length
lens collects light which is collimated by a 6.5 mm diameter, 11 mm focal length lens. A
combination of a 1-inch diameter, 60 mm focal length lens and a 12.5 mm diameter, 10 mm
focal length lens are used to couple light into each of the four multimode fibers.
lens (L2) place immediately before a custom pentaprism beam-splitter (unmodified from
the original design).The distance between the first two lenses is 123 mm, slightly more than
the sum of their focal length (111 mm). The three wave-plates from the original design
were moved to the transmitter, allowing the receiver to be more compact. The 532 nm
filters (2 nm bandwidth) that were originally before the detectors were removed, and two
were placed before the pentaprism along with two shortpass filters with a cut-on (high
transmission) range of 400 nm to 700 nm.
The 5 mm polarizing beam splitter was replaced with 10 mm versions, an improvement
originally made to facilitate the demonstration of QKD with a diffusive screen (Chapter 4).
The four 1-inch diameter, 60 mm focal length lenses (L3), originally used to focus light
on the active area of the detectors, are now used to gather light for a 12.5 mm diameter,
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Figure 5.5: Theoretical propagation of the light with pointing mismatch in the modified
quantum receiver. The top image includes the source and the bottom image is a zoomed
view of the receiver. By improving the receiver design we are able to increase the theoretical
field of view by a full order of magnitude. Focal lengths are 100 mm (L1), 11 mm (L2),
60 mm (L3) and 10 mm (L4). The fiber couplers are marked as FC.
10 mm focal length lens (L4). These 10 mm focal length lenses (one in each of the four
arms) are used to focus light into 105 µm multimode fibers which carry the light into
four fiber coupled detectors. This fiber coupling allows us to increase the field of view, by
having a 105 µm core rather than a 50 µm active area, while helping to reduce background
counts. The detector system is a fiber coupled 4-channel photon counting card (SPCM-
AQ4C) from Excelitas Technologies [83]. These detectors have a 180 µm active area, a
detection efficiency of ≈48% at 532 nm, and an average dark count rate of 500 cps. While
these detectors do have a significantly higher dark count rate, their ability to function with
a 105 µm multimode fiber enables an greater field of view of the receiver, reducing the
loss from pointing as well as the number of dropouts expected by our system. In addition,
the lower losses and higher background counts expected by this demonstration reduces the
importance of low dark counts compared to the high loss demonstration.
Figure 5.5 shows the theoretical light propagation in the final version of the quantum
receiver. Light from a source, placed 1 m from the input lens, is focused on the input lens
and propagated up to the detector active area. The pointing mismatch from the receiver is
obtained by having a non-zero width to the source. The rays further from the center of the
source are received with pointing errors of arcsin(L/d), where L is the distance from the
center of the source to where the ray originates from, and d is the distance from the source
to the input lens. To simulate the pointing mismatch of the transmitter, we translate the
focus point of the rays away from the center of the input lens. This creates a transmitter
pointing error of arcsin(l/d), where l is the distance from the center of the input lens where
the light is focused. The field of view of the modified quantum receiver was measured to
be ≈0.4 mrad, or 0.02◦, a full order of magnitude greater than the original.
The receiver is mounted in the rear cargo area of a pickup truck (see Figure 5.6). To
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help reduce vibrations, we use a suspension system consisting of an inner tube placed under
the bottom breadboard, and bungee cords to hold the breadboard down. Four screws are
also attached to the optical breadboard to ensure the quantum receiver is secured on the
truck. These screws maintain the horizontal position of the receiver while allowing it to
freely move vertically by ≈10 cm. Beyond this range the screw head will either be stopped
by the wooden base, or the breadboard itself will come in contact with the base. This
vertical movement allows the suspension system to stabilize the receiver while providing a
“hard stop” should the suspension system break.
5.1.3 Transmitter system
The QKD source used for this experiment is the same as described in Section 3.1.1, except
with a different 810 nm pump laser. The titanium sapphire laser used in the original source
was not available and a different titanium sapphire laser, with 50 fs pulses (compared to
3 ps in the original titanium sapphire laser), was used instead. The light produced by the
source is sent to the transmitter using a single-mode fiber.
Our free-space transmitter (Figure 5.7), which was designed and built during the course
of this project, consists of a bare fiber on a five-axis fiber positioner and is collimated to a
≈1 cm beam using a 1-inch diameter, 30 mm focal length lens. A customized chopper wheel
(Figure 5.8), where six polarization films have been added, was used to characterize the
polarization drift in the fiber from the lab to the transmitter. Each of the six polarization
films measure one of 6 polarizations: horizontal, vertical, diagonal, anti-diagonal, right-
handed circular and left-handed circular. In addition, some of the closed slots of the
chopper have been removed to maximize the light transmitted.
The chopper is followed by at beam splitter reflecting 10% of the input light to a fiber
coupler, and a multimode fiber is used to send the light to a single-photon detector (one
channel of another SPCM-AQ4C 4-channel photon counting card from Excelitas Technolo-
gies [83]). The same automated polarization alignment software described in Section 3.1.5
is used determine the required compensation. The compensation is then implemented using
a set of three wave plates (two quarter-wave plates on either sides of a half-wave plate).
Since the chopper wheel is placed in the path of the beam, it will effectively reduce the
source frequency by half due to the wheel’s duty cycle (half of the slots are either closed or
contain a polarizer). This is different from additional loss as the signal-to-noise ratio in the
signals from the open slots remain the same as the signal-to-noise ratio if the chopper was
not present. A future improvement would be to move the chopper in the reflected path of
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Figure 5.6: Photo of the moving receiver platform. The receiver system is mounted on a
wooden platform using bungee cords and an inner tube which act as a suspension system
to reduce vibrations. The wooden platform is attached to the truck using bungee cords
at all four corners, acting as an additional suspension system in the horizontal plane (the
weight of the platform, ≈50 kg, and its low center of mass prevent any significant vertical
movement relative to the truck bed).
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Figure 5.7: Photo of the transmitter. Light coming out of a bare fiber is collimated using
a 1-inch, 3 mm lens. A modified chopper wheel is used to characterize the polarization
drift and a set of three wave plates is used to compensate the drift.
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Figure 5.8: Photo of the modified optical chopper wheel. Polarizers have been placed in Six
of the open slots for characterization and six closed slots have been removed to maximize
the duty cycle, allowing more signals to be transmitted intact. The final duty cycle is 50%,
effectively reducing the source frequency by half.
the 10% reflective beam splitter. This would require characterization of the phase change
induced by the reflection, an additional complication to the polarization compensation.
The transmitter is mounted on a second set of rotation stages and includes its own
set of camera and beacon lasers. The assembly is mounted in a dome on the roof of the
University of Waterloo Research Advancement Center 1 (Figure 5.9).
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Figure 5.9: Photo of the transmitter station. The transmitter system is mounted on an
aluminum frame in an astronomy dome. The frame is not attached to the floor but bags
of rocks are used at the bottom of the frame to increase stability and reduce vibrations.
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5.2 Experimental conditions
During the experiment, the truck drove along Westmount road, approximately 650 m from
the dome at the roof of the Research Advancement Center 1 where the transmitter was
located (Figure 5.10). The spot at the receiver (Figure 5.11) was approximately 12 cm in
diameter (FWHM). The truck was driven at speeds of ≈20 km/h and ≈30 km/h, leading to
theoretical angular speeds of 0.45◦/s and 0.68◦/s. The measured angular speeds were 0.5◦/s
and 0.75◦/s, suggesting actual speeds of 22 km/h and 33 km/h. In comparison, a LEO
satellite will have a maximum angular speed of ≈ 0.7◦/s (when near zenith). Therefore
the ≈30 km/h test corresponds to the worst case angular speed of a LEO satellite. Both
experimental tests where performed during the same night (June 21th 2014) under clear
sky and with a measured average temperature of 17.3◦C an no measured winds, with the
20 km/h test performed around 2:15 am and the 30 km/h test performed around 2:45 am.
The initial link was established at rest, at the earliest point in the road that allowed
a line-of-sight between the transmitter and the receiver. From there, the motors were
stopped and the truck was moved to an earlier point in the road (with no line-of-sight to
the transmitter). The motors were then turned on and the truck was accelerated from
rest to its desired speed while the transmitter was out-of-sight. Since no beacon could
be seen during this time, all signals registered by the camera were below the noise level
resulting in no motor movement from the pointing. Once a line-of-sight was established,
and the beacon acquired by the camera, the pointing system began adjusting the motors
and tracking the signal.
The total test duration, including acquisition was approximately 20 s at 20 km/h and
10 s at 30 km/h. For both tests the aquisition time was approximately 5 s. However, the
20 km/s test was less constant than the 30 km/h test, resulting in bigger dropouts of 2–3 s.
In contrast, the more stable 30 km/h test had only short sub-second dropouts. As a result,
quantum signals were visible for approximately 10 s and 5 s for 20 km/h and 30 km/h
respectively.
5.2.1 Analysis of the link loss
Data from an initial static test (used for characterization), where the motors were running
but the truck was stationary, yielded an intrinsic total loss of 27 dB (including channel,
receiver optics and detector efficiency). Using our link analysis, the estimated size of the
beam at the receiver (≈12 cm), and the pointing accuracy or our motors (measured to be
≈ 0.01◦ during the static test), we calculate a diffraction loss contribution of ≈12 dB and
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Figure 5.10: Map showing the location of the dome (red) and the part of the road the
truck was driven on (blue) during the moving receiver tests. The yellow lines represent the
cone in which the line-of-sight was possible. The distance from the dome to the truck is
≈650 m and the length of the road traveled during the test was ≈100 m. This map was
generated using Google Earth [214]
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Figure 5.11: Photo of the alignment beam spot at the receiver on Westmount (distance
of ≈650m). The spot size was approximately 12 cm in diameter (FWHM), over twice the
size of the input lens of the receiver telescope (2-inch)
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an additional ≈7 dB of average loss from the average beam broadening due to atmospheric
turbulence and transmitter pointing error. The detector efficiency also contribute an addi-
tional ≈3 dB. This leaves 5 dB of loss to be attributed to atmospheric transmittance and
optical losses in the receiver.
During preliminary tests in the lab, we aligned the transmitter and receiver over a
distance of ≈1 m and measured a total loss of ≈5 dB. Over this short distance diffraction
and atmospheric turbulence was negligible, leading to a spot size on the receiver of ≈1 cm
(same size as the beam at the output of the transmitter). Since this spot size is much
smaller than our receiver aperture (1-inch), we will essentially have no geometric losses. In
addition, the motors were inactive and the pointing was manually aligned to an accuracy
on the order of < 0.001◦, over an order of magnitude better than our motor’s accuracy,
and much better than the field of view of the receiver. Therefore, loss from pointing error
will also be essentially zero. Finally, atmospheric transmission will also have no significant
contribution over such a short distance. Therefore the measured ≈5dB of loss measured
can all be attributed to detector efficiency (3 dB) and optical losses in the receiver.
The 2 dB of optical losses measured in the lab can be attributed to two main causes,
imperfect coupling efficiency (misalignment) and optical components (including reflectivity,
absorption, etc.). The optical components contribution comes from reflectivity of the optics
(typically around 0.5% per optical components, giving a total of ≈4%), the imperfect
transmission of the filters (totaling a loss of ≈7%), a 5% loss at the pentaprism beam-
splitter (due to the third port containing 5% of the input light), and reflectivity of the
detector window (measured to be 2.5%). This leads to a total transmission of ≈82%,
roughly 0.8 dB of loss.
The coupling losses come from coupling from free-space into the multimode fibers and
from the coupling efficiency of the multi-mode fibers to the detectors. This coupling ef-
ficiency in the fiber is determined by the spacial overlap on the input beam on the fiber
core, while the coupling efficiency to the detector is determined by the overlap of the beam
at the output of the fiber with the detector active area. By replacing the multimode fiber
with a single-mode fiber and adjusting the position of the fiber in the receiver, we were
able to measure the the spot size hitting the fiber core to be on the order of 25 µm. This
would allow a coupling efficiency near unity (assuming a Gaussian beam distribution).
This suggest the other 1 dB of loss to be attributed to the coupling efficiency of the fiber
to the detectors (≈80% coupling).
In the 650 m test, additional optical losses would be incurred due to reduced coupling
efficiency into the multimode fibers, due to the lower pointing accuracy causing the beam
to be off-center compared to the fiber core, aberration of the beam at the edge of the lenses,
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and other imperfections in the optics. The field of view of the receiver was measured to
be 0.02◦, which corresponds to a drop in power of one standard deviation (60% in one
dimension, 37% in two dimension). At a deviation of 0.01◦ (our pointing accuracy), the
power would drop to 88% for each dimensions, totaling 78% (1.1 dB). We note that this
is just a rough calculation to estimate the coupling efficiency in order to determine if the
losses measured are reasonable. This rough method should not be considered exact.
The total loss due to atmospheric turbulence and optical losses at 650 m was measured
to be ≈5 dB. Using the lab measurement we can account for 2 dB caused by optical losses.
The previous rough calculation of the extra coupling loss due to pointing error of the
receiver allows us to account for an additional 1 dB. This leaves only ≈2 dB of loss which
would be caused by atmospheric transmittance, aberration of the beam at the edge of the
lenses and other imperfections in the optics.
The predicted atmospheric transmission losses after 650 m for a rural (5 km visibility)
sea-level rural atmosphere, modeled using MODTRAN [80], is 1.5 dB, leaving 0.5 dB to
be attributed to aberration of the beam at the edge of the lenses and other imperfections
in the optics.
While the truck was moving, we measured an additional 11 dB of loss on average,
increasing our total average loss to 38 dB. This extra loss was caused by the additional
vibrations of the receiver while the truck was moving, which effectively reduced pointing
accuracy of the receiver to a measured value of ≈0.04◦. Applying our previous rough
analysis of the coupling efficiency drop due to pointing error leads to a power drop to 13%
in each dimension, totaling 2% in both dimensions (17 dB). Since the initial drop in the
static test was 1.1 dB, this rough calculation predicts additional coupling efficiency loss of
15.9 dB compared to the static test, sufficient to explain the measured 11 dB of additional
loss. The various loss contributions are summarized in Table 5.1.
Based on this loss, and the results of the high loss demonstration (Chapter 3, where we
demonstrated QKD at up to 56 dB in the asymptotic limit), our system should be able to
perform QKD at up to an additional 18 dB of loss. If we where to increase the distance
without changing any part of the system, the extra losses would be due to geometric losses
(quadratic scaling when the beam waist is already much larger than the receiving telescope)
and atmospheric transmittance (exponential scaling), giving an additional transmission loss
of
−10 log10((
650
x
)2) + 1.5
x− 650
650
, (5.1)
where x is the new distance in meters. For an additional loss of 18 dB, the distance would
be x ≈ 2865 m. At this distance, the total geometric loss would be 31.9 dB and the
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Table 5.1: Summary of the loss contributions during a static and a moving test. Losses from
coupling efficiency was measured in the lab and and lens aberration and imperfect optics
are based on the measurement in the static test. All other values are theoretical predicted
using our link analysis and the specifications of the components. The total theoretical loss
shows that the measured losses are reasonable. The lower measured loss in the moving
test can be explained by the inaccuracy in the calculation of the loss contribution from the
receiver pointing error.
Loss contributor Loss in the
static test
[dB]
Loss in the
moving test
[dB]
Diffraction 12 12
Turbulence and transmitter pointing 19 19
Total Geometric 19 19
Receiver pointing 1 17
Atmospheric transmission 1.5 1.5
Lens aberration and imperfect optics 0.5 0.5
Optical losses 1 1
Coupling efficiency to the detector 1 1
Detector efficiency 3 3
Total 27 43
Measured 27 38
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atmospheric transmission would be 6.6 dB. Our system should therefore have a maximum
operable distance of around 2.9 km, limited mainly by geometric effects. We note that
the increased detector dark counts (≈500 cps instead of ≈10cps), as well as the increased
background counts, further limit the maximum loss tolerable by our system. Since the total
background and dark counts are ≈10 times greater than in the high loss demonstration, the
signal must also be ≈10 times greater to maintain the signal to noise ratio. This reduces
the maximum loss tolerable by our system to 46 dB (assuming the same intrinsic QBER
as the high loss demonstration), giving a maximum distance of around 1.35 km.
5.3 Results of the moving receiver demonstration
5.3.1 Performance of the pointing system
In both the 20 km/h and 30 km/h tests the truck accelerated to the desired speed before
the beacon was acquired by the camera. Once the beacon was acquired the pointing system
began tracking the link. In both cases the beacon was first acquired by the receiver camera.
Once the pointing system aligned the receiver, the transmitter camera also acquired the
receiver’s beacon and, allowing for the link to be established.
The reason the transmitter acquired the beacon laser later is because the precise heading
of the truck (and thus the precise direction the receiver was pointing towards) was hard
to replicate. Therefore, when the truck passed its initial calibration position (where the
link was initially established while the truck was static), the receiver’s beacon would point
in a different position than it was during the calibration and miss the transmitter. In
contrast, the transmitter remained static, thus maintaining a constant pointing direction
and allowing its beacon to still hit the receiver as it passed. Once the receiver acquired
the transmitter’s beacon and aligned to it, its beacon once again became visible at the
transmitter.
Pointing during the 20 km/h moving receiver test
In our first test the truck was driven at ≈20 km/h. The beacon spot deviation during the
test is shown in Figure 5.12. During the first 3 s of the test, only the receiver’s camera had
acquired a beacon signal. Once the transmitter’s camera also acquired beacon signal the
spot deviation stabilized. After ≈6 s, the spot stabilized to an average deviation of 0.005◦
in the transmitter camera (Alice) and 0.04◦ in the receiver camera (Bob).
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Figure 5.12: Beacon angular deviation measured by the camera during the 20 km/h test.
The receiver (Bob) shows an increased variation compared to the transmitter (Alice) which
is caused by additional jitter from the truck. The increased deviation in the x-axis (along
the direction of motion of the truck) suggest that the speed of the truck was not constant,
causing additional pointing error.
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The lower accuracy of the receiver can be attributed to vibrations at the receiver while
the truck was moving, causing additional jitter in the pointing direction of the receiver.
Since the position of the spot in the camera depends on the origin position of the beacon
relative to the pointing direction of the camera, the change in pointing direction of the
receiver due to jitter would directly affect the deviation of the spot on the receiver camera.
At the transmitter, the change in pointing direction of the receiver would only slightly
change the origin of the beacon, resulting in negligible deviation. The transmitter is also
affected by jitter from the aluminum frame (as it dissipates the angular momentum created
by the motors), however this jitter is much smaller than those caused by the truck, allowing
a more accurate pointing. We note that if the transmitter and receiver where swapped, with
the transmitter on the truck, the transmitter pointing would be reduced in the same way
as with the receiver. This would result in worst performance as the reduced transmitter
pointing would reduce the likelihood of the beam spot hitting the receiver, causing more
drop outs. In contrast, a lower pointing accuracy at the receiver causes lower efficiency
coupling, which increases loss, but rarely complete drop outs.
At both the transmitter and the receiver, the deviation was significantly worse in the
x-axis (along the direction of motion of the truck) compared to the y-axis (orthogonal
to the direction of motion). This is not due to the increased speed along the y-axis but
rather to the difficulty in maintaining a constant speed while driving. Our pointing system
calculates the average speed and implements it along with a correction factor, therefore
it should not be negatively affected by a faster constant speed. A non-constant speed
would however cause additional pointing error. In addition, the aluminum frame at the
dome will induce more jitter in the horizontal plane compared to the vertical plane (the
frame, which is not secured to the floor, is light enough to experience small sways from
side-to-side but will not move vertically). Therefore the frame will induce more jitter in
the x-axis compared to the y-axis when dissipating the angular momentum created by the
motors.
Figure 5.13 shows the speed of the motors during the test. Once again the transmitter’s
camera only acquire the beacon 3 s after the initial acquisition by the receiver. After
stabilization (at ≈6 s), the motors settle to a more constant angular speed to match the
angular speed of the truck. This is best seen at the transmitter (Alice) where the motors
settle to an angular speed of 0.53◦/s in the x-axis and 0.008◦/s in the y-axis.
At the receiver (Bob), the angular speed averaged 0.50◦/s in the x-axis and 0.018◦/s in
the y-axis. The angular speed at the receiver has more variations than the angular speed
at the transmitter because of the additional jitter of the truck. The average x-axis angular
speed is slightly lower than the average at the transmitter because it only included the
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Figure 5.13: Angular speed of the motors during the 20 km/h test. As was the case for
the spot deviation, the motor speeds at the transmitter (Alice) show less variation than
the motor speed at the receiver (Bob) due the the latter being negatively impacted by the
extra jitter of the truck. The x-axis angular speed at the receiver slowly increases during
the test, showing that the truck was accelerating.
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speed when the link was acquired (from ≈6 s to ≈19 s), thereby ignoring the region of
higher angular speed at 4–6 s that occurred before the link acquisition.
The x-axis angular speed at the transmitter shows a clear increase during the test, from
0.45◦/s at 7 s to 0.62◦/s at 19 s. This is due to the increasing speed of truck, which was
measured by the GPS receiver (Figure 5.14). This change in speed of the truck is what
caused the additional pointing error in the x-axis seen in Figure 5.12. The GPS receiver
also measured the heading of the truck, showing an average heading of ≈ 9◦ E of N with
small variation of ≈ 5◦ over the course of the test.
The measured angular speed of 0.53◦/s corresponds to the angular speed of a 600 km
altitude LEO satellite at 60◦ of elevation from the horizon, with the range 0.45–0.62◦/s
corresponding to 55–70◦ from the horizon. From Section 2.1 (specifically Figure 2.2), over
75% of passes never reach an elevation angle above 55◦. Only approximately 11% of passes
ever reach an elevation angle above 70◦ from the horizon. Therefore the 20 km/h test is
sufficient to represent the angular speed of almost 90% of passes.
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Figure 5.14: Speed, in km/h, and heading, in degree East (E) of North (N), of the truck
measured by the GPS during the 20 km/h test. The measured speed increases during the
test, showing that the increase in the angular speed of the transmitter motor was due to
increased speed of the truck. The heading of the truck varied between 7◦ and 12◦ E of N
and averaged ≈ 9◦ E of N.
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Pointing during the 30 km/h moving receiver test
For the second test, the truck was driven at ≈30 km/h to better represent the maximum
angular of a LEO satellite (0.7◦/s when near zenith). Figure 5.15 shows the beacon spot
deviation during the test. Once again the receiver’s camera was the first to acquire a
beacon signal. However, the transmitter’s camera acquired its signal sooner (around 1.5 s)
compared to the 20 km/h test (3 s), allowing for an earlier stabilization (after 3.5 s).
The stabilization time was also shorter (2 s instead of 3 s). This difference in acquisition
time may be the result of a more stable link (suggesting a more constant speed) and the
random nature of the jitter from the truck (which may have moved the beacon towards
the transmitter sooner).
The average deviation during the test (from≈3.5 s to≈9 s) was 0.005◦ in the transmitter
camera (Alice) and 0.06◦ in the receiver camera (Bob). Comparing with the 20 km/h test
(Figure 5.13), one can see that the amplitude of the deviations at the receiver increased due
to the higher speed of the truck, causing higher amplitude jitter and thus higher average
deviation. The deviation at the transmitter, for which the effect of the jitter from the
truck is negligible, did not change significantly compared to the 20 km/h test.
Another difference between the two tests is that the deviation at the receiver is similar
in both axis (both averaging to 0.06◦). This suggests the speed of the truck was almost
constant during the test. In contrast, the x-axis deviation the transmitter still showed a
significantly greater deviation than the y-axis (averaging 0.007◦ compared to 0.003◦). This
extra deviation is caused by the jitter in the aluminum frame which can sway from side-to-
side but not move up and down, creating more jitter in the x-axis. As stated previously,
this jitter is caused by the angular momentum created by the motor which is dissipated
by the frame.
The angular speed of the motors is shown in figure 5.16. Once the beacon was acquired
by the transmitter, at around 1.5 s, the angular speed quickly settled to an average angular
speed of 0.75◦/s in the x-axis and 0.012◦/s in the y-axis. The receiver averaged angular
speeds of 0.7◦/s in the x-axis and 0.013◦/s in the y-axis. Once again, the extra variation
in the receiver is due to the jitter from the truck, and the average angular speed in the
x-axis is lowered because the average ignores the higher angular speed of the motor before
the test fully stabilized (at ≈3.5 s).
The x-axis angular speed at the transmitter shows an almost constant speed during
the test. Upon closer inspection one can find that the speed was still increasing, but at a
much slower rate than the 20 km/h test. The angular speed increase of the 30 km/h was
≈ 0.03◦/s (compared to ≈ 0.17◦/s during the 20 km/h test). The speed measured by the
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Figure 5.15: Beacon angular deviation measured by the camera during the 30 km/h test.
Once again the increase in variation at the receiver (Bob) can be attributed to the jitter
produced by the truck. The average deviation in the x-axis at the receiver is the same
as the average deviation in the y-axis, suggesting a more constant angular speed. The
transmitter (Alice) however still show increased deviation in the x-axis, caused by the
jitter in the frame, since it can more easily move in the horizontal plane compared to the
vertical plane.
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Figure 5.16: Angular speed of the motors during the 30 km/h test. The higher variation
at the receiver (Bob) is again due to the jitter of the truck. Unlike the 20 km/h test, the
x-axis angular speed at the transmitter (Alice) shows a more constant speed with only a
small increase of ≈ 0.03◦/s during the test.
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GPS receiver (Figure 5.17) also showed a very constant speed with a small increase. This
more constant speed is reflected in the beacon spot deviation at the receiver (Figure 5.15)
which showed no significant difference between its x-axis deviation (along the direction of
motion of the truck) and its y-axis deviation (orthogonal to the direction of motion). Once
again, the heading of the truck had only a small variation (≈ 3◦), with an average heading
of ≈ 10◦ E of N.
The measured angular speed of 0.75◦/s is greater than the maximum angular speed of
a 600 km altitude LEO satellite (≈ 0.7◦/s at zenith). The 30 km/h test thus represents a
pointing and tracking situation that is worst than any part of a LEO satellite pass.
5.3.2 Performance of the polarization compensation system
Before being transmitted by our receiver telescope, the quantum signal, which originates in
our lab on the first floor of the Research advancement center 1, must travel trough ≈70 m of
fiber. This fiber will introduce a unitary change, based on the thermal and physical stress
along the fiber, which will cause a misalignment of the polarization states. In addition,
the fiber connecting to the transmitter is exposed to the outside environment and will
move as the transmitter is rotated, causing the unitary to change during the tests. These
change to the polarization states are compensated using a polarization characterization
and compensation system where the measurement is performed using a chopper wheel and
the compensation is implemented using a set of three wave plates.
Lab demonstration of the polarization compensation system
Using the polarization characterization we can monitor the polarization states after travel-
ing through the fiber and estimate the quality of the polarization states after the compen-
sation. During initial test in the lab (Figure 5.18), the polarization compensation system
was shown to be capable of compensating random polarization change in ≈3–5 s. The po-
larization change was simulated by randomly moving a fiber-based polarization controller.
Since the update period of the polarization compensation system is only 1 Hz, 3–5 s
corresponds to only 3–5 steps. This however is not the speed limit of the polarization com-
pensation system. The speed of the compensation is determined by a cost factor that limits
how far the wave plates will move. This cost factor is a user given value of the relative
weight of the movement distance of the wave plates (in degree) compared to the expected
gain in polarization visibility. A high cost factor will reduce the speed of the compensa-
tion, leading to more stable yet potentially less optimal polarization compensation. If the
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Figure 5.17: Speed, in km/h, and heading, in degree East (E) of North (N), of the truck
measured by the GPS during the 30 km/h test. The measured speed was vary stable during
the test, with a slightly higher speed at the beginning, before the link acquisition. The
heading of the truck varied between 9◦ and 12◦ E of N and averaged ≈ 10◦ E of N.
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Figure 5.18: Measured post compensation QBER in the lab. The change in polarization
was produced by randomly moving a fiber-based polarization controller. After the change,
the polarization compensation system requires only ≈3–5 s to compensates the change.
The minimum QBER value is limited by the source.
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cost factor is too high may lead to a slower polarization compensation than the drift it’s
trying to compensate, resulting (over time) in a drop in the visibility of the compensated
polarization. However a cost factor too low will cause high instantaneous movement of the
wave plates which will reduce the stability of the polarization at the output. In extreme
cases the new wave plate setting may be further than the per second speed of the wave
plate’s rotation stage (20◦/s), reducing the update of the polarization compensation as it
waits for the motion to finish. Lower cost factors (which could compensate the polarization
change faster than 3–5 s) had visibly lower stability when there were no polarization drift.
In the moving tests, the polarization drift is expected to be slow, and therefore is
not well represented by a large instantaneous change. The cost factor that produced
the lab result of 3–5 s compensation was chosen because it allowed for a reasonably fast
compensation without significant impact on the stability when there were no polarization
drift.
Performance of the polarization compensation system during the tests
Because the characterization is performed using the same timing analysis as the QKD
software, where the proper peak is chosen based on its QBER, an initial rough alignment
had to be performed manually using fiber-based polarization controller located in the lab.
This alignment allowed us to achieve an initial QBER at the transmitter of ≈10%. This
alignment is insufficient to properly perform QKD yet it is sufficient to ensure the proper
peaks will be easily discernible by the software compared to the the other peaks which only
have random correlations with the expected states (averaging 50% QBER). From there the
polarization compensation can return the state to its original polarization produced in the
lab.
The QBER measured at the transmitter before compensation and the predicted QBER
after compensation are shown in Figure 5.19 for the 20 km/h test, and in Figure 5.20
for the 30 km/h test. In both tests, the pre-compensation QBER was measured around
10–12% and the post-compensation QBER was predicted to be around 6–7%. The pre-
compensation QBER also shows an increase during the tests (more so in the 30 km/h test),
while the post compensation QBER is, on average, constant.
In both tests, the pre-compensation and post-compensation QBER show a correlated
variation on the order of 2%. This correlation is mainly due to variation in purity of the
polarization states at the source. In addition, noise from background and dark counts will
also result in variation of the measured an predicted QBER.
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Figure 5.19: Measured pre-compensation and predicted post-compensation QBER at the
transmitter during the 20 km/h test. The polarization compensation system corrects the
unitary induced by the fiber and returns the polarization states to its intrinsic QBER of
≈6–7% (limited by the quality of the source in the lab).
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Figure 5.20: Measured pre-compensation and predicted post-compensation QBER at the
transmitter during the 30 km/h test. Once again the polarization compensation system
corrects the unitary induced by the fiber and returns the polarization states to its intrinsic
QBER of ≈6% (limited by the quality of the source in the lab).
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5.3.3 Analysis of the intrinsic QBER of the WCP QKD source
The post-compensation QBER is limited by the quality of the source in the lab. A possible
cause is an imperfect overlap between the two crystals, which in turn is due to the short
pulse duration and large bandwidth of the titanium sapphire laser used as 810 nm pump.
The titanium sapphire laser used had a short pulse duration of ≈50 fs, giving it a Fourier
limited bandwidth of ≈20 nm. Using filters, the bandwidth was reduced to ≈2 nm, giving
a Fourier limited pulse duration of ≈500 fs. In comparison, the titanium sapphire laser
used in the high loss QKD demonstration (Chapter 3) had a pulse duration of ≈3 ps and
a bandwidth of <1 nm.
The shorter pulse duration can causes the up-converted 532 nm beam in each of the
two crystals to be more sensitive to temporal mismatch, causing a bad temporal overlap
between the two beams. In addition, the increased spectral width allows for mismatch in the
up-converted spectra of the two crystals, which have non-identical up-conversion efficiency
curves as a function of spectrum. A shorter spectrum reduces the allowed spectrum of
up-conversion, making is easier to match the efficiency curve more closely. Together, both
of these effect reduce the overlap of the up-converted beams, limiting the quality of the
states that are produced from a combination of the two crystals (such as the diagonal state,
which is produced by equal overlapping of the two output beams with a phase of +1). Any
imperfect overlap and imbalance will affect the states in a non-unitary way, preventing the
polarization compensation from reversing their effect (since wave plates can only be used
to implement unitary transformations).
The modulators may also cause increased intrinsic QBER, either by applying the wrong
phase to the states or due to an imbalance in power between the two arms of the interfer-
ometer. An imbalance will limit the quality of the states in a similar way as an imbalance
in the efficiency of the crystals, and is therefore also not unitary and thus cannot be re-
versed by the polarization compensation system. Since each states is determined by their
respective phases, any deviation from the intended phase in the modulators will change the
state and cause additional QBER. Such deviations would affect the states on an individual
basis and therefore cannot be undone using the polarization compensation (except in the
case of a single constant deviation for all phases).
Polarization states predicted by the polarization compensation system
We can visualize the polarization states by using a Bloch sphere representation [140].
Figure 5.21 (Figure 5.22) shows the projection of the state onto the equator of the Bloch
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sphere during one second of the 20 km/h (30 km/h) test. The equator of the Bloch sphere
represents the linear polarizations (diagonal is 0◦, vertical is 90◦, antidiagonal is 180◦ and
horizontal is 270◦), allowing us to easily visualize polarizations states compared to their
intended polarizations. Even after compensation, three of the four predicted polarization
states in the 20 km/h test, and two of the four states in the 30 km/h, show a length of
much less than one. This is due in part to the states having a non-zero contribution in the
axis orthogonal to the equator (which corresponds to right-handed and left-handed circular
polarizations), and in part to non-perfect purity of the states.
A pure state is any state that can be represented by a state vector [17]. In contrast,
states that are not pure states (called mixed state) can only be described by a set of two
or more state vectors with a probability distribution for each state vector. For example,
the diagonal state is a pure state that can be described as |D〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V〉). However,
a mixed state composed of equal part |H〉 and |V〉 cannot be represented as a single vector
combination of |H〉 and |V〉 but must instead be seen as having equal probability (50%) of
being either |H〉 or |V〉, never a combination.
Table 5.2 shows the purity (measure of how pure a state is) and fidelity (measure of the
overlap between the measured state and the theoretical state) of the post-compensation
polarization states. Each of the four intended polarizations states (horizontal, vertical,
diagonal and antidiagonal) are pure states, yet the average purity for all four state during
the tests where 0.91 in the 20 km/h test and 0.92 in the 30 km/h test, indicating that the
states were partially mixed (all non-mixed states should have a purity of one). The decrease
in purity can be caused by imperfect overlap of the up-converted beams of the two crystals,
and can also be caused by background contributions. The background contribution would
affect all four polarization states equally (on average), yet in both tests the average purity
of the antidiagonal state (≈0.99% in both tests) and the purity of the horizontal state
(≈96% in the 20 km/h test and ≈0.99% in the 30 km/h test) are much higher than the
purity of the diagonal (≈89% in both tests) and vertical (≈78% in both tests) states. This
implies that the background can only have a small contribution in the degradation of the
purity for the diagonal and vertical states, with the rest of the contribution being due to
the imperfect overlap of the up-converted beams of the two crystals.
The polarization states are also visibly skewed towards ≈ 135◦. This could be caused
by the polarization compensation not fully compensating the unitary in the fibers, an
imbalance in the efficiency of the two crystals, and imbalance in the transmission of the two
arms of the modulators, or a deviation from the intended phases applied by the modulators.
To identify the cause we model these effects and optimize the parameters to replicate the
states observed. This analysis is done using a density matrix representation [17].
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Figure 5.21: Measured pre-compensation (top) and predicted post-compensation (bottom)
polarization states projected on the equator of the Bloch sphere. Even after compensation
the four states do not match the theoretical distribution (90◦ from each other) and are
instead skewed towards ≈ 135◦. This can be caused by an imbalance in the total up-
conversion efficiency of the crystals. In addition, the length of three of the two vectors
are less than unity due to the non-perfect purity of the states which is can be caused by
imperfect overlap of the up-converted beams from the two crystals.
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Figure 5.22: Measured pre-compensation (top) and predicted post-compensation (bottom)
polarization states during the 30 km/h test projected on the equator of the Bloch sphere.
Once again the states are skewed towards ≈ 135◦, possibly due to the imbalance in the
total up-conversion efficiency of the crystal. The length of the vector are slightly closer to
unity than in the 20 km/h, which may suggest a slightly better overlap of the up-converted
beams from the two crystals, or better signal-to-noise ratio at the transmitter during the
30 km/h test.
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Table 5.2: Purity and fidelity of the the predicted state post-compensation polarization
states. Both the purity and fidelity of the 30 km/h test are better than those for the
20 km/h test, suggesting a lower intrinsic QBER of the source.
20 km/h test 30 km/h test
Expected state Purity Fidelity Purity Fidelity
|H〉 0.9566 0.9601 0.9952 0.9839
|V〉 0.7832 0.8659 0.7867 0.8705
|D〉 0.8927 0.9347 0.8900 0.9337
|A〉 0.9927 0.9807 0.9960 0.9835
Average 0.9063 0.9354 0.9170 0.9429
Theoretical model of polarization effects from the source
The input state at the modulator interferometer is the diagonal state (|D〉 = 1/√2(|H〉 +
|V〉)), which can be represented with the density matrix [140]
ρD =
[
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
]
. (5.2)
The phase modulators will apply a phase difference between the two arms of the inter-
ferometer. Since we cannot measure global phases, we can model the phase modulators
as applying a phase to the vertical (|V〉) component of the state only. This phase can be
modeled using the unitary [140]
Uphase =
[
1 0
0 eiφ
]
, (5.3)
where φ is the phase being applied for each states. The theoretical phases are pi/2 for |H〉,
−pi/2 for |V〉, 0 for|D〉, and pi for|A〉).
The imbalance in the two arms of the modulator will cause one of the two components
of the state (either the |H〉 component or the |V〉 component) to be greater than the other.
For a general state, this effect will cause the transformation
Umod(α |H〉+ β |V〉) = Nfactor(α cos θmod |H〉+ β sin θmod |V〉), (5.4)
implying
Umod = Nfactor
[
cos θmod 0
0 sin θmod
]
. (5.5)
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Nfactor is a normalization factor which is determined by the normalization condition
α2 cos2 θmod + β
2 sin2 θmod = 1, (5.6)
which depends on the amplitudes α and β of the state it’s acting upon. This unusual
normalization condition arises because the imbalance process is not unitary. It can be seen
as loss acting independently on each arms of the interferometer, giving a probability of
the photon state being loss. To maintain normalization we must post-select on having a
photon state exit the interferometer, leading to the above normalization condition.
After the interferometer, the state is rotated to transform the right-handed and left-
handed circular polarizations to horizontal and vertical polarizations. The rotation matrix
performing this transformation is given by
R =
1√
2
[
1 −i
i 1
]
. (5.7)
The state then travels through fibers to the up-conversion source. This fiber will induce
an unknown unitary on the state. All unitary rotations of the polarization state are part
of the special unitary group SU(2) [215] and can be written as
Ua =
[
cos(θa)e
iφa − sin(θa)e−iψa
sin(θa)e
iψa cos(θa)e
−iφa
]
. (5.8)
During the up-conversion, the efficiency of the crystals may be unbalanced, leading to
a similar effect as the imbalance in the modulator. The transformation can be modeled in
the same way:
Ucryst = Nfactor
[
cos θcryst 0
0 sin θcryst
]
, (5.9)
with the normalization condition
α2 cos2 θcryst + β
2 sin2 θcryst = 1. (5.10)
Finally, the state will be rotated by the unitary of the fiber going to the roof and by the
polarization compensation system (using the wave plates). The polarization compensation
system attempts to return the state to the correct orientations by calculating the wave plate
positions that will maximize the fidelity of the states. Because some of the effects describe
above are not unitary rotation, the polarization compensation will attempt to rotated
the states to the closest match it can find. Therefore, the polarization compensation will
not only compensate the unitary of the fiber to the roof but also the other polarization
degrading effect.
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Table 5.3: Fidelity of the modeled state with the predicted state (from the polarization
compensation system) at the output of the transmitter. Our model found good agreement
with most of the polarization states except the vertical state, where the fidelity was only
88% and 89% for the 20 km/h and 30 km/h test, respectively.
Expected
state
Fidelity for the
20 km/h test [%]
Fidelity for the
30 km/h test [%]
|H〉 96.37 99.31
|V〉 88.16 89.12
|D〉 94.19 94.73
|A〉 99.85 100.00
Average 94.64 95.79
We can model both the unitary of the fiber to the roof and the unitary applied by the
polarization compensation system with a single SU(2) matrix:
Ub =
[
cos(θb)e
iφb − sin(θb)e−iψb
sin(θb)e
iψb cos(θb)e
−iφb
]
. (5.11)
The final state at the output of the transmitter is then given by
UbUcrystUaRUmodUphaseρDU
′
phaseU
′
modR
′U ′aU
′
crystU
′
b (5.12)
where ′ denotes the conjugate transpose of the matrix.
Applying the theoretical model of polarization effects of the source
We applied our model by optimizing the parameters to maximize the fidelity of our mod-
eled polarization states at the transmitter with the predicted states from the polarization
compensation system. We found average fidelities of 95% and 96% for the 20 km/h and
30 km/h test respectively (Table 5.3). In both cases, the fidelity of the vertical state (|V〉)
was the limiting factor, with 88% for the 20 km/h test and 89% fidelity for the 30 km/h
test respectively. For all other states the fidelity was above 94%, reaching as high as 100%
for the the antidiagonal state (|A〉). The optimized parameters are listed in Table 5.4.
Only two of the four of the phases applied by the modulators showed significant devi-
ation form the desired values (φV and φD), while the other two (φH and φA) showed only
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Table 5.4: Optimized parameters used to model the state at the output of the transmitter.
Two of the phases (φV and φD) showed a significant deviation from the desired values
which would result in non-unitary degradation of the polarization states, which cannot
be corrected by the polarization compensation system. In addition, the crystals showed a
significant imbalance (θcryst) which would also result in a non-unitary degradation of the
polarizations states. While the unknown unitary from the modulator to the crystals (θa,
φa and ψa) and the unknown unitary from the crystals to the output of the transmitter (θa,
φa and ψa) both showed significant deviations, both of these are unitary and can therefore,
in principle, be compensated by the polarization compensation system.
Parameter Desired value
for minimum
intrinsic QBER
Value for the
20 km/h test
Value for the
30 km/h test
φH 1.5708 1.5708 1.5953
φV −1.5708 −1.5217 −1.4603
φD 0 −0.1104 −0.1227
φA 3.1416 3.1661 3.0802
θmod 0.7854 0.7977 0.7977
θa 0 −2.0494 1.1045
φa 0 −0.0491 0.0245
ψa 0 3.1416 3.0925
θcryst 0.7854 0.9940 0.9695
θb 0 1.0917 1.1024
φb 0 −3.1054 3.1170
ψb 0 −3.1209 −3.1907
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small deviation. The states that showed higher deviations in the modulator phases are also
the one that showed the lowest fidelity during the experiment (Table 5.2), suggesting that
a large part of the reduced fidelity of these two states may have been caused by the phase.
The modulator’s interferometer showed little imbalance (θmod), suggesting it did not have
a significant impact on the intrinsic QBER. However, the balance in the crystals (θcryst)
showed a significant deviation from the desired value, resulting in efficiencies of ≈30% in
one crystals and ≈70% in the other, a ratio of 2.3. This would significantly affect the in-
trinsic QBER of the source. These effects (modulator phases, imbalance in the modulator
interferometer and imbalance in the efficiency of the crystal) are non-unitary and therefore
cannot be compensated by the polarization compensation system.
In principle, both the unknown unitary from the modulator to the crystals (θa, φa and
ψa) and the unknown unitary from the crystals to the output of the transmitter (θa, φa
and ψa) can be compensated by the polarization compensation system (as they are unitary
transformations). Therefore, while their values deviate significantly from the desired values
it would not directly contribute to the degradation in the intrinsic QBER of the source.
It is of interest to point out the high variation in the angle θa of the unknown unitary
from the modulator to the crystals, the only parameter that showed a large change between
the two tests. This change corresponds to 3.1535, of 1.0039pi. Because φa ≈ 0 and ψa ≈ pi,
the unitary will be:
Ua ≈
[
cos(θa)e
0 − sin(θa)e−ipi
sin(θa)e
ipi cos(θa)e
0
]
=
[
cos(θa) sin(θa)
− sin(θa) cos(θa)
]
, (5.13)
for the 20 km/h test and
Ua ≈
[
cos(θa + pi)e
0 − sin(θa + pi)e−ipi
sin(θa + pi)e
ipi cos(θa + pi)e
0
]
=
[
− cos(θa) − sin(θa)
sin(θa) − cos(θa)
]
, (5.14)
for the 30km/h test. Therefore both unitaries are equivalent up to a global phase pi.
Finally, the deviation of the parameters in the unknown unitary from the crystals
to the output of the transmitter (θa, φa and ψa) are likely caused by the polarization
compensation system which attempts to correct the polarization states to maximize fidelity.
Since the fidelity is affected by processes beyond the unitary from the fiber to the dome, the
polarization compensation system will not compensate this last unitary but will instead
try to compensate all effects as best it can.
This can be visualized by calculating the polarization states after the crystals, pro-
jecting it on the equator of the Bloch sphere and comparing it with the state after the
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polarization compensation system (Figure 5.23 and 5.24). The polarization states after
the crystals is calculated by applying the inverse of the unitary from the crystals to the
output of the transmitter (calculated by our model) to the predicted polarization state
after the transmitter. This shows how compensating only the unitary in the fiber to the
dome would result is significantly worst fidelity.
The largest non-unitary deviation occurs at the efficiency imbalance of the crystals,
suggesting is was the main limitation in the intrinsic QBER of the source. In addition,
imperfect overlap of the crystals (which was not modeled) would reduce purity. Applying
The calculated unknown unitary from the modulator to the crystals in reverse to the
polarization axis at the crystals (horizontal and vertical), we find that the axis of the
crystals is rotated by ≈ 35◦ on the equator of the Bloch sphere. This would bring the axis
of the crystals from 90◦/270◦ (H/V) to 125◦/305◦, in close agreement with the observed
135◦ from Figure 5.21 and 5.22 (which is also affected by the individual phases at the
modulator).
More stable optical alignment, along with a longer pulse duration and shorter band-
width, would be required to return the QKD source to a better intrinsic QBER (the
titanium sapphire laser used in the high loss QKD demonstration allowed for an intrinsic
QBER of ≈2%). However the new titanium sapphire laser is designed to produce femtosec-
ond pulses and cannot generate longer pulses. In addition, increasing the pulse duration
by using additional spectral filtering reduces the power available for up-conversion, limit-
ing the average photon number of our pulses to less than our desired µ = 0.5. This not
only decreases the signal-to-noise at the receiver (which in turns increases the QBER), but
also reduces the signal-to-noise ratio at the polarization compensation system, limiting
the compensation quality during the test. We therefore had no choice but to perform the
experiment with the current intrinsic source as no other pulsed pump laser was available.
This theoretical modeling of the intrinsic QBER of the source was performed after the
test and time constraints prevented us from performing the experiment again. A more
rudimentary version of this analysis has been implemented as part of the polarization
compensation system so that the performance of source can be better characterize in future
experiment.
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Figure 5.23: Modeled polarization states at the output of the crystals (top) and Post-
compensation polarization states predicted by the polarization compensation system at the
transmitter (bottom) during the 20 km/h test projected on the equator of the Bloch sphere.
The polarization compensation system is capable of improving the fidelity of the states by
compensating based on fidelity with the initial states rather than simply compensating the
unitary of the fiber to the dome (which would result in the same polarization states at the
transmitter as the ones at the output of the crystals).
189
  0.2
  0.4
  0.6
  0.8
  1
30
210
60
240
90
270
120
300
150
330
180 0
 
 
H after compensation
V after compensation
D after compensation
A after compensation
  0.2
  0.4
  0.6
  0.8
  1
30
210
60
240
90
270
120
300
150
330
180 0
 
 
H after compensation
V after compensation
D after compensation
A after compensation
Figure 5.24: Post-compensation polarization states predicted by the polarization compen-
sation system (top) and modeled post-compensation polarization states (bottom) during
the 30 km/h test projected on the equator of the Bloch sphere. Once again the fidelity of
the states at the transmitter is improved by having the polarization compensation system
maximize the fidelity of the states with the initial states rather than simply compensating
the unitary of the fiber to the dome.
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5.3.4 Performance of the full system
Full system during 20 km/h moving receiver test
The measured QBER and count rates measured at the receiver during the 20 km/h test is
shown in Figure 5.25. For the first 6 s (before the link stabilized) there were no significant
quantum signals recorded by the receiver, leading to high QBER (≈40%). While this
QBER is below the typical average background QBER, one must remember that the QKD
software determines the correct peak by minimizing QBER. In this case there were no real
peaks and so the program optimized on the area of background counts with the lowest
QBER.
The average background counts measured at the receiver during this acquisition period
was ≈1500 cps, and the timing widow used was 1 ns. Since the period of the source is
12.5 ns, this implies that the average count rate after time filtering was only ≈120 cps,
half of which are discarded during sifting. The signal pulses represent 92% of the pulses,
while the decoy pulses represent 8% of the pulses. Therefore an average of only 55 cps
are attributed to signals and 5 cps to decoys. These low count rates are what allows the
program (which identifies the correct signal peak based on minimum QBER) to post select
on QBER than strongly deviate from the expected 50% (especially with the decoy QBER).
Once the link stabilizes the receiver begins to receive quantum signal counts. The
average count rate from the quantum signals was around 30000 cps, with a maximum
count rate of 45000 cps and short drop outs at ≈9–10 s and at ≈16–17 s. As the count rate
rises the QBER also drops because it is no longer based on noise. Peaks can also be seen
on the user interface (Figure 5.26), showing the time correlation of the quantum signals.
A comparison of the predicted QBER at the transmitter after compensation (as seen
in Figure 5.19) with the measured signal QBER at the receiver (Eµ in Figure 5.25) is
shown in Figure 5.27. The measured QBER drops to a value very close to the predicting
QBER, indicating that the link’s contribution to the total QBER is significantly less than
the intrinsic QBER. The QBER’s increase in the link is due to transmitter and receiver
misalignment and background counts.
Full system during 30 km/h moving receiver test
Figure 5.28 shows the measured QBER and count rates in the 30 km/h test. Similarly to
the 20 km/h test, there were no significant quantum signal recorded by the receiver until
the link stabilized at ≈4 s. The below average signal QBER is again due to the software
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Figure 5.25: QBER and count rate measured at the receiver during the 20 km/h test. The
shaded regions around the QBERs corresponds to a 95% central credible interval (described
in Section 3.3.3). The QBER drops when the count rate increases at 7–15 s. Outside of
this range the QBER is based on noise. The decoy state QBER has higher fluctuations
compared to the signal QBER because it is based on a very small number of counts (on
the order of 5 cps). The 100% decoy QBER measured at ≈5 s occurred when only 2 decoy
counts were measured (both happened to be orthogonal to the intended polarization).
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Figure 5.26: Snapshot of the user interface showing quantum signal peaks during 1 s of the
20 km/h test. The background level can also be seen at the base of the peaks. Once again
the width of the signal peak is determined by the combined contributions of the laser pulse
width (≈50 fs, negligible), the drift in the repetition rate of the pulsed laser (typically a few
100s of ps), the detector timing jitter (≈600 ps, includes detector electronics), the timing
accuracy of the time-tagger (156.25 ps) and the delay of the four detectors compared to
each other (typically aligned within 100–200 ps).
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Figure 5.27: Comparison of the predicted QBER at the transmitter after compensation
with the measured QBER at the receiver during 20 km/h test. Once the link is stabilized
the measured QBER reduces to a value only slightly higher than the predicted QBER at
the transmitter, showing that there is minimal QBER increase due to the link. The higher
QBER at ≈9.5 s is due to a drop of the received counts (see Figure 5.25). Shaded area
represents points where the number of signal counts at the receiver exceeded 10000.
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minimizing on the QBER. One difference with the 20 km/h test is that the decoy QBER
remains high during the link acquisition time. However, the total decoy counts during
that time was only 7 counts, averaging less than 2 cps. Therefore the decoy states did not
significantly affect the QBER minimization. It is therefore not unreasonable for the decoy
states to have high QBER in this region given the high statistical uncertainty and the fact
that they did not significantly affect the QBER minimization.
After stabilization, the quantum signals increased the count rate a the receiver to up to
70000 cps. In contrast to the 20 km/h test, the 30 km/h test did not experience any drop
outs. Drop outs are a random effect caused by pointing error (mainly the transmitter’s
pointing error), and therefore do not always occur. As with the 20 km/h test, the QBER
dropped as the count rates increased beyond the noise level. Figure 5.29 shows the time
correlated peaks from the quantum signals, confirming that the higher count rate is not
based on noise.
Figure 5.30 shows a comparison of the predicted QBER at the transmitter after com-
pensation (as seen in Figure 5.20) with the measured signal QBER at the receiver (Eµ in
Figure 5.28). Once again the measured QBER is only slightly higher than the predicting
QBER, indicating that the link’s contribution to the total QBER is significantly less than
the intrinsic QBER.
Time-of-flight correction
A first order time-of-flight correction was implemented to compensate the change in the
time delay of the received counts while the truck was moving. This time-of-flight cor-
rection used the GPS coordinate to calculate the change in the transmission path length
between two seconds, and implemented a linear correction on the time-tags in the sec-
onds. Therefore, the accuracy of the time-of-flight correction is reduced when the change
in transmission path length deviates from a constant. The time-of-flight extracted from
the GPS is shown in Figure 5.31. The change in the time-of-flight is very close to being
linear, suggesting that our model is sufficient to compensate it’s effect.
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Figure 5.28: QBER and count rate measured at the receiver during the 30 km/h test. The
shaded regions around the QBERs corresponds to a 95% central credible interval (described
in Section 3.3.3). Once again the QBER drops when the count rate increases at 4–8 s, while
being based on noise outside of this region. The high QBER of the decoy states near the
beginning is due to the high statistical fluctuation of the measurement which is based on
an average decoy count rate of less than 2 cps.
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Figure 5.29: Snapshot of the user interface showing quantum signal peaks during 1 s of
the 30 km/h test. Once again the background level can be seen at the base of the peaks.
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Figure 5.30: Comparison of the predicted QBER at the transmitter after compensation
with the measured QBER at the receiver during 30 km/h test. The measured QBER
after link stabilization is once again only slightly higher than the predicted QBER at the
transmitter, showing that there is minimal QBER increase due to the link. Shaded area
represents points where the number of signal counts at the receiver exceeded 10000.
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Figure 5.31: Time of flight from the dome to the receiver based on the GPS coordinates.
The time-of-flight changes almost linearly and can therefore be compensated using our first
order linear time-of-flight correction.
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Secure key extraction
Table 5.5 shows the experimentally measured QKD parameters during the moving receiver
tests. The parameters shown are the same used in Equation 3.10 and Equation 3.11. The
data is post selected on seconds with count rates exceeding 10000 counts to remove data
where the received counts were mostly noise. In addition, the last two seconds of the
30 km/h test (out of 4 s) were also removed because they produced wider peak (around
10 ns width compared to the typical 1 ns). This post-selection does not break security
because it is based on count rates and timing information but not on the measurement
outcome(1 s worth) [72]. These peaks may be the result of an instability in the pulsing
frequency of the titanium Sapphire laser, or from an inaccurate timing information from
the GPS.
In both tests, the QBER seen at the receiver when receiving quantum signals was
around 8–9%. From polarization compensation (Section 5.3.2), the theoretically predicted
QBER was already 5-6% due to limitations of the source. The additional 1–3% QBER
seen at the receiver can be attributed to the higher background counts, as well as minor
polarization misalignments at the transmitter and at the receiver.
Our protocol was able to extract a small amount of secret key in the asymptotic limit
(7.8 bits in the 20 km/h test and 73.5 bits for the 30 km/h test). The reason these key
length are so small is because our protocol is optimized for low QBER (in the range of
2–5%). Our protocol is therefore not able to reach the theoretical limit for 4-states BB84
protocols. The maximum QBER known to allow BB84 when using true single photons is
11% for on-way post-processing [216] and 20% for two way post-processing [217] (note that
these are not proven limit, higher QBER may be possible). Since WCP source does not use
true single photons, the limit is even lower. From Equation (2.27), the asymptotic rate is
q{−QµηECH2(Eµ) +Q1 [1−H2(E1)]}. For µ = 0.5, and with with perfect error correction
and no background QBER (Eµ = E1), the QBER where the rate becomes negative (and
therefore no key can be extracted) is 9%.
Recently, it has been shown that key extraction can be improved by using noisy pre-
processing, where one introduces noise in the system to reduce the amount of information
shared with an eavesdropper, thus reducing the required privacy amplification at the cost
of increasing error correction. This noise can be added after the transmission by randomly
flipping bits in the sifted key. In our case, the intrinsic QBER of the source provides this
noise, and by characterizing this intrinsic QBER we can bound the minimum error ratio
of an eavesdropper, allowing better key generation [218, 219]. Because our system already
characterizes the intrinsic QBER of the source (using the polarization compensation sys-
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Table 5.5: Experimentally measured QKD parameters during the moving receiver runs.
The parameters are based on the seconds where the received counts exceeded 10000 (shaded
areas in Figure 5.27 and Figure 5.30), with the exception of the last two seconds of the
30 km/h test which where removed because they produced much wider peaks than was
expected. The parameters corresponds to those in Equation (2.31), Equation (3.10) and
Equation (3.11). The average loss differs from the average measured loss in Table 5.1
because we post-selected on seconds with >10000 counts.
Parameter 20 km/h test 30 km/h test
Duration 6 s 2 s
µ 0.480 0.495
ν 0.112 0.118
Eµ [%] 9.12 8.03
Eν [%] 9.77 7.78
Eµ0 [%] 49.9 50.0
Eν0 [%] 50.0 50.0
Qµ 1.03× 10−4 1.02× 10−4
Qν 2.67× 10−5 2.83× 10−5
Q1 5.32× 10−5 6.71× 10−5
E1 [%] 0.64 4.86
Y0 5.57× 10−6 2.39× 10−6
Average loss [dB] 32.1 33.6
ηEC 1.1 1.1
Raw key rate 5047 bits/s 4994 bits/s
Sifted key rate 2537 bits/s 2491 bits/s
Secure key rate 16 bits/s 64 bits/s
(asymptotic)
Secure key bit-string 00000100001111000000001010 10111101111101110000001001
000001 10001000000011110010101001
00101110011010000001000101
10010000000101101001000100
010000000010000001100110
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tem), such a method could be used the extract a higher key rate despite the high intrinsic
QBER.
Modifying our protocol to allow it to function at higher QBER would require a signif-
icant change to our QKD software and would likely result in lower performance at lower
QBER (as these protocols are typically optimized for high QBER). Instead it was decided
to focus our effort on designing and building a new source capable of lower intrinsic QBER.
Despite successfully extracting secret key in the asymptotic limit, we were unable to
extract any secure key when including finite-size statistics. Extracting key with finite size
effect would require longer link duration (our link was only 4 s compared to 200 s for a
typical satellite pass) or the combination of several links.
5.4 Future improvements to the system
5.4.1 New QKD source
As was stated previously, the moving receiver tests were only able to produce extract
secure key from in the asymptotic limit due to high intrinsic QBER of our current QKD
source. To overcome this, a new QKD source has been designed. To avoid any issue of
imperfect overlap between up-converted beams, the new source will directly modulate the
polarization state of a pulsed laser source. In addition, the new source will operate at
785 nm, closer to the optimal wavelength for a satellite uplink (see Section 2.5.1).
The modulation system will be similar to the telecom waveguide intensity and polariza-
tion modulator described in Section 3.1.2. An intensity modulator will be used to control
the average photon number of both signal and decoy states, while two phase modulators,
in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer configuration, will control the polarization state. The
modulators will be off-the-shelf LiNbO3 electro-optical modulators designed to operate at
785 nm [160]. The lower wavelength allows us to use the modulators directly on a pulsed
laser with the desired final wavelength. The planned laser will have a repetition of 40 MHz.
A further improvement to the source will increase the repetition rate by replacing the
785 nm laser by an up-conversion source that combines a high rate 1550 nm laser, capable
of 500 MHz repetition rate, with a 1590 nm laser to produce high rate 785 nm pulses. The
approach of using an up-conversion source was chosen because of the availability of higher
rate sources at 1550 nm compared to 785 nm.
The pulsed 1550 nm laser is an electronically triggered laser from ID Quantique [32],
while the 1590 nm laser is a wavelength tunable continuous wave laser from EMCORE [220],
202
allowing us to adjust the wavelength of the up-converted beam. The up-conversion will be
achieved using a single type-I periodically poled lithium niobate (PPLN) crystal from HC
Photonics [221]. Since only one crystal is used, only a single up-converted beam will be
produced, removing any up-conversion overlap concern. The up-converted beam will then
be directly modulated to the desired state.
5.4.2 Additional improvements
In addition to a new source, new telescopes with larger aperture size and a fine point-
ing system are currently being designed. The larger aperture size will reduce diffraction
losses while the fine pointing system will reduce the loss from pointing error and elimi-
nate dropouts. These improvements will not only improve the links to the truck but are
necessary to extend to longer distances.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and outlook
This work has demonstrated the feasibility of using a low Earth orbit satellite for quan-
tum key distribution (QKD). In Chapter 2, a detailed theoretical modeling showed the
capability of both uplink and downlink scenarios in producing secure keys. The downlink
was shown to perform significantly better than the uplink making it the preferred option
for high rate QKD. However, the uplink was shown to benefit from a simpler design and
relaxed satellite pointing requirements, while allowing more scientific freedom by having
access to the source, which is located on the ground, enabling a far greater range of quan-
tum experiments. These advantages make the uplink ideal for scientific demonstrations
using low complexity satellite QKD systems, where high key rate is less crucial.
We used our model to resolve important design considerations such as operating wave-
length, telescope designs, pointing requirements, specific orbits and ground station location.
We found the optimal wavelength to be near 785 nm for an uplink, allowing the produc-
tion of up to 2 Mbit with reasonable telescope sizes and currently available technology. We
also showed that such system could be used to perform fundamental experiments such as
Bell tests and teleportation at distances on the order of 1000 km, far beyond what can be
reached on ground with current technology.
The demanding high loss regime of a satellite uplink was explored in Chapter 3 by
experimentally performing full QKD, including all post processing steps, at losses beyond
50 dB. Our system was shown capable of extracting secure keys at up to 56 dB of losses in
the asymptotic limit, and at up to 45 dB with finite-size statistics on 10 min of data. We
also showed secure key extraction with simulated satellite passes that replicate the losses
and short durations expected of a satellite uplink. We were able to extract 8578 bits of
secure key, while including finite-size statistics, from a simulated best pass. In addition, we
were able to extract 349 bits of secure key (with finite-size statistics) from the combination
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of 2 upper quartile passes. This suggests that our system would be able to extract secure
key from a single upper quartile pass if the source rate was increased by a factor 2 (from
76 MHz to 152 MHz).
In Chapter 4, we investigated the feasibility of using light scattered on a diffusive
screen to perform QKD. While this concept showed promising results, degradation in our
detectors reduced the high loss capabilities of our system to ≈53 dB. This limited our
system to performing the experiment at distances of less than 1 m and angles near 0◦.
Future work with better detectors will be necessary to fully demonstrate the viability
QKD with a diffusive screen.
Finally, Chapter 5 detailed a custom built pointing system that was used to exchange
quantum signals to a truck moving at angular speeds of up to 0.75◦/s, exceeding the maxi-
mum expected angular speed in a low Earth orbit satellite pass (0.7◦/s). This required the
design and construction of a transmitter and a quantum receiver with pointing capabilities,
as well as the design and implementation of an active polarization compensation system.
The limitations of the QKD source, which showed an intrinsic QBER of 5–6%, prevented
the extraction of a secure key when including finite-size statistics. Yet our system was still
shown capable of producing secure key in the asymptotic limit (up to 73.5 bits when the
receiver was moving at an angular speed of 0.75◦). In addition, we showed that our system
was capable of tracking the moving receiver sufficiently well to exchange quantum signals
at raw key rates of 20–70 kbits/s without the need of a fine pointing mechanism.
Several steps are still necessary to fully enable satellite QKD. First, the QKD system
must be modified to a wavelength better suited for satellite QKD. This requires changes
to the source as well as both the transmitter and the receiver. The changes are currently
being performed, with the final system planed for a wavelength of 785 nm, an optimal
wavelength for a satellite QKD uplink.
A crucial step will be the creation of a new source capable of both low intrinsic QBER
and a higher source rate. Plans are currently underway to construct a 785 nm source
capable of reaching a 500 MHz repetition rate by combining a high rate 1550 nm pulsed laser
and a wavelength tunable 1590 nm continuous laser trough up-conversion (Section 5.4.1).
The new source would use only one up-conversion crystal, removing the need to perfectly
match two output beams to create superposition. The up-converted beam would then be
directly modulated to create the desired quantum states.
For true key security, the QKD sequence will need to be changed to a fully random
sequence instead of the current repeating pseudo-random sequence. This will require a
quantum random number generator and better driving electronics of the modulator. True
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vacuum pulses must also be added to the sequence to replace the current insecure method
of measuring the background between the signal peaks. These vacuum peaks will be added
in the next generation 500 MHz QKD source (while still using a repeating pseudo-random
sequence).
An entangled source will also be needed in order to increase the range of quantum
experiments to a satellite. This is necessary to perform, among other experiments, a
long distance Bell test to the satellite. For this purpose, an entangled source is currently
being constructed with one of the produced photons near 785 nm. Modifications to the
QKD software are also planned to allow key extraction using an entanglement-based QKD
scheme.
By moving the chopper wheel (Section 5.1.3) to the reflected path of the beam splitter
one could double the rate of transmitted signal pulses (as the chopper either blocks or
polarizes half of the pulses). In addition, the chopper wheel could be modified with addi-
tional polarizers, doubling the number of signals used in estimating the unitary that the
polarization compensation system needs to compensate. Moving the chopper wheel would
require characterization of the unitary produced in the reflection at the beam-splitter. The
contribution from this unitary would then have to be removed (through the software) when
determining the optimal wave plate settings to compensate the unitary of the fiber.
The position data of the transmitter and receiver, provided by the GPS, and the ori-
entation data, provided by the gyroscope, could be used to implement initial acquisition.
This would allow a rough pointing of the telescopes, sufficient for acquisition of the beacon
lasers, at which point the coarse pointing would take over and align the telescopes to allow
transfer of quantum signals.
Finally, the addition of a fine pointing system will be crucial in both the transmitter
and receiver to allow longer distance transmission to a moving receiver. The current system
has shown to be sufficient in terms of tracking speed, but the low pointing accuracy is too
lossy to function at long distances. The addition of such a fine pointing system is already
underway.
Future plans are to perform QKD at longer distances to a moving receiver platform
such as a boat, where the tracking speed is more relaxed but finer pointing accuracy is
crucial. QKD to either a high altitude balloon, allowing longer distances and atmospheric
losses similar to a satellite, or to a plane, allowing both longer distances similar to a boat
and high angular speeds similar to the truck, are currently being evaluated.
The work presented here achieved important milestones necessary to implement satel-
lite QKD. We showed the theoretical feasibility and performance of satellite QKD and
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experimentally overcame important challenges. We demonstrated QKD at high losses and
showed the ability of exchanging quantum signals to a moving platform traveling at greater
angular speeds than a low Earth orbit satellite.
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Appendix A
Loss estimation program
Here we show the MATLAB code used to estimate the loss.
A.1 Main loss code
1 %note: units are always SI units
2 clear;
3
4 %%%%%Main parameter inputs
5 dorbit=600e3; %Orbit distance from the Earth
6 Gaperture=0.5; %Diameter of the ground telescope
7 Saperture=0.3; %Diameter of the satellite telescope
8 P error=2e−6; %Pointing error in rad
9 lambda=785e−9; %Wavelenght
10 detector=[0.59]; %Detector efficiency
11 optical components=0.5; %Loss from the optical components (3dB)
12 A=1.7e−14; %Cn(0)ˆ2 for sea level atmosphere
13 v=21; %Average rms wind speed for sea level atmosphere
14 Tmirror=0; %Diameter of the secondary mirror in a ...
Cassegrain design at the transmitter (this secondary mirror is ...
assumed to be circular and at the center of the beam)
15 Rmirror=0; %Diameter of the secondary mirror in a ...
Cassegrain design at the receiver (this secondary mirror is ...
assumed to be circular and at the center of the beam)
16
17 %%%%%Definition of the type of scenario
18 entangled=1; %WCP source is 0, entangled source is 1
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19 up=1; %Downlink if up==0, uplink if up==1
20
21 %%%%%Assignment of the transmitter and receiver
22 if(up==0)
23 Raperture=Gaperture; %Diameter of the receiving apperture
24 Taperture=Saperture; %Diameter of the transmitting apperture
25 elseif(up==1)
26 Raperture=Saperture; %Diameter of the receiving apperture
27 Taperture=Gaperture; %Diameter of the transmitting apperture
28 end
29
30 %%%%%Assignement of the beam waist
31 if(entangled==0)
32 w=Taperture; %Optimal FWHM for a faint laser
33 norm factor=4*log(2)/(pi*w*w*(exp(−log(2)*Tmirror*Tmirror/(w*w))−...
34 exp(−log(2)*Taperture*Taperture/(w*w)))); %Normalising ...
factor so that the total power output of the transmitting ...
aperture is 1 W
35 elseif(entangled==1)
36 w=Taperture/2; %Optimal FWHM for an entangled source
37 norm factor=4*log(2)/(pi*w*w); %Normalising factor so that ...
the total power output of the entangled source is 1 W
38 end
39
40 %%%%%Optional parameters (affect accuracy and speed of the simulation)
41 R=6.37e6; %Earth's radius (average)
42 points transmitter=50; %Point evaluated at the transmitting ...
apperture (in each dimension)
43 dxo=Taperture/points transmitter; %Discretization of the x ...
axis of the transmitting apperture
44 dyo=Taperture/points transmitter; %Discretization of the y ...
axis of the transmitting apperture
45 dx=1e−2; %Discretization of the x axis of the receiving apperture
46 points receiver=5000; %Point evaluated at the receiving apperture
47 %%note: the distance evaluated (from the center of the receiver) is ...
points receiver*dx, thus this value must be ≥ to Raperture/2, the ...
default values, 5000*1e−2 give a maximum receiver size of 100 ...
meters in diameter
48
49 %%%%%%%loading the atmospheric transmittance: the file contains a 2D ...
matrix of atmospheric transmittance (named atmosphere in the file) ...
as a function of wavelength and angle. The file also contains a ...
vector of the wavelength (named ALambda).
50 load (sprintf('atmosphere(rural−5km)'))
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51 angleT=80:−1:0; %By default the angle is not specified in the ...
file. Change this line if using an updated file with a different ...
angle vector.
52 %%This file is generated using MODTRAN.
53
54 trans=0; %Transmittance as a function of angle for the chosen ...
wavelength
55 dLambda=5e−9; %Uncertainty in wavelenght
56 for i=(lambda−dLambda):5e−11:(lambda+dLambda)
57 trans=trans+interp1(Alambda*1e−6,atmosphere,i)/(1+2*dLambda/5e−11); ...
%Transmittance vs angle including uncertainty
58 end
59 %%Alternatively, trans can be manually specified
60
61 %%%%%%%loading the orbit data: the file contains vectors for range ...
(distance between the ground and the satellite) and elevation ...
(elevation angle of the satellite from the horizon).
62 load (sprintf('Ranges ottawa−d=%gkm',dorbit/1000),'range','elevation')
63 %%This file is generated using STK from AGI.
64 %%Alternatively, each vectors can be manually specified or the ...
elevation vector alone can be specified and range will be ...
automatically calculated
65 theta=90−elevation; %Converts the elevation as angle from zenith ...
(this is what the code was designed to use)
66 range=range/1000; %Converts the range to m (the file specifies ...
in km)
67
68 %%%%%Initial definitions
69 Intensity=zeros(10*(points receiver−2),1); %Radial intensity ...
distribution at the receiver (assumes circular symmetry)
70 w t=zeros(numel(theta),1); %Width of the distribution at the ...
receiver from atmospheric turbulence
71 loss diff=zeros(numel(theta),1); %loss from diffraction only
72 loss turbulence=zeros(numel(theta),1); %loss from diffraction + ...
pointing + turbulence
73 loss transmittance=zeros(numel(theta),1); %loss from ...
diffraction + pointing + turbulence + atmospheric transmittance
74 loss optical=zeros(numel(theta),1); %total loss (diffraction + ...
pointing + turbulence + atmospheric transmittance + detector ...
efficiency and optical loss)
75
76 %%%%%Calculation of the Width of the distribution from turbulence ...
(only accounted for in uplink)
77 if(up==1)
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78 for i=1:numel(theta)
79
80 if(range(i)>0) %check if range exists, otherwise calculate
81 d=range(i) %distance from the earth to the satellite
82 else
83 d=−R*cos(pi*theta(i)/180)+sqrt((R*cos(pi*theta(i)/180))ˆ2+...
84 dorbitˆ2+2*R*dorbit); %distance from the earth ...
to the satellite
85 end
86
87 z=0:50:d; %Points of the ingration (default all points ...
from the ground to the satellite using a discretization of ...
50 meters between points)
88 H=−R+sqrt(Rˆ2+z.ˆ2+2*R*z.*cos(pi*theta(i)/180)); ...
%Height (from grund) for each point of the integration
89 Cn2=0.00594*(v/27)ˆ2*(H*1e−5).ˆ10.*exp(−H/1000)+...
90 2.7e−16*exp(−H/1500)+A*exp(−H/100); %calculation of ...
the refractive index structure constant at each point ...
of the integration
91 I=trapz(z,Cn2.*(1−z/d).ˆ(5/3)); %Integration over the ...
path (this is the integral that appears in the calculation ...
of the transverse coherence length)
92 w2(i)=sqrt(2)*2*d/((2*pi/lambda)*((1.46/(cos(pi*theta(i)/180))*...
93 (2*pi/lambda).ˆ2*I).ˆ−(3/5))); %Width of the ...
distribution at the receiver from atmospheric turbulence
94
95 end
96 end
97
98 for i=1:numel(theta)
99
100 if(range(i)>0) %check if range exists, otherwise calculate
101 d(i)=range(i) %distance from the earth to the satellite
102 else
103 d(i)=−R*cos(pi*theta(i)/180)+sqrt((R*cos(pi*theta(i)/180))ˆ2+...
104 dorbitˆ2+2*R*dorbit); %distance from the earth ...
to the satellite
105 end
106
107 error=sin(P error)*d(i); %Pointing error in distance at ...
the receiving aperture
108
109 A=zeros(points receiver,1); %Field at one point at the ...
receiving apperture
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110 I=zeros(points receiver,1); %Intensity at one point at the ...
receiving apperture
111 kc=zeros(points receiver,1); %Position at the receiving ...
receiving apperture
112 kc2=zeros(10*(points receiver−1),1); %Position at the ...
receiving receiving apperture
113
114 for k=1:points receiver %Rayleigh−Sommerfeld diffraction
115 kc(k)=(k−1)*dx; %Vector of the radial distance from the ...
center of the receiver
116
117 %Calulation of the contribution to the field from each point in the ...
transmitting aperture
118 for h=−(((Taperture/2)/dxo)):(((Taperture/2)/dxo))
119 limit=sqrt(abs(((Taperture/2)ˆ2−hˆ2*dxoˆ2)))/dyo;
120 for j=−limit:limit
121 if(sqrt(h*h*dxo*dxo+j*j*dyo*dyo)≥(Tmirror/2))
122 A(k)=A(k)+dxo*dyo*sqrt(exp(−((h*h*dxo*dxo+j*j*dyo*dyo)/...
123 (w*w))*4*log(2.0)))*exp(2i*pi*sqrt(d(i)ˆ2+...
124 (kc(k)−h*dxo)ˆ2+(j*dyo)ˆ2)/lambda)/(d(i)ˆ2+...
125 (kc(k)−h*dxo)ˆ2+(j*dyo)ˆ2);
126 end
127 end
128 end
129
130 I(k) = norm factor*d(i)*d(i)*abs(A(k))ˆ2/(lambda*lambda); ...
%Radial intensity distribution at the receiver (assumes ...
circular symmetry)
131 end
132
133 %%%%%Increase the number of points in the intensity distribution to ...
improver the accuracy of the receiver power calculation
134 for l=1:10*(points receiver−2)
135 kc2(l)=(l−1)*dx/10;
136 Intensity(l)=interp1((1:points receiver),I,1+l/10); %Radial ...
intensity distribution at the receiver (assumes circular ...
symmetry) with increased number of points
137 end
138
139 %%%%%Integrate over the receiver to find the received power when only ...
considering diffraction
140 power=0; %received power
141 for l=1:10*(points receiver−2)
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142 if(kc2(l)<(Raperture/2)) %Must be inside the receiver ...
diameter to contribute
143 if(kc2(l)>(Rmirror/2)) %must be outside the ...
obstructed area of the secondary mirror to contribute
144 power=power+(Intensity(l)+Intensity(l+1))*pi*...
145 (2*kc2(l+1)−dx/10)*dx/20; %received power
146 end
147 end
148 end
149
150 loss diff(i)=−10*log10(power); %loss from diffraction only
151
152 %%%%%Performs a 2D convolution of the diffracted profile with the ...
pointing error and atmospheric turbulence distributions.
153 I=convolution(I,error,w2(i),Raperture,points receiver,dx);
154
155 %%%%%Increase the number of points in the intensity distribution to ...
improver the accuracy of the receiver power calculation
156 for l=1:10*(points receiver−2)
157 kc2(l)=(l−1)*dx/10;
158 Intensity(l)=interp1((1:points receiver),I,1+l/10); %Radial ...
intensity distribution at the receiver (assumes circular ...
symmetry) with increased number of points
159 end
160
161 %%%%%Integrate over the receiver to find the received power when ...
considering all geometric losses
162 power=0; %received power
163 for l=1:10*(points receiver−2)
164 if(kc2(l)<(Raperture/2)) %Must be inside the receiver ...
diameter to contribute
165 if(kc2(l)>(Rmirror/2)) %must be outside the ...
obstructed area of the secondary mirror to contribute
166 power=power+(Intensity(l)+Intensity(l+1))*pi*...
167 (2*kc2(l+1)−dx/10)*dx/20; %received power
168 end
169 end
170 end
171
172 loss turbulence(i)=−10*log10(power); %loss from diffraction + ...
pointing + turbulence
173
174 %%%%%Adding the loss from atmospheric transmittance
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175 if(theta(i)<80) %The current file does not contain data past 80 ...
degrees from zenith
176 transmittance=interp1(angleT,trans,theta(i)); ...
%Transmittance of the atmosphere at the current angle
177 else
178 transmittance=interp1(angleT,trans,79.9); %The value at 80 ...
for the atmosphere(rural−5km) is 0 which would generate a loss ...
value of infinity. Interpolating at value at 79.9 prevents ...
this problems. (Note that a value of 0 at 80 is unphysical and ...
happened because the atmospheric transmission was rounded off ...
at 0 when the file was generated)
179 end
180
181 loss transmittance(i)=−10*log10(transmittance*power); %loss ...
from diffraction + pointing + turbulence + atmospheric transmittance
182
183 loss optical(i)=−10*log10(optical components*detector*transmittance*power); ...
%total loss (diffraction + pointing + turbulence + atmospheric ...
transmittance + detector efficiency and optical loss)
184 end
A.2 2D convolution code
1 function meanI=convolution(I,error,w2,Raperture,points receiver,dx)
2
3 %%%%%Because both distributions are Gaussian they can be combined ...
into a Gaussian of width sqrt((2*error)ˆ2+w2ˆ2). (error is a ...
standard deviation a therefore equal to half the beam width)
4 if(((2*error)ˆ2+w2ˆ2)>0) %Verifies that the total distribution ...
from pointing error and atmospheric turbulence is non−zero
5 dtheta=2*pi/100;
6 meanI=zeros(points receiver,1); %Average Intensity at one ...
point at the receiving apperture (with pointing error and turbulence)
7 for h=1:1:1+Raperture/dx %Points of the intensity profile at ...
the receiver that are evaluated (there is no received power from ...
the intensity outside the telescope, this reduces the time of the ...
function)
8 j=(1:1:points receiver)'; %Radial points integrated over
9 q=0:dtheta:(2*pi−dtheta); %Angular points integrated over
10 r0=sqrt((((j−1).ˆ2+(h−1)ˆ2).*dxˆ2)*ones(1,numel(q))−...
11 2.*(j−1).*(h−1).*dx*dx*cos(q));
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12 sigma r0=2*dtheta*exp(−2*((r0/sqrt((2*error)ˆ2+w2ˆ2)).ˆ2))./...
13 (pi*((2*error)ˆ2+w2ˆ2));
14 meanI(h)=sum((j−1).*sum(sigma r0,2).*I)*dx*dx; %Average ...
Intensity at one point at the receiving apperture (with ...
pointing error and turbulence)
15 %%Note: to understand how the convolution is done see equation 82 and ...
83 of "Operational and convolution properties of two−dimensional ...
Fourier transforms in polar coordinates" by Natalie Baddour
16 end
17
18 else
19 meanI=I; %If the total distribution from pointing error ...
and atmospheric turbulence is zero the beam profile is unchanged
20 end
21
22 end
216
Appendix B
Background counts estimation program
Here we show the MATLAB code used to estimate the background counts. This code is a
modified version of a program written by Bassam Helou.
B.1 Downlink background code
1 clear;
2
3 Detector number=4; %Number of detectors used at the receiver ...
(typically 4 for QKD)
4 %%Note: some experiments require a different number of detectors.
5 D dark=Detector number*20; %Summed dark counts in all detectors ...
per seconds.
6
7 %%%%%Main parameter inputs (in SI)
8 dorbit=600e3; %Orbit distance from the Earth
9 FOV=50e−6; %Field of View of the receiver
10 lambda=670e−9; %Wavelenght
11 Raperture=0.5; %Diameter of the ground telescope
12 Filter=1e−9; %Bandwidth of the filter
13 detector=[0.65]; %Detector efficiency
14 optical components=0.5; %Loss from the optical components (3dB)
15 artSkyBright=19.21; %artificial sky brightness for our location
16 moon phase=0.5; %Phase of the moon
17
18 %natural sky brightness based on wavelength and moon phase
19 if(moon phase==1)
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20 if(lambda<500)
21 natural sky brightness=17.5;
22 elseif(lambda≥500&&lambda<600)
23 natural sky brightness=17;
24 elseif(lambda≥600&&lambda<720)
25 natural sky brightness=16.8;
26 elseif(lambda≥720)
27 natural sky brightness=16;
28 end
29 elseif(moon phase==0.5)
30 if(lambda<500)
31 natural sky brightness=20;
32 elseif(lambda≥500&&lambda<600)
33 natural sky brightness=19.5;
34 elseif(lambda≥600&&lambda<720)
35 natural sky brightness=19.2;
36 elseif(lambda≥720)
37 natural sky brightness=18.4;
38 end
39 end
40
41 %%%%%%%loading the atmospheric transmittance: the file contains a 2D ...
matrix of atmospheric transmittance (named atmosphere in the file) ...
as a function of wavelength and angle. The file also contains a ...
vector of the wavelength (named ALambda).
42 load (sprintf('atmosphere(rural−5km)'))
43 angleT=80:−1:0; %By default the angle is not specified in the ...
file. Change this line if using an updated file with a different ...
angle vector.
44 %%This file is generated using MODTRAN.
45
46 trans=0; %Transmittance as a function of angle for the chosen ...
wavelength
47 dLambda=5e−9; %Uncertainty in wavelenght
48 for i=(lambda−dLambda):5e−11:(lambda+dLambda)
49 trans=trans+interp1(Alambda*1e−6,atmosphere,i)/(1+2*dLambda/5e−11); ...
%Transmittance vs angle including uncertainty
50 end
51 %%Alternatively, trans can be manually specified
52
53 %%%%%%%loading the orbit data: the file contains vectors for range ...
(distance between the ground and the satellite) and elevation ...
(elevation angle of the satellite from the horizon).
54 load (sprintf('Ranges ottawa−d=%gkm',dorbit/1000),'range','elevation')
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55 %%This file is generated using STK from AGI.
56 %%Alternatively, the elevation vector can be specified (range is not ...
used for the downlink background calculation)
57
58 for i=1:numel(elevation)
59
60 receiver = struct('FOV', FOV, 'wavelength', lambda, ...
'telescopeRadius', Raperture*100, ...
61 'filterBandpass', Filter*1e−9, 'setupEfficiency', ...
detector(k)*optical components,...
62 'artSkyBright', artSkyBright, 'natSkyBright', natSkyBright,...
63 'observElevation', elevation(i),'trans', trans);
64
65 %background counts calculations using modified version of Bassam's code
66 backgroundCountsDown(i) = calcDownlinkBackground(receiver)+D dark; ...
%in photon/sec
67
68 end
1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 %Description:
3 %calcDownlinkBackground calculates the estimated number of background ...
counts a
4 %ground station will receive per second.
5 %Input:
6 % 1. receiver(strucutre): The receiver's parameters are entered in
7 % receiver
8 % The required entries in the structure are:
9 % The following 8 arguments parameterize the telescope
10 % a) 'FOV': The field of view of the receiver (in rad).
11 % b) 'wavelength': The wavelength photons are emitted at.
12 % c) 'telescopeRadius': The receiver's radius in cm.
13 % d) 'filterBandpass': approximately the area under of the ...
curve
14 % of the receiver's filter bandwith (in nm).
15 % e) 'setupEfficiency': the optical efficiency of the setup
16 % multiplied by the detector efficiency (format 0.a).
17 % f) 'observElevation': The receiver's observation elevation
18 % angle. In other words, this is the angle from the horizon ...
in degrees.
19 % The following three parameters specify the night sky ...
brightness:
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20 % g) 'artSkyBright'(the artificial night sky brightness): ...
The brightness of the
21 % night sky (in mag) due to lights emitted by human ...
actvities.
22 % (in mag)
23 % h) 'natSkyBright'(the natural night sky brightness): The ...
brightness of the
24 % night sky (in mag) due to natural sources such as the ...
moon.
25 % (in mag)
26
27 %Output:
28 % backgroundCounts: The estimated number of background counts ...
that are
29 % detected by the receiver. (photons/s)
30
31
32 function backgroundCounts = calcDownlinkBackground(receiver)
33
34 %refernce counts at the astronomical band containing receiver.wavelength
35 refCountsAtWav = obtainReferenceCount(receiver.wavelength);
36 %refernce counts at the V band containing receiver.wavelength
37 refCountsVband = obtainReferenceCount(550);
38 %Calculate the total night sky brightness
39 transStruct = struct('wavelength', receiver.wavelength, 'angle', ...
90−receiver.observElevation,'trans', receiver.trans);
40 extinctionCoeff = getTransmission(transStruct);
41 correctedNatSkyBright = ...
receiver.natSkyBright−log10(extinctionCoeff)/(0.4);
42 % totalBright = log(10ˆ(−0.4*receiver.artSkyBright) + ...
43 % 10ˆ(−0.4*correctedNatSkyBright))/log(10ˆ(−0.4));
44 %FOV area in arcsecˆ2
45 FOVarea = pi*(receiver.FOV*206264)ˆ2;
46 %telescope area in cmˆ2
47 telescopeArea = pi*receiver.telescopeRadiusˆ2;
48
49 backgroundCounts = FOVarea*telescopeArea*receiver.setupEfficiency*...
50 receiver.filterBandpass*(refCountsAtWav*10ˆ(−0.4*correctedNatSkyBright) ...
+ ...
51 refCountsVband*10ˆ(−0.4*receiver.artSkyBright));
52
53 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
54 % Since the apparent magnitude is a relative measure, one needs the
55 % photon flux at a certain magnitude to compute the photon flux at a
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56 % different magnitude.
57 % This function takes in a wavelength (in nm), determines which
58 % astronomical band it is closest to, and then output the number of
59 % reference counts (in ph cm −2 s −1 n m −1) at 0 magnitude.
60 function refCounts = obtainReferenceCount(wavelength)
61
62 %Data format: Wavelength, ∆Wavelength, reference number of counts
63 data = [360 40 7650; ...
64 440 80 14845; ...
65 550 90 10386; ...
66 640 150 5801; ...
67 790 150 3883; ...
68 1260 200 1954; ...
69 1600 370 1015; ...
70 2220 500 447; ...
71 3400 700 139; ...
72 5000 1200 53];
73
74 numData = size(data, 1);
75
76 %first if the wavelengh is less than what the data gives approximates ...
it to
77 %the first band
78 if (wavelength < data(1,1))
79 refCounts = data(1, 3);
80 return;
81 elseif (wavelength > data(numData,1))
82 refCounts = data(numData, 3);
83 return;
84 end
85
86 foundBand = false;
87 ind = 1;
88 %find which astronomical band the wavelength is closed to
89 while (foundBand == false)
90 currUpBound = data(ind, 1) + data(ind, 2);
91 nextLowBound = data(ind+1, 1) − data(ind+1, 2);
92
93 %check if the wavelength is between two bands
94 if (wavelength ≥ data(ind, 1) && wavelength ≤ data(ind+1, 1))
95 %wavelength closer to next band center
96 if (abs(wavelength−data(ind, 1)) > abs(wavelength−data(ind+1, ...
1)))
97 closerInd = ind + 1;
221
98 %should go to upper band but first make sure it is within
99 %∆Wavelength
100 if (wavelength < nextLowBound)
101 if (wavelength ≤ currUpBound) %is it within current band
102 closerInd = ind;
103 %if not it is closest to which band boundary?
104 elseif (abs(wavelength−nextLowBound) > ...
105 abs(wavelength−currUpBound))
106 closerInd = ind;
107 end
108 end
109 else %closer to current band
110 closerInd = ind;
111 % make sure it is within ∆Wavelength
112 if (wavelength > currUpBound)
113 if (wavelength ≥ nextLowBound) %is it within next band
114 closerInd = ind + 1;
115 %if not it is closest to which band boundary?
116 elseif (abs(wavelength−nextLowBound) < ...
117 abs(wavelength−currUpBound))
118 closerInd = ind + 1;
119 end
120 end
121 end
122
123 foundBand = true;
124 end
125
126 ind = ind+1;
127 end
128
129 refCounts = data(closerInd, 3);
B.2 Uplink background code
1 clear;
2 Detector number=4; %Number of detectors used at the receiver ...
(typically 4 for QKD)
3 %%Note: some experiments require a different number of detectors.
4 D dark=Detector number*20; %Summed dark counts in all detectors ...
per seconds.
222
56 %%%%%Main parameter inputs (in SI)
7 dorbit=600e3; %Orbit distance from the Earth
8 FOV=50e−6; %Field of View of the receiver
9 lambda=785e−9; %Wavelenght
10 Raperture=0.3; %Diameter of the ground telescope
11 Filter=1e−9; %Bandwidth of the filter
12 StarBright=23.5; %Starlight contribution in magnitude (23.5 ...
for starlight+airglow, 24.5 for only starlight)
13 detector=[0.59]; %Detector efficiency
14 optical components=0.5; %Loss from the optical components (3dB)
15 latitude=45.31; %Latitude coordinate of the used location (20km ...
outside of Ottawa)
16 longitude=−75.5; %Longitude coordinate of the used location ...
(20km outside of Ottawa)
17 moon phase=0.5; %Phase of the moon
18 moonElevation=45; %Elevation angle of the moon from zenith
19 earthAlbedo=0.3; %Earth albedo ate the ground station (the ...
average Earth albedo is 0.3)
20
21 %%%%%%%loading the atmospheric transmittance: the file contains a 2D ...
matrix of atmospheric transmittance (named atmosphere in the file) ...
as a function of wavelength and angle. The file also contains a ...
vector of the wavelength (named ALambda).
22 load (sprintf('atmosphere(rural−5km)'))
23 angleT=80:−1:0; %By default the angle is not specified in the ...
file. Change this line if using an updated file with a different ...
angle vector.
24 %%This file is generated using MODTRAN.
25
26 trans=0; %Transmittance as a function of angle for the chosen ...
wavelength
27 dLambda=5e−9; %Uncertainty in wavelenght
28 for i=(lambda−dLambda):5e−11:(lambda+dLambda)
29 trans=trans+interp1(Alambda*1e−6,atmosphere,i)/(1+2*dLambda/5e−11); ...
%Transmittance vs angle including uncertainty
30 end
31 %%Alternatively, trans can be manually specified
32
33 %%%%%%%loading the orbit data: the file contains vectors for range ...
(distance between the ground and the satellite), elevation ...
(elevation angle of the satellite from the horizon) and azimuth angle.
34 load (sprintf('Ranges ottawa−d=%gkm',dorbit/1000),'range','elevation',...
35 'azimuth')
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36 %%This file is generated using STK from AGI.
37 %%Alternatively, each vectors can be manually specified or the ...
elevation vector alone can be specified and range calculated by ...
giving the orbit altitude in sat.heightSat (see below)
38
39 for i=1:numel(elevation)
40
41 sat = struct('FOV', FOV, 'rot', azimuth(i), 'elev', ...
elevation(i)*pi/180, 'latitude', latitude, ...
42 'longitude', longitude, 'wavelength',lambda*1e9, 'telescopeRadius', ...
100,...
43 'filterBandpass', Filter*1e−9, 'earthAlbedo', earthAlbedo, ...
'moonIlluminated', moon phase,...
44 'setupEfficiency',detector(k)*optical components, 'moonElevation', ...
moonElevation,'trans', trans);
45 %%Note: the speceified telescopeRadius in 100 (1m) to save ...
calculation time, a correction to the actual receiver size is done ...
after the initial calculation. This is especially useful when ...
evaluating different receiver diameter by adding an extra ...
for(Rapperture=[input desired values in this vector]) around the ...
correction.
46
47 %Choose a method to specify the altitude of the satellite
48 %sat.heightSat = dorbit; %Orbit altitude, must be specified if ...
range is not
49 sat.distanceFromGrndStn = range(i)/1000; %distance from ground ...
to satellite (more accurate with the orbit analysis)
50
51
52 imgInfo='C:\Users...\images\world avg.tif\world avg dat.tif'; ...
%Loads the image of the artificial background light
53 %%Important: you must have this file on your computer and specify the ...
complete path.
54
55 %%%%%background counts using modified version of Bassam's code
56 [backgroundCountsUp temp(i), additionalInfo] = ...
calcBackgroundCnts(sat, imgInfo);
57
58 %%%%%Extra fuction calculation the background contribution from ...
starlight and airglow. The contribution in only relevant when all ...
other contributions are very small. contributes around ...
4photons/s/nm/cm/mradˆ2, meaning a 30cm receiver with a 50microrad ...
field of view and 1nm filter would see around 0.3photons/s.
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59 receiver = struct('FOV', FOV, 'wavelength', lambda, ...
'telescopeRadius', 100, ...
60 'filterBandpass', filter*1e9, 'setupEfficiency', ...
detector*optical components,...
61 'StarBright', StarBright, 'observElevation', 90−theta(i));
62
63 backgroundCountsUp temp(i)=backgroundCountsUp temp(i)+UplinkStarBackground(receiver); ...
%in photon/sec
64
65 %%%%%Correction to the actual receiver size
66 %%This is where one would start a for(Rapperture=[input desired ...
values in this vector]) loop
67
68 cosTerm = (dist*cos(angle*pi/180));
69 height sat = (−R+sqrt(Rˆ2+distˆ2+2*R*cosTerm)); %based on cosine law
70
71 solid angle ratio=2*pi*((sqrt(Rapertureˆ2+height satˆ2)...
72 −height sat)/sqrt(Rapertureˆ2+height satˆ2)); %ratio of the ...
solid angle with the actual Raperture compared to a ...
telescopeRadius of 1m
73
74 backgroundCountsUp(m)=backgroundCountsUp temp(i)*solid angle ratio...
75 +D dark; %corrected background count
76
77 %%End of a for(Rapperture=[input desired values in this vector] loop
78
79 end
1 %Description:
2 %calcBackgroundCnts calculates the estimated number of background ...
counts a
3 %satellite will receive per second.
4 %Input:
5 % 1. sat(strucutre): The satellite's parameters are entered in sat
6 % The required entries in the structure are:
7 % The following 8 arguments parameterize the receiver
8 % a) 'FOV': The field of view of the receiver (in rad).
9 % b) 'wavelength': The wavelength photons are emitted at.
10 % c) 'telescopeRadius': The receiver's radius in cm.
11 % d) 'filterBandpass': approximately the area under of the ...
curve
12 % of the receiver's filter bandwith (in nm).
13 % e) 'setupEfficiency': the optical efficiency of the setup
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14 % multiplied by the detector efficiency (format 0.a).
15 % The following two parameters fix the ground station's ...
location:
16 % f) 'latitude': The latitude of the ground station's location
17 % (in degrees).
18 % g) 'longitude': The longitude of the ground station's ...
location
19 % (in degrees).
20 % The following 3 parameters fix the satellite's position:
21 % You have two options in specifying the altitude of the
22 % satellite:
23 % h1) 'distanceFromGrndStn': The distance of the satellite from
24 % the ground station in km.
25 % If distanceFromGrndStn is not specified then you have to ...
input:
26 % h1) 'heightSat': The satellite's orbit is assumed to be a ...
circle
27 % and (heightSat+radiusEarth) is the radius of the ...
orbit (in
28 % km).
29 % The meaning of the next two parameters is:
30 % Imagine that the axis connecting, the center of the
31 % earth and the ground station, is the z axis. In addition, the
32 % ground station is the origin. The line tangent to earth and
33 % that lies on the plane defined by the constant longitude ...
circle
34 % 'longitude' (and that points south) is the x axis. We now ...
have a
35 % coordinate system. As in a spherical coordinate system, ...
let the
36 % inclination angle be the angle from the z axis and let the
37 % azimuthal angle be the angle from the x axis. Then 'elev' is
38 % the inclination (elevation) angle and 'rot' the azimuthal
39 % angle. An alternative way of obtaining the x, y, z axes ...
is to
40 % start with a normal earth coordinate system: z is (0 0 ...
1), y (0
41 % 1 0), x is (1 0 0). Next using the rotation matrices rotate
42 % each axis first by (90−lat) around the y axis and then ...
long around
43 % the z axis. (lat, long) are the the latitude and ...
longitude of
44 % the ground stations. In fact, the above rotations would ...
(0 0
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45 % radius earth) to the coordinates of the ground station.
46 % i) 'elev': See description above (in rad) from the horizon
47 % j) 'rot': See description above (in rad)
48 % Other parameters:
49 % k) 'earthAlbedo': quantifies how strongly the surface ...
near the
50 % ground station reflects light (format: 0.a).
51 % l) 'moonIlluminated': The proportion of the moon that is
52 % illuminated (format: 0.a).
53 % m) 'moonElevation': The angle the moon is at as measured from
54 % the zenith (i.e. looking up) (in degrees)
55 % 2. imgInfo (structure or filename): If a filename then the path of
56 % the image that can be downloaded from
57 % http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/download rad cal 96−97.html ...
(the high
58 % resolution image is expected.
59 % As a structure here is what is expected:
60 % a) 'R': The referencing matrix of the image.
61 % b) 'imgFilename': The path of the image containing the data
62 % c) 'heightImg': The height of the image
63 % d) 'widthImg': The width of the image
64 %
65 %Output:
66 % 1. backgroundCounts: The estimated number of background counts ...
that are
67 % detected by the receiver. (photons/s)
68 % The next 4 outputs are useful for plotting:
69 % 2. additionalInfo (structure) Contains additional information ...
about the
70 % background counts. The fields of the structure are:
71 % a) 'fluxlessCtns': Background counts emitted due to human
72 % activities divided by the photon flux of light emitted by ...
man. The
73 % units are cmˆ2*arcsecˆ2*um (so you have to provide the flux in
74 % ph/cmˆ2/arcsecˆ2/um)
75 % b) 'albedolessCnts': Background counts due to the moon ...
divided by
76 % the earth's albedo.
77 % 3. X (m*n matrix): nightime lights emitted by humans data.
78 % 4. R (3*2 matrix): Referencing matrix for X
79 % 5. intersLine2D (m*2 matrix;): Points in (longitude, latitude) format
80 % that lie on the boundary of the intersection of the surface ...
of the
81 % earth with the satellite's FOV cone.
227
82
83 function [backgroundCounts, additionalInfo, X, R, intersLine2D] = ...
84 calcBackgroundCnts(sat, imgInfo)
85
86 radiusEarth = 6371; %useful constant
87
88 if (isfield(imgInfo, 'widthImg')) %we have a structure input
89 R = imgInfo.R;
90 imgFilename = imgInfo.imgFilename;
91 heightImg = imgInfo.heightImg;
92 widthImg = imgInfo.widthImg;
93 else
94 %We have a string filename input and so the image is the high res pic
95 %from http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/download rad cal 96−97.html
96 R = ...
[0,−0.00832999963313300;0.00832999963313300,0;−180.004164999817,...
97 90.0041649998166];
98 heightImg = 21600;
99 widthImg = 43200;
100 imgFilename = imgInfo;
101 end
102
103 %If distanceFromGrndStn is specified convert it to height Sat
104 if (isfield(sat, 'distanceFromGrndStn') && (sat.distanceFromGrndStn ≥0))
105 cosTerm = (sat.distanceFromGrndStn*cos(pi/2−sat.elev));
106 sat.heightSat = (−radiusEarth + ...
sqrt(radiusEarthˆ2+sat.distanceFromGrndStnˆ2+...
107 +2*radiusEarth*cosTerm)); %based on cosine law
108 end
109
110 %there are a lot of numerical computations. INTERSECT ACCURACY indicates
111 %the allowed error of the numerical computations. Most of the ...
computations
112 %involves finding the longitude of points with a certain latitude and ...
that
113 %lie on the boundary of the intersection surface.
114 global INTERSECT ACCURACY
115 %take the case of satellite with 0 elevation as an estimate of the ...
size of
116 %the intersection surface. At 0 elecation, the surface has a circle ...
for its
117 %boundary.
118 approxSurfaceRadius = sat.FOV*sat.heightSat;
119 %convert to latitude range
228
120 circEarth = 2*pi*radiusEarth;
121 latitudeRange = approxSurfaceRadius/circEarth*360;
122 INTERSECT ACCURACY = latitudeRange*1e−3;
123
124 additionalInfo = struct('heightSat', sat.heightSat, 'wavelength', ...
sat.wavelength, ...
125 'elev', sat.elev);
126
127 %First obtain the number of background counts because of nightime lights
128 %emitted by human activities
129 if (sat.heightSat > 0) %heightSat is an optional parameter
130 %Let S be the surface of intersection of the satellite FOV cone ...
and earth.
131 %Find points on the boundary of S (intersLine2D) and the area of S.
132 [intersLine2D, areaFOV] = intersectionSurfaceInfo(sat);
133 areaFOV = areaFOV*(1e3)ˆ2; %convert from kmˆ2 to mˆ2
134
135 additionalInfo.areaFOV = areaFOV;
136
137 % obtain the solid angle from which the telescope on the ...
satellite can
138 %be seen from Earth; note that the telescope radius is in cm.
139 heightSatInM = sat.heightSat*1e3; %heightSat in meters
140 solidAngle = 1; ...
%%%%%2*pi*(1−heightSatInM/sqrt((sat.telescopeRadius*1e−2)ˆ2 + ...
heightSatInMˆ2));
141
142 %extract a portion of the image so as not to deal with very large
143 %images.
144 distanceFactor = 3;
145 maxDistFromLong = distanceFactor*max(abs(intersLine2D(:, 1) − ...
sat.longitude));
146 maxDistFromLat = distanceFactor*max(abs(intersLine2D(:, 2) − ...
sat.latitude));
147 %X contains the subimg data and R is the referecing matrix for R
148 [X, R] = extractSubImg(sat.latitude, sat.longitude, R, ...
abs(maxDistFromLat), ...
149 abs(maxDistFromLong), imgFilename, heightImg, widthImg);
150
151 %finally obtain the average flux emitted by S. The flux is in ...
ph/cmˆ2/s/sr/um
152 avgFlux = obtainAvgFlux(X, R, intersLine2D, sat);
153
154 additionalInfo.artFlux = avgFlux;
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155
156 %The counts from lights emitted by human activities
157 fluxlessCtns = (areaFOV*1e4)*solidAngle*sat.filterBandpass/1000;
158 nightimeCnts = avgFlux*fluxlessCtns; %convert area FOV to cmˆ2
159 else
160 %extract a portion of the image so as not to deal with very large
161 %images.
162 %want 6 pixels
163 lonDist = 6*abs(R(1,2)); latDist = 6*abs(R(2,1));
164 [X, R] = extractSubImg(sat.latitude, sat.longitude, R, latDist, ...
lonDist, ...
165 imgFilename, heightImg, widthImg);
166 %Obtain the pixel coordinates of the uplink location
167 [centerLat, centerLong] = latlon2pixs(R, sat.latitude, ...
sat.longitude);
168
169 %obtain the nightime lights photon flux emitted at the location ...
of the
170 %ground station. The flux is in ph/cmˆ2/s/sr/um
171 flux = obtainFlux(X(sCeil(centerLat), sCeil(centerLong)), ...
sat.wavelength);
172
173 %simplified from the 'nightimeCnts = flux*areaFOV*solidAngle;'
174 %expression above. We use small angle approximation on solidAngle
175 fluxlessCtns = ...
pi*sat.FOVˆ2*pi*sat.telescopeRadiusˆ2*sat.filterBandpass/1000;
176 nightimeCnts = flux*fluxlessCtns;
177 end
178 transStruct = struct('wavelength', sat.wavelength, 'angle', ...
0,'trans', sat.trans);
179 extinctionCoefficient0 = getTransmission(transStruct);
180 transStruct = struct('wavelength', sat.wavelength, 'angle', ...
90−sat.elev*180/pi,'trans', sat.trans);
181 extinctionCoefficientElev = getTransmission(transStruct);
182 nightimeCnts = nightimeCnts * ...
extinctionCoefficientElev/extinctionCoefficient0;
183
184 %obtain the background counts due to the moon
185 avgSunTemperature = 5778; %in K
186 planckH = 6.626e−34; %mˆ2*kg/s;
187 speedLight = 3e8; %m/s
188 boltzmannConstant = 1.381e−23; %mˆ2*kg*sˆ−2*Kˆ−1
189 radiusSun = 6.955e8; %in m
190 earthSunDistance = 1.496e11; %in m
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191 solarIrradiance = ...
2*speedLight/(sat.wavelength*1e−9)ˆ4/(exp(planckH*speedLight/ ...
192 (sat.wavelength*1e−9*boltzmannConstant*avgSunTemperature))−1);
193 solarIrradiance = solarIrradiance/earthSunDistanceˆ2*pi*radiusSunˆ2/1e9;
194 % solarIrradiance = 4.61e18; %ph/s/nm/mˆ2 at one astronomical unit
195 solarIrradiance = solarIrradiance/(1e2)ˆ2; %convert to ph/s/nm/cmˆ2
196 %From Bonato et al., 2009, New J. Phys. 11 045017; with FOV instead ...
of IFOV
197 if (sat.heightSat > 0)
198 photonsDay = sat.earthAlbedo*solarIrradiance*(areaFOV*1e4)...
199 *solidAngle*sat.filterBandpass/pi;
200 else
201 photonsDay = sat.earthAlbedo*sat.telescopeRadiusˆ2*pi*sat.FOVˆ2...
202 *solarIrradiance*sat.filterBandpass;
203 end
204 %multiply photonsDay by a constant alpha that quantifies the effect of
205 %sunlight not directly reaching earth but getting first reflected by the
206 %moon.
207 albedoMoon = 0.12;
208 moonRadius = 1737.1; %mean radius in km
209 earthMoonDistance = 384405; %in km and an average
210 alpha = albedoMoon*(moonRadius/earthMoonDistance)ˆ2;
211 photonsNight = alpha*photonsDay; %Bonato et al., 2009, New J. Phys. ...
11 045017
212 %now add the partial effect of the moon
213 %Below is an approximation of the effect of the proportion of the ...
moon that
214 %is illuminated on the brightness of the moon. The below formula is based
215 %on data from the references listed in the next paragraph. The ...
formula was
216 %found using the data and Matlab's cftool (Rˆ2 ¬ 0.9997 which is good ...
enough
217 %since the data is not perfectly accurate anyway.). Finally, note ...
that the
218 %data is most accurate for the V astronomical band.
219 %Unofficial reference: http://www.asterism.org/tutorials/tut26−1.htm;
220 %Reference:"Astrophysics of the Solar System" By K D Abbhyankar; sec. 6.3
221 aF = −15; %F for fitted coefficient
222 bF = 0.2774;
223 cF = 15;
224 magnitudeIncrease = aF*sat.moonIlluminatedˆbF+cF;
225 photonsNight = photonsNight/2.512ˆmagnitudeIncrease;
226 if (sat.moonIlluminated == 0) photonsNight = 0; end
227 %now correct for atmospheric extinction of moonlight. The data above
231
228 %assumes that the moon's elevation angle is 0 degrees.
229 %first calculate the extinction at 0 degrees
230 transStruct = struct('wavelength', sat.wavelength, 'angle', ...
sat.moonElevation,'trans', sat.trans);
231 extinctionCoefficient = getTransmission(transStruct);
232 photonsNight = photonsNight*extinctionCoefficient/extinctionCoefficient0;
233 %the reflected moonlight passes through the atmosphere again to reach the
234 %satellite. The extinction coefficient will be calculated with the
235 %satellite's elevation angle
236 photonsNight = photonsNight * extinctionCoefficientElev;
237
238 %blackbody radiation background counts
239 avgTemperature = 293; %in K
240 N0 = 2*speedLight/(sat.wavelength*1e−9)ˆ4/(exp(planckH*speedLight/ ...
241 (sat.wavelength*1e−9*boltzmannConstant*avgTemperature))−1); %in ...
ph/s/nm/mˆ2/sr
242 if (sat.heightSat > 0)
243 radiationCounts = N0*areaFOV*solidAngle*sat.filterBandpass;
244 else
245 radiationCounts = ...
N0*sat.FOVˆ2*piˆ2*(sat.telescopeRadius*1e−2)ˆ2*sat.filterBandpass;
246 end
247
248 %nightimeCnts can be 0 because the ground station location is not ...
light polluted
249 if (nightimeCnts == 0)
250 backgroundCounts = photonsNight + radiationCounts;
251 else
252 %the light detected from the geotiff of nightime lights already
253 %contains blackbody radiation counts
254 backgroundCounts = nightimeCnts + photonsNight;
255 end
256
257 %finally take into account the setup efficiency
258 backgroundCounts = sat.setupEfficiency*backgroundCounts;
259
260 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
261 %correctForSatRot corrects for the satellite's rotation angle.
262 %It applies the correct rotation to a location with latitude lat and
263 %longitude lon. The rotation is around the axis connecting the center of
264 %the earth and the ground station.
265 % Input:
266 % 1. sat (structure): Contains the satellite's information
267 % 2−3. (lat, lon): The latitude and longitude of some location
232
268 % Output:
269 % (rotLat, rotLon): The original rotation rotated
270 function [rotLat, rotLon] = correctForSatRot(sat, lat, lon)
271
272 %The ground station in x,y,z coordinates
273 locInt = convertEarthCoord(sat.latitude, sat.longitude);
274
275 %rotation matrices that take the ground station from (0, 0, 1) to (lat,
276 %lon)
277 rotLatM = rotMatrix([0 1 0], pi/2−convertRadians(sat.latitude)); %b |c ...
(0 0 1) has lat of 90
278 rotLongM = rotMatrix([0 0 1], convertRadians(sat.longitude));
279
280 locationCoord = convertEarthCoord(lat, lon);
281 %do a rotation with axis rotLongM*rotLatM*[0 0 1]' and center
282 %locInt
283 locationCoord = locationCoord−locInt;
284 rotMtemp = rotMatrix((rotLongM*rotLatM*[0 0 1]')', sat.rot);
285 locationCoord = rotMtemp*locationCoord';
286 locationCoord = locInt+locationCoord';
287
288 %convert back to (lat, lon) coordinates
289 [rotLon,rotLat,ignore] = cart2sph(locationCoord(1), locationCoord(2), ...
locationCoord(3));
290 rotLat = rotLat*180/pi; %convert to degrees
291 rotLon = rotLon*180/pi;
292
293 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
294 %Given a point with coordinates (lat, lon) determine if a closed ...
surface is on
295 %the left of that point. The closed surface is the intersection of the
296 %satellite's FOV cone with earth.
297 %returns −1 if the point is on a boundary stable or unstable point ...
meaning
298 %that nothing is to the left or right of the point.
299 function left = surfaceIsToTheLeft(lat, lon, satellite)
300
301 %add a small longitude and check whether the resulting point is ...
inside the surface
302
303 global INTERSECT ACCURACY;
304 ∆Lon = INTERSECT ACCURACY*5;
305 smallestDeltaLon = INTERSECT ACCURACY/2; %the smallest longitude to ...
be added
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306 inside = false;
307 while (inside == false && ∆Lon > smallestDeltaLon)
308 insideLeft = insideCone(satellite, lat, lon−∆Lon); %add to the left
309 if (insideLeft)
310 left = true;
311 end
312
313 insideRight = insideCone(satellite, lat, lon+∆Lon); %add to the right
314 if (insideRight)
315 left = false;
316 end
317
318 inside = or(insideRight, insideLeft);
319
320 ∆Lon = ∆Lon/1.5;
321 end
322
323 %most likely point is at a stable/unstable extremum
324 if (∆Lon ≤ smallestDeltaLon)
325 left = −1;
326 end
327
328 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
329 %given a point (lat, lon) on the boundary of the surface intersection of
330 %the FOV cone and earth, estimate the constant latitude=lat intersection
331 %with the boundary.
332 %The estimation is made using points on the boundary (bndryPoints).
333 %the point is inputted by providing its index in the bndryPoints array
334 %the array should be organized such that lon is first and then lat.
335 %sat contains the satellite information
336 function lonEstimate = obtainIntersectionLon(bndryPoints, pointIndex, ...
sat)
337
338 %retrieve the point's coordinates
339 lon = bndryPoints(pointIndex, 1); lat = bndryPoints(pointIndex, 2);
340
341 %if the point is to the left of the surface need to find two other points
342 %to the right of surface. The points also have to be above and below lat.
343 pointIsLeft = surfaceIsToTheLeft(lat, lon, sat);
344
345 if (pointIsLeft == −1)
346 lonEstimate = lon; %constant lat line only intersects one point ...
(lat, lon)
347 return;
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348 end
349
350 opposideSide = not(pointIsLeft);
351 %look for a point above lat and to opposite side of the point
352 foundPoint = false;
353 abovePoint = [0 0];
354 ind = 0;
355 while (foundPoint == false)
356 ind = ind+1;
357
358 index = max(1, pointIndex−ind);
359 currentPoint = bndryPoints(index,:);
360
361 if (index == 1)
362 abovePoint = currentPoint; foundPoint = true;
363 else
364 isLeft = surfaceIsToTheLeft(currentPoint(2), currentPoint(1), ...
sat);
365
366 if (isLeft == opposideSide)
367 abovePoint = currentPoint;
368 foundPoint = true;
369 end
370 end
371 end
372
373 %look for a point below lat and to opposite side of the point
374 numPoints = size(bndryPoints, 1);
375 foundPoint = false;
376 belowPoint = [0 0];
377 ind = 0;
378 while (foundPoint == false)
379 ind = ind+1;
380
381 index = min(numPoints, pointIndex+ind);
382 currentPoint = bndryPoints(index,:);
383
384 if (index == numPoints)
385 belowPoint = currentPoint; foundPoint = true;
386 else
387 isLeft = surfaceIsToTheLeft(currentPoint(2), currentPoint(1), ...
sat);
388
389 if (isLeft == opposideSide)
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390 belowPoint = currentPoint;
391 foundPoint = true;
392 end
393 end
394 end
395
396 %take care of the case that the above or below point has the same ...
latitude as lat
397 if (abovePoint(2) == lat)
398 lonEstimate = abovePoint(1);
399 elseif (belowPoint(2) == lat)
400 lonEstimate = belowPoint(1);
401 else
402 %now perform linear interpolation
403 latDiff = abs(abovePoint(2)−belowPoint(2));
404 lonDiff = abovePoint(1)−belowPoint(1);
405 latDiffWithPoint = abs(abovePoint(2)−lat);
406 lonEstimate = abovePoint(1)+lonDiff*(latDiffWithPoint/latDiff);
407 end
408
409 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
410 %obtainAvgFlux obtains the average flux emitted by a surface.
411 %Input:
412 % 1. X (m*n matrix): The image data.
413 % 2. R: X's referencing matrix.
414 % 3. intersLine2D: Points on the boundary of the surface
415 % 4. sat (structure): The satellite information
416 %Output:
417 %avgFlux: The average flux from the surface in ph/cmˆ2/s/sr/um
418 function avgFlux = obtainAvgFlux(X, R, intersLine2D, sat)
419
420 radiusEarth = 6371; %useful constant
421
422 intersLine2D = sortrows(intersLine2D,−2); %sort by latitude in ...
decreasing order
423 %go through pixel by pixel and calculate the average emitted flux
424 avgFlux = 0;
425 totalPixelArea = 0;
426 %calculate the latitude, longitude limits
427 minLon = min(intersLine2D(:, 1));
428 maxLon = max(intersLine2D(:, 1));
429 minLat = min(intersLine2D(:, 2));
430 maxLat = max(intersLine2D(:, 2));
431 %convert to pixel coordinates
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432 [minRow, minCol] = latlon2pixs(R, maxLat, minLon);
433 [maxRow, maxCol] = latlon2pixs(R, minLat, maxLon);
434 numPoints = size(intersLine2D, 1);
435 %the idea is to inspect all pixels in a box defined by minrow, maxrow,
436 %mincol and maxcol. The search is done row by row. The boundaries of each
437 %pixel are converted to latitude and longitude and compared to area
438 %segments extracted from intersLine2D. intersLine2D is sorted in latitude
439 %decreasing order, so as we traverse each row we do not have look ...
into all
440 %of intersLine2D but only at a certain section of intersLine2D ...
starting at
441 %intersLine2D.
442
443 %first calculate the area segments. This will a bit of extra memory but
444 %will speed up the computation.
445 %4 columns: latUp latDown lonLeftBndry lonRightBndry
446 % −−−−−−−−−−−− latUp
447 % −−−−−−−−−−−− latDown
448 areaSegments = zeros(numPoints−1, 4);
449 for ind = 1:1:numPoints−1
450 %now obtain the boundaries of the area segement
451 areaSegments(ind, 1) = intersLine2D(ind, 2); %latUp
452 areaSegments(ind, 2) = intersLine2D(ind+1, 2); %latDown
453
454 if (ind 6= numPoints−1)
455 %now get the longitude boundaries of the area segment
456 longBndry1 = intersLine2D(ind+1, 1);
457 longBndry2 = obtainIntersectionLon(intersLine2D, ind+1, sat);
458
459 areaSegments(ind, 3) = min(longBndry1, longBndry2); %lonLeftBndry
460 areaSegments(ind, 4) = max(longBndry1, longBndry2); ...
%lonRightBndry
461 else
462 %the last point does not have a good estimate for lonLeftBndry
463 %and lonRightBndry so just use the previous ones
464 areaSegments(ind, 3) = areaSegments(ind−1, 3);
465 areaSegments(ind, 4) = areaSegments(ind−1, 4);
466 end
467 end
468
469 startRowInd = 1; %will start looking in intersecLine2D from this index
470 for row = floor(minRow):1:sCeil(maxRow)
471 %row latitude boundaries
472 % −−−−−−−−−−− upperRowLat
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473 % −−−−−−−−−−− lowerRowLat
474 [lowerRowLat, ignore] = pix2latlong(R,row,maxCol);
475 [upperRowLat, ignore] = pix2latlong(R,(row−1),maxCol);
476
477 %make sure we have the correct startRowInd
478 ind = startRowInd;
479 latLowBndry = areaSegments(ind ,2);
480 while (latLowBndry > upperRowLat) %b |c higher lat means lower pixel
481 ind = ind+1;
482 latLowBndry = areaSegments(ind ,2);
483 end
484 startRowInd = ind;
485
486 for col = floor(minCol):1:sCeil(maxCol)
487 %col longitude boundaries
488 [ignore, leftColLon] = pix2latlong(R,row,(col−1));
489 [ignore, rightColLon] = pix2latlong(R,row,col);
490
491 currentPixelArea = 0;
492 %now that we have the latitude and longitude boundaries of the
493 %sides of the pixels, estimate the area of intersection of the
494 %pixel and intersection surface.
495 %there will be some intersection of the area segment with the ...
pixel
496 %as long as:
497 % −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− area segment lower latitude boundary
498 % −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− pixel lower latitude boundary
499 latLowBndry = intersLine2D(startRowInd+1, 2);
500 ind = startRowInd;
501 while (latLowBndry ≥ lowerRowLat && ind < numPoints)
502
503 %initialize
504 latUpBndry = areaSegments(ind ,1);
505 latLowBndry = areaSegments(ind ,2);
506 lonLeftBndry = areaSegments(ind ,3);
507 lonRightBndry = areaSegments(ind ,4);
508
509 %calculate the intersection of the area segment with the ...
pixel
510 latStart = min(latUpBndry, upperRowLat);
511 latEnd = max(latLowBndry, lowerRowLat);
512 %now for the left longitude
513 pixelLongDiff = abs(lonLeftBndry−lonRightBndry);
514 distToTheRight = abs(leftColLon−lonRightBndry);
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515 distToTheLeft = abs(leftColLon−lonLeftBndry);
516 if (distToTheRight ≤ pixelLongDiff && distToTheLeft ≤ ...
pixelLongDiff)
517 latRightItrsc = leftColLon;
518 elseif(distToTheRight > distToTheLeft)
519 latRightItrsc = lonLeftBndry;
520 else
521 latRightItrsc = lonRightBndry;
522 end
523 %now for the right longitude
524 distToTheRight = abs(rightColLon−lonRightBndry);
525 distToTheLeft = abs(rightColLon−lonLeftBndry);
526 if (distToTheRight ≤ pixelLongDiff && distToTheLeft ≤ ...
pixelLongDiff)
527 latLeftItrsc = rightColLon;
528 elseif(distToTheRight > distToTheLeft)
529 latLeftItrsc = lonLeftBndry;
530 else
531 latLeftItrsc = lonRightBndry;
532 end
533
534 %calculate the intersection area
535 ∆Lon = abs(latRightItrsc−latLeftItrsc);
536 area = lonLatArea(latStart, latEnd, ∆Lon, radiusEarth);
537 currentPixelArea = currentPixelArea+area;
538
539 %proceed to the next area segment
540 ind = ind+1;
541 end
542
543 flux = obtainFlux(X(row, col), sat.wavelength);
544 avgFlux = avgFlux+currentPixelArea*flux;
545 totalPixelArea = totalPixelArea+currentPixelArea;
546 end
547
548 if (ind 6=startRowInd)
549 startRowInd = ind−1;
550 end
551 end
552 avgFlux = avgFlux/totalPixelArea;
553
554 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
555 % intersectionSurfaceInfo returns informations about the surface of
556 % intersection of the satellite's FOV cone and earth.
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557 % Input:
558 % sat (structure): The satellite information
559 % Output:
560 % 1. intrscPoints (m*2): Points that lie on the boundary of the ...
intersection
561 % surface. The format is (lon, lat)
562 % 2. surfaceArea: The area of the surface in kmˆ2
563 function [intrscPoints, surfaceArea] = intersectionSurfaceInfo(sat)
564
565 radiusEarth = 6371; %useful constant
566
567 %find the intersection surface boundary by going latitude by latitude and
568 %using constant longitude lines. We check where these lines intersect the
569 %intersection surface.
570 numSteps = 50;
571 %sat0rot has the same data as satellite but rot is equal to 0
572 sat0rot = sat; sat0rot.rot = 0;
573 latUpBound = getLatUpBound(sat0rot, sat.latitude, sat.longitude);
574 latLowBound = getLatLowBound(sat0rot, sat.latitude, sat.longitude);
575 ∆Lat = (latUpBound−latLowBound)/numSteps;
576 latitudeIntersects = zeros(numSteps+1, 1);
577 intrscPoints = zeros(2*numSteps, 2);
578
579 %first add the boundary points
580 latitudeIntersects(1) = sat.longitude;
581 latitudeIntersects(numSteps+1) = sat.longitude;
582 latUseDown = latLowBound; latUseUp = latUpBound;
583 lonLowIntrsct = sat.longitude; lonUpIntrsct = sat.longitude;
584 if (sat.rot 6= 0)
585 [latUseDown, lonLowIntrsct] = correctForSatRot(sat, latLowBound, ...
sat.longitude);
586 [latUseUp, lonUpIntrsct] = correctForSatRot(sat, latUpBound, ...
sat.longitude);
587 end
588 intrscPoints(1, :) = [lonLowIntrsct latUseDown];
589 intrscPoints(2*numSteps, :) = [lonUpIntrsct latUseUp];
590
591 %add the remaining points
592 ind = 2;
593 for lat = latLowBound+∆Lat:∆Lat:latUpBound−∆Lat,
594
595 %we can guess what the longitude will be
596 indLat = round((lat−latLowBound)/∆Lat)+1; %the current index to ...
be used
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597 if (indLat == 2)
598 guess = latitudeIntersects(indLat−1)−sat.longitude;
599 lonUpIntrsct = getLongUpBound(sat0rot, lat, sat.longitude, ...
guess);
600 else
601 %check if the function is now decreasing, for example if we ...
have a
602 %circle intersection then the longitude increases at first ...
but then
603 %decreases
604 increasing = insideCone(sat0rot, lat, ...
latitudeIntersects(indLat−1));
605 diffLong = ...
abs(latitudeIntersects(indLat−2)−latitudeIntersects(indLat−1));
606 longInitial = latitudeIntersects(indLat−1);
607 if (increasing == false)
608 lonUpIntrsct = getLongLowBound(sat0rot, lat, longInitial, ...
609 diffLong);
610 else
611 lonUpIntrsct = getLongUpBound(sat0rot, lat, longInitial, ...
612 diffLong);
613 end
614 end
615 %can reduce computation time by not finding the below value. By ...
symmetry
616 lonLowIntrsct = sat.longitude − abs(lonUpIntrsct−sat.longitude);
617
618 latitudeIntersects(indLat) = lonUpIntrsct;
619
620 %if the satellite has a rotation angle then need to correct for it
621 if (sat.rot 6= 0)
622 [latUseUp, lonUpIntrsct] = correctForSatRot(sat, lat, ...
lonUpIntrsct);
623 [latUseDown, lonLowIntrsct] = correctForSatRot(sat, lat, ...
lonLowIntrsct);
624 else
625 latUseUp = lat; latUseDown = lat;
626 end
627 intrscPoints(ind, :) = [lonUpIntrsct latUseUp];
628 intrscPoints(ind+1, :) = [lonLowIntrsct latUseDown];
629
630 ind = ind+2;
631 end
632
241
633 %now estimate the area of the intersection surface
634 surfaceArea = 0;
635 for ind = 1:1:(size(latitudeIntersects, 1)−1)
636 latStart = latLowBound+(ind−1)*∆Lat;
637 latEnd = latLowBound+ind*∆Lat;
638
639 minDeltaLon = min(abs(latitudeIntersects(ind)−sat.longitude), ...
640 abs(latitudeIntersects(ind+1)−sat.longitude));
641
642 surfaceArea = surfaceArea + lonLatArea(latStart, latEnd, ...
minDeltaLon, radiusEarth);
643 %add the area of right triangle with height ∆Lat and width ∆Lon
644 ∆Lon = abs(latitudeIntersects(ind+1)−latitudeIntersects(ind));
645 surfaceArea = surfaceArea + lonLatArea(latStart, latEnd, ∆Lon, ...
radiusEarth)/2;
646 end
647 surfaceArea = 2*surfaceArea; %in kmˆ2
648
649 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
650 % insideCone determines if a point is inside the surface of ...
intersection of
651 % the satellite's FOV cone with the surface of the earth.
652 % Input:
653 % (lat, lon): Specify the location of the point in (latitude, ...
longitude)
654 % coordinates.
655 % sat (structure): Contains the satellite's information
656 function insideCone = insideCone(sat, lat, lon)
657
658 radiusEarth = 6371; %useful constant
659
660 %We will work in a coordinate system where the origin is the location of
661 %interest and the axis of the cone is the z axis.
662 %below is the transformation that takes the axis cone to the appropriate
663 %one (step1 is adding a vector so cone axis is of an appropriate length)
664 %step2: elevation rotation
665 step2ElevM = rotMatrix([0 1 0], (pi/2−sat.elev));
666 %step3: rotation transformation
667 step3RotM = rotMatrix([0 0 1], sat.rot);
668
669 coordPoint = convertEarthCoord(lat, lon);
670 %apply the necessary transformations to bring it near the the ...
location of
671 %interest
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672 rotLatM1 = rotMatrix([0 1 0], pi/2−convertRadians(sat.latitude)); ...
%b |c (0 0 1) has lat of 90
673 rotLongM2 = rotMatrix([0 0 1], convertRadians(sat.longitude));
674 %first apply the the rotations that took the location of
675 %interest to [0 0 0]. The inverse of a rotation is its transpose.
676 coordPoint = rotLatM1'*rotLongM2'*coordPoint';
677 coordPoint = coordPoint −[0 0 radiusEarth]';
678 %then apply the inverse of the transformations that made the axis of the
679 %cone the z axis
680 coordPoint = step2ElevM'*step3RotM'*coordPoint;
681
682 lengthAxis = getLocationSatelliteDistance(sat);
683 %equation of a cone whose vertex is the origin and axis the z axis
684 uprightConeEqu = coordPoint(1).ˆ2+coordPoint(2).ˆ2 − ...
685 tan(sat.FOV)ˆ2*(coordPoint(3)−lengthAxis).ˆ2;
686 %note that inside the cone the coneequ will be say negative and ...
outside the
687 %opposite sign. This is because of the equation of the cone:
688 %cos(FOV)=((x,y,z).coneAxis/length((x,y,z))).
689 if (uprightConeEqu > 0) insideCone = false; return; end
690
691 intersectEarth = false;
692 %now check if the the point emits light that will intersect earth twice
693 centerCoord = step2ElevM'*step3RotM'*[0 0 −radiusEarth]'; centerCoord ...
= centerCoord';
694 %check if the line connecting the vertex of the cone and the current
695 %location intersects earth twice
696 vertexCoord = [0 0 lengthAxis];
697 v = coordPoint'−vertexCoord;
698 twoCoeff = norm(v)ˆ2;
699 oneCoeff = 2*(Dot(v, vertexCoord)−Dot(centerCoord, v));
700 zeroCoeff = norm(centerCoord)ˆ2+norm(vertexCoord)ˆ2 − radiusEarthˆ2 − ...
2*Dot(centerCoord, vertexCoord);
701 discriminant = oneCoeffˆ2−4*zeroCoeff*twoCoeff;
702
703 if (discriminant < 0 )
704 intersectEarth = true;
705 elseif (discriminant > 0)
706 sol1 = (−oneCoeff+sqrt(discriminant))/(2*twoCoeff);
707 point1 = vertexCoord+v*sol1;
708 sol2 = (−oneCoeff−sqrt(discriminant))/(2*twoCoeff);
709 point2 = vertexCoord+v*sol2;
710
711 %sol2 should be smaller and we expect coordPoint to be close to it,
243
712 %i.e. we expect it to be the closer solution to the satellite
713 if (norm(coordPoint'−point2) > norm(coordPoint'−point1))
714 intersectEarth = true;
715 end
716 end
717
718 if (discriminant == 0 | | (uprightConeEqu ≤ 0 && intersectEarth == false))
719 insideCone = true;
720 else
721 insideCone = false;
722 end
723
724 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
725 %get the distance between the location of interest and the satellite.
726 %Input:
727 % sat(structure): Contains information about the satellite
728 %Output:
729 % locationSatelliteDistance: The distance in km.
730 function locationSatelliteDistance = getLocationSatelliteDistance(sat)
731
732 radiusEarth = 6371; %useful constant
733
734 locationSatelliteDistance = sqrt(sat.heightSatˆ2 + ...
735 2*radiusEarth*sat.heightSat + ...
736 −2*radiusEarth*sat.heightSat*cos(pi/2−sat.elev)); %law of cosines
737
738 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
739 %return the rotation matrix with axis [x y z] and angle theta
740 function rotM = rotMatrix(axis, theta)
741
742 iden = eye(3);
743 P = axis'*axis;
744 Q = [0 −axis(3) axis(2); axis(3) 0, −axis(1); −axis(2) axis(1) 0];
745 rotM = P + (iden − P)*cos(theta) + Q*sin(theta);
746
747 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
748 %convertEarthCoord converts to (x, y, z) coordinates with the earth's
749 %center as the origin.
750 %Input:
751 % lat and lon in degrees
752 %Output:
753 % [x y z] where each coordinate is in km
754 function earthPoint = convertEarthCoord(lat, lon)
755
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756 radiusEarth = 6371; %useful constant
757
758 incAngle = pi/2−convertRadians(lat);
759 azimAngle = convertRadians(lon);
760 earthPoint = radiusEarth * ...
761 [sin(incAngle)*cos(azimAngle) sin(incAngle)*sin(azimAngle) ...
cos(incAngle)];
762
763 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
764 %lonLatArea calculates the area of a segment that starts at latStart ...
(latitude
765 % start) and ends at latEnd (the end latitude). ∆Lon (∆ longitude)
766 % is the height of the segment.
767 %We can think of this as a rectangle of width latitude and height ∆Lon
768 %in spherical coordinates (that is why we need the radius).
769 function area = lonLatArea(latStart, latEnd, ∆Lon, radius)
770
771 %convert to appropriate spherical coordinates
772 start = 90−latStart; endL = 90−latEnd;
773
774 %This is basically an integration in spherical coordinates.
775 area = abs(convertRadians(∆Lon) * ...
776 (cos(convertRadians(start))−cos(convertRadians(endL)))*radiusˆ2);
777
778 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
779 %getLongUpBound gets the longitude intersection of a constant ...
latitude=lat
780 %line with the boundary of intersection of the satellite's FOV cone ...
and the
781 %surface of the earth. The search begins at (lat, lon) and proceeds ...
to the
782 %right.
783 %Input:
784 % 1. satellite (structure): Contains the satellite's information
785 % 2−3. (lat, lon): the search begins at this location
786 % 4. guess: A guess starting point of how far away from (lat, lon) ...
should
787 % the search begin
788 function upBoundLong = getLongUpBound(satellite, lat, lon, guess)
789 %estimate what the longitude boundary would be with a binary search
790 global INTERSECT ACCURACY;
791 if (nargin < 4 | | guess == 0) guess = INTERSECT ACCURACY*1e2; end
792 upBound = guess; lowBound = 0;
793
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794 %The search should stop when we have two points very close to each other,
795 %and such that one point is inside the cone and the other is not.
796 valid = xor(insideCone(satellite, lat, lon+upBound), ...
797 insideCone(satellite, lat, lon+lowBound));
798
799 while (valid == false | | (abs(upBound−lowBound) > INTERSECT ACCURACY))
800 inside = insideCone(satellite, lat, lon+upBound);
801
802 if (inside == true)
803 temp = upBound;
804 upBound = min((upBound+abs(upBound−lowBound)), 360);
805 lowBound = temp;
806 else
807 upBound = (upBound+lowBound)/2;
808 end
809
810 valid = xor(inside, insideCone(satellite, lat, lon+lowBound));
811 end
812
813 upBoundLong = lon+(upBound+lowBound)/2;
814
815 %Similar to getLongUpBound but the search is to the left
816 function lowBoundLong = getLongLowBound(satellite, lat, lon, guess)
817 global INTERSECT ACCURACY;
818 if (nargin < 4 | | guess == 0) guess = INTERSECT ACCURACY*1e2; end
819 upBound = 0; lowBound = −guess;
820
821 valid = xor(insideCone(satellite, lat, lon+upBound), ...
822 insideCone(satellite, lat, lon+lowBound));
823
824 while (valid == false | | (abs(upBound−lowBound) > INTERSECT ACCURACY))
825 inside = insideCone(satellite, lat, lon+lowBound);
826
827 if (inside == true)
828 lowBound = (upBound+lowBound)/2;
829 else
830 temp = lowBound;
831 lowBound = max((lowBound−abs(upBound−lowBound)), −360);
832 upBound = temp;
833 end
834
835 valid = xor(insideCone(satellite, lat, lon+upBound), inside);
836 end
837
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838 lowBoundLong = lon+(upBound+lowBound)/2;
839
840 %Similar to getLongUpBound but now we look for the intersection of a
841 %constant longitude line. We search to the south.
842 function upBoundLat = getLatUpBound(satellite, lat, lon, guess)
843 %estimate what the longitude boundary would be with a binary search
844 global INTERSECT ACCURACY;
845 if (nargin < 4 | | guess == 0) guess = INTERSECT ACCURACY*1e2; end
846 upBound = guess; lowBound = 0;
847 while abs(upBound−lowBound) > INTERSECT ACCURACY
848 inside = insideCone(satellite, lat+upBound, lon);
849
850 if (inside == true)
851 temp = upBound;
852 upBound = min((upBound+abs(upBound−lowBound)), 360);
853 lowBound = temp;
854 else
855 upBound = (upBound+lowBound)/2;
856 end
857 end
858
859 upBoundLat = lat+upBound;
860
861 %Similar to getLongUpBound but now we look for the intersection of a
862 %constant longitude line. We search to the north.
863 function lowBoundLat = getLatLowBound(satellite, lat, lon, guess)
864 global INTERSECT ACCURACY;
865 if (nargin < 4 | | guess == 0) guess = INTERSECT ACCURACY*1e2; end
866 upBound = 0; lowBound = −guess;
867 while abs(upBound−lowBound) > INTERSECT ACCURACY
868 inside = insideCone(satellite, lat+lowBound, lon);
869
870 if (inside == true)
871 temp = lowBound;
872 lowBound = max((lowBound−2*abs(upBound−lowBound)), −360);
873 upBound = temp;
874 else
875 lowBound = (upBound+lowBound)/2;
876 end
877 end
878
879 lowBoundLat = lat+lowBound;
880
881 %convert from latitude, longitude to pixel coordinates
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882 function [lat, lon] = pix2latlong(R, row, col)
883
884 [lat, lon] = pix2latlon(R, row+.5, col+.5);
885
886 %convert from degrees to radiant
887 function radians = convertRadians(degrees)
888
889 radians = degrees*pi/180;
1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 %Description:
3 %UplinkStarBackground calculates the estimated number of background ...
counts a
4 %satellite will receive per second from starlight and airglow.
5 %Input:
6 % 1. receiver(strucutre): The receiver's parameters are entered in
7 % receiver
8 % The required entries in the structure are:
9 % The following 7 arguments parameterize the telescope
10 % a) 'FOV': The field of view of the receiver (in rad).
11 % b) 'wavelength': The wavelength photons are emitted at.
12 % c) 'telescopeRadius': The receiver's radius in cm.
13 % d) 'filterBandpass': approximately the area under of the ...
curve
14 % of the receiver's filter bandwith (in nm).
15 % e) 'setupEfficiency': the optical efficiency of the setup
16 % multiplied by the detector efficiency (format 0.a).
17 % f) 'observElevation': The receiver's observation elevation
18 % angle. In other words, this is the angle from the horizon ...
in degrees.
19 % The following three parameters specify the night sky ...
brightness:
20 % g) 'StarBright'(the star+airglow night sky brightness): ...
The brightness of the
21 % night sky (in mag) due to lights emitted by stars and ...
airglow.
22 % (in mag)
23
24 %Output:
25 % backgroundCounts: The estimated number of background counts ...
that are
26 % detected by the receiver. (photons/s)
27
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28 function backgroundCounts = UplinkStarBackground(receiver)
29
30 %refernce counts at the astronomical band containing receiver.wavelength
31 refCountsAtWav = obtainReferenceCount(receiver.wavelength);
32 %refernce counts at the V band containing receiver.wavelength
33 refCountsVband = obtainReferenceCount(550);
34 %FOV area in arcsecˆ2
35 FOVarea = pi*(receiver.FOV*206264)ˆ2;
36 %telescope area in cmˆ2
37 telescopeArea = pi*receiver.telescopeRadiusˆ2;
38
39 backgroundCounts = FOVarea*telescopeArea*receiver.setupEfficiency*...
40 receiver.filterBandpass*(refCountsAtWav*10ˆ(−0.4*receiver.StarBright));
41
42 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
43 % Since the apparent magnitude is a relative measure, one needs the
44 % photon flux at a certain magnitude to compute the photon flux at a
45 % different magnitude.
46 % This function takes in a wavelength (in nm), determines which
47 % astronomical band it is closest to, and then output the number of
48 % reference counts (in ph cm −2 s −1 n m −1) at 0 magnitude.
49 function refCounts = obtainReferenceCount(wavelength)
50
51 %Data format: Wavelength, ∆Wavelength, reference number of counts
52 data = [360 40 7650; ...
53 440 80 14845; ...
54 550 90 10386; ...
55 640 150 5801; ...
56 790 150 3883; ...
57 1260 200 1954; ...
58 1600 370 1015; ...
59 2220 500 447; ...
60 3400 700 139; ...
61 5000 1200 53];
62
63 numData = size(data, 1);
64
65 %first if the wavelengh is less than what the data gives approximates ...
it to
66 %the first band
67 if (wavelength < data(1,1))
68 refCounts = data(1, 3);
69 return;
70 elseif (wavelength > data(numData,1))
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71 refCounts = data(numData, 3);
72 return;
73 end
74
75 foundBand = false;
76 ind = 1;
77 %find which astronomical band the wavelength is closed to
78 while (foundBand == false)
79 currUpBound = data(ind, 1) + data(ind, 2);
80 nextLowBound = data(ind+1, 1) − data(ind+1, 2);
81
82 %check if the wavelength is between two bands
83 if (wavelength ≥ data(ind, 1) && wavelength ≤ data(ind+1, 1))
84 %wavelength closer to next band center
85 if (abs(wavelength−data(ind, 1)) > abs(wavelength−data(ind+1, ...
1)))
86 closerInd = ind + 1;
87 %should go to upper band but first make sure it is within
88 %∆Wavelength
89 if (wavelength < nextLowBound)
90 if (wavelength ≤ currUpBound) %is it within current band
91 closerInd = ind;
92 %if not it is closest to which band boundary?
93 elseif (abs(wavelength−nextLowBound) > ...
94 abs(wavelength−currUpBound))
95 closerInd = ind;
96 end
97 end
98 else %closer to current band
99 closerInd = ind;
100 % make sure it is within ∆Wavelength
101 if (wavelength > currUpBound)
102 if (wavelength ≥ nextLowBound) %is it within next band
103 closerInd = ind + 1;
104 %if not it is closest to which band boundary?
105 elseif (abs(wavelength−nextLowBound) < ...
106 abs(wavelength−currUpBound))
107 closerInd = ind + 1;
108 end
109 end
110 end
111
112 foundBand = true;
113 end
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114
115 ind = ind+1;
116 end
117
118 refCounts = data(closerInd, 3);
119
120 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
121 %calculateExtinction calculates the extinction coefficient at a ...
wavelength
122 %and elevation angle as measured from the zenith
123 %Input:
124 % 1. wavelength: The wavelength (in nm)
125 % 2. elevAngle: The elevation angle as measured from the zenith in
126 % degrees
127 function extinctionCoefficient = calculateExtinction(wavelength, ...
elevAngle)
128
129 % because at 300 this function peaks and at about 255 becomes negative,
130 % consider the 300 wavelength as an upper bound
131 w = max(300, wavelength);
132
133 %The equation below is a fit of data from "Fundamentals of Astronomy" ...
by C
134 %Barbieri, Chapter 16.3
135 p1 = 0.03884;
136 p2 = 9.683;
137 p3 = 1.108;
138 p4 = 0.525;
139 q1 = −294;
140 q2 = −1.077;
141 q3 = 0.6175;
142 extinction0 = (p1*w.ˆ3 + p2*w.ˆ2 + p3*w + p4) ./ (w.ˆ3 + q1*w.ˆ2 + ...
q2*w + q3);
143 %as we increase elevAngle the air mass increases. Reference: Kasten, ...
F., and A. T.
144 %Young. 1989. Revised optical air mass tables and approximation formula.
145 %Applied Optics 28:4735 4 7 3
146 extinctionCoefficient = extinction0/ ...
147 (cos(convertRadians(elevAngle))+0.50572*(96.07995−elevAngle)ˆ−1.6364);
148
149 function radians = convertRadians(degrees)
150
151 radians = degrees*pi/180;
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1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 %extractSubImg extracts a sub image from an image specified by its path.
3 %Input:
4 % (centerLat, centerLon): the center of the subimage
5 % R: the referencing matrix of the original image
6 % latExtent: the new image will be centered at centerLat and will ...
extend
7 % latExtent above and below the center.
8 % latExtent: the new image will be centered at centerLon and will ...
extend
9 % lonExtent to the right and left of the center.
10 %Output:
11 % newImgData (m*n matrix): The sub image pixel data
12 % Rnew: The referencing matrix.
13 function [newImgData,Rnew] = extractSubImg(centerLat, centerLon, R, ...
14 latExtent, lonExtent, imgPath, heightImg, widthImg)
15
16
17 %make sure not to overwrite anything
18 ind = 0;
19 tempPath = sprintf('uplinkEstimationTempFile%06d.tif', ind);
20 while (exist(tempPath, 'file') == 2 && ind < 2000)
21 ind = ind+1;
22 tempPath = sprintf('uplinkEstimationTempFile%06d.tif', ind);
23 end
24
25 pixelLongDist = lonExtent/abs(R(1,2));
26 pixelLatDist = latExtent/abs(R(2,1));
27 %some small safety factor
28 pixelLongDist = round(pixelLongDist+1);
29 pixelLatDist = round(pixelLatDist+1);
30
31 %obtain the center pixel coordinates
32 [centerRow, centerCol] = latlon2pixs(R, centerLat, centerLon);
33
34 %start with the right extent of the image
35 diffCenterPix = ceil(centerCol)−centerCol;
36 minPixelDist = 2+diffCenterPix; %want at least 2 pixels from the ...
center pixel
37 wantedPixedDist = pixelLongDist+diffCenterPix;
38 if (wantedPixedDist < minPixelDist) wantedPixedDist = minPixelDist; end
39 lonExtentRight = wantedPixedDist*abs(R(1,2));
40 maxLon = centerLon+abs(lonExtentRight);
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41
42 %The left extent of the image
43 diffCenterPix = abs(floor(centerCol)−centerCol);
44 minPixelDist = 2+diffCenterPix; %want at least 2 pixels from the ...
center pixel
45 wantedPixedDist = pixelLongDist+diffCenterPix;
46 if (wantedPixedDist < minPixelDist) wantedPixedDist = minPixelDist; end
47 lonExtentLeft = wantedPixedDist*abs(R(1,2));
48 minLon = centerLon−abs(lonExtentLeft);
49 %The up extent of the image
50 diffCenterPix = abs(floor(centerRow)−centerRow);
51 minPixelDist = 2+diffCenterPix; %want at least 2 pixels from the ...
center pixel
52 wantedPixedDist = pixelLatDist+diffCenterPix;
53 if (wantedPixedDist < minPixelDist) wantedPixedDist = minPixelDist; end
54 latExtentUp = wantedPixedDist*abs(R(2,1));
55 maxLat = centerLat+abs(latExtentUp);
56 %The up extent of the image
57 diffCenterPix = abs(ceil(centerRow)−centerRow);
58 minPixelDist = 2+diffCenterPix; %want at least 2 pixels from the ...
center pixel
59 wantedPixedDist = pixelLatDist+diffCenterPix;
60 if (wantedPixedDist < minPixelDist) wantedPixedDist = minPixelDist; end
61 latExtentDown = wantedPixedDist*abs(R(2,1));
62 minLat = centerLat−abs(latExtentDown);
63
64 %convert to pixel coordinates
65 [minRow, minCol] = latlon2pixs(R, maxLat, minLon);
66 [maxRow, maxCol] =latlon2pixs(R, minLat, maxLon);
67 minRow = max(1, round(minRow)); minCol = max(1, round(minCol));
68 maxRow = min(heightImg, round(maxRow)); maxCol = min(widthImg, ...
round(maxCol));
69 heightImgNew = maxRow−minRow; widthImgNew = maxCol−minCol;
70 %call gdal translate to obtain a portion of the image. The options
71 %format is like '−srcwin TLcol TLrow width height imageFilename
72 %outputfilename'
73 opts = [' ' num2str(minCol) ' ' num2str(minRow) ' ' ...
num2str(widthImgNew) ...
74 ' ' num2str(heightImgNew) ' "' imgPath '"' ' ' tempPath];
75 dos(['gdal translate −srcwin' opts]);
76
77 [newImgData, Rnew, ignore] = geotiffread(tempPath);
78
79 delete(tempPath); %delete the temporary file
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1 %convert from latitude, longitude coordinates to pixel coordinates
2 function [row, col] = latlon2pixs(R, lat, lon)
3
4 %obtain the center pixel coordinates
5 [row, col] = latlon2pix(R, lat, lon);
6 %correct for the way latlon2pix works (the .5)
7 row = row−.5; col = col−.5;
1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 %Given the wavelength and pixel value convert the radiance from W/cmˆ2/sr
3 %to ph/cmˆ2/s/sr/um
4 function photonFlux = obtainFlux(pixelValue, wavelength)
5
6 radiance = 1e−10*double(pixelValue).ˆ1.5; %in watts/cmˆ2/sr/um
7 %convert to photon flux in ph/cmˆ2/s/sr
8 energyPhoton = 6.63e−34*3e8/(wavelength*1e−9);
9 photonFlux = radiance/energyPhoton;
1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 %sCeil is a special ceil that behaves like ceil except when number is 0
3 %if number is 0 it is send to 1
4 function result = sCeil(number)
5
6 if (number == 0)
7 result = 1;
8 else
9 result = ceil(number);
10 end
B.3 Additional background calculation functions
1 %transStruct is a structure that contains input information
2 % It contains the following variables:
3 % 1.angle: provided in degrees
4 % 1.wavelength: provided in nm
5 function transmission = getTransmission(transStruct)
6
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7 angle = transStruct.angle;
8
9 if(angle>79.9)
10 angle=79.9;
11 end
12 angle2=80:−1:0;
13 transmission=interp1(angle2,transStruct.trans,angle); ...
%Transmittance of the atmosphere (trough a perpendicular path)
255

Appendix C
Key generation and performance of
fundamental experiments program
Here we show the MATLAB code used to estimate the Key generation and performance
of fundamental experiments program. This code was originally written by Evan Meyer-
Scott with some simulations modified from programs written Thomas Jennewein. Some
additional modifications to the programs were done in collaboration with Evan. Some of
these simulations require the quantum optics and computation Toolbox by Sze Tan.
C.1 WCP QKD
C.1.1 Signal visibility and count rate
1 function [rate, vis]=Visibility weak(loss1,darks1)
2
3 %% Initializations
4 N=7; %Fock space dimension, N must be minimum of 2
5 standard defintions qo toolbox;
6
7
8
9 % 2−channel detectors with active basis choices or 4−channel passive?
10 detector channels=4;
11
12 % Set some parameters like source rate, coincidence window, average ...
photon
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13 % number (for faint lasers); optics and detector efficiency should be in
14 % loss already
15
16 %net source rates (i.e. backcalculated from the singles) gives ...
approximately
17 %the epsilon, but for faint lasers, net source rate is the laser rep ...
rate:
18 net source rates=300e6;
19 % coinc window is the maximal source emission time slots − a ...
somewhat simple model
20 % is to take 1/single photon coherence (in the limit that the single ...
photon
21 % coherence is shorter than the pump coherence)
22 % But it might be set to the coincidence window for simplification
23 coinc window=0.5e−9;
24 f source=1/coinc window;
25
26 % Convert loss in dB to loss
27 var link1=10.ˆ(−loss1/10);
28
29
30 % Add initial visibility, i.e. polarization misalignment
31 initial vis=.98;
32
33 %% Run it
34 %Make a coherent state, average photon number mu and nu
35 mu=0.5;
36 nu=0.1;
37 alpha=sqrt(mu);
38 alpha nu=sqrt(nu);
39 D = expm(alpha*a'−alpha'*a);
40 psi = tensor(D*vacc,vacc);
41 D = expm(alpha nu*a'−alpha nu'*a);
42 psi nu = tensor(D*vacc,vacc);
43
44 %Use a slightly misaligned HWP to simulate polarization misalignment
45
46 eta=acos(initial vis)/2;
47 H bs = (tensor(a,a') + tensor(a',a))*eta;
48 U bs = expm(−1i*H bs);
49 psi=U bs*psi;
50
51
52
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53 % Define loss1&2 for this loop
54 effc link1=var link1;
55
56 %if we have 4 detector channel the state must be converted to ...
a 4 mode
57 %state ( |H1,V1,D2,A2>). To do this we use a four mode beam ...
splitter and
58 %use a half wave plate to convert |H1,V1,H2,V2> to |H1,V1,D2,A2>.
59 if detector channels==4
60 %50:50 beam−splitter
61 H bs = (tensor(a,a') + tensor(a',a))*pi/4;
62 U bs = expm(−1i*H bs);
63 four mode U bs=permute(tensor(U bs,U bs),[1 3 2 4]);
64 %half wave plate at 45
65 HWP=expm(−1i*((tensor(a,a')*exp(1i*pi/2) + ...
tensor(a',a)*exp(−1i*pi/2))*2*pi/8));
66 four mode HWP = tensor(tensor(ida,ida),HWP);
67 psi=four mode HWP*(four mode U bs*tensor(psi,vacc,vacc));
68 psi nu=four mode HWP*(four mode U bs*tensor(psi nu,vacc,vacc));
69 end
70
71 %Define Noise factor for arm1
72 noise factor1=darks1/f source;
73 % Create detectors, including fock space N, combined ...
losses due to the
74 % link, optics efficiency, and detector efficiency, and darks
75 [apd link1 un linkapd1]= ...
BucketDetector noise(N,effc link1,noise factor1);
76
77
78
79 %double link with arbitrary losses in each arm, measure ...
on fock space
80 %N, state psi, and detector modules 1 and 2
81 if detector channels==2
82 probs2f=real(measure 2modes 2detectors(N,psi,apd link1, ...
un linkapd1));
83 probs2f nu=real(measure 2modes 2detectors(N,psi nu, ...
apd link1,un linkapd1));
84 elseif detector channels==4
85 probs2f=real(measure 4modes 4detectors(N,psi,apd link1, ...
un linkapd1));
86 probs2f nu=real(measure 4modes 4detectors(N,psi nu, ...
apd link1,un linkapd1));
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87 end
88
89 %Double click rate
90 if detector channels==2
91 double1=probs2f(3);
92 double1 nu=probs2f nu(3);
93 elseif detector channels==4
94 %Here we only care about the multi click where one clicks was
95 %in the correct basis (H click and/or v click)
96 double1=probs2f(5);
97 double1 nu=probs2f nu(5);
98 end
99
100
101 %Rates returned are 'per pulse', so multiply by source rate
102 if detector channels==2
103 rate=(sum(probs2f(1:2)))*net source rates;
104 rate nu=sum(probs2f nu(1:2))*net source rates;
105 else
106 rate=(sum(probs2f(1:4)))*net source rates;
107 rate nu=(sum(probs2f nu(1:4)))*net source rates;
108 end
109 %Determine visibility and QBER from returned detection ...
probabilities
110 QBER=(probs2f(2)+double1/2)/(sum(probs2f(1:2))+double1);
111 QBER nu=(probs2f nu(2)+double1 nu/2)/ ...
(sum(probs2f nu(1:2))+double1 nu);
112
113 vis=1−2*QBER;
114 vis nu=1−2*QBER nu;
115
116
117
118
119
120 end
1 %Evan Meyer−Scott, 10.17.2010 from Thomas Jennewein, 8.10.2008
2 %Determin the singles count rates for a 2 mode state, e.g. |H1,V1>
3
4 function probs=measure 2modes 2detectors(N,in,proj,unproj)
5
6 ida=identity(N);
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78 final state=in;
9
10 %singles
11 H=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj),final state));
12 V=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj),final state));
13 %Double clicks
14 HV=sum(expect(tensor(proj,proj),final state));
15
16 probs=[H,V,HV];
1 %Jean−Philippe Bourgoin, 08.05.2013 from Evan Meyer−Scott, 10.17.2010 ...
and Thomas Jennewein, 8.10.2008
2 %Determin the singles count rates for a 2 mode state, e.g. |H1,V1,D2,A2>,
3 %detected in 4 detectors with a passive basis choice.
4
5 function probs=measure 4modes 4detectors(N,in,proj,unproj)
6
7 ida=identity(N);
8
9 final state=in;
10
11 %singles
12 H=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,unproj,unproj),final state));
13 V=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,unproj,unproj),final state));
14 D=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,unproj,proj,unproj),final state));
15 A=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,unproj,unproj,proj),final state));
16 %multi clicks
17 HV=sum(expect(tensor(proj,proj,ida,ida),final state));
18 HD=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,proj,ida),final state));
19 HA=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,unproj,proj),final state));
20 VD=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,proj,ida),final state));
21 VA=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,unproj,proj),final state));
22 DA=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,unproj,proj,proj),final state));
23 multi HV basis=HV+HD+HA+VD+VA;
24
25 probs=[H,V,D,A,multi HV basis];
C.1.2 Key generation with decoy pulse method
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1 function [Keylength]=keyrate weak sent pulse(loss,vis,Nreceived,Nsent)
2
3 % This function computes the number of extractable secure key bits ...
given a
4 % received polarization visibility vis and Nreceived raw key bits between
5 % Alice and Bob (Nreceived = number of Bob's detections in any ...
basis). For
6 % decoy states the average channel loss is also needed.
7 %The final key rate is per sent pulse and must be multiplied by the ...
total number of sent pulse (Nsent)
8
9 %To maximize key generation one must use a visibility cut−off to ...
ignore the worst parts of the pass (this can be optimized for each ...
passes, for simplicity we used a fixed cut−off of 0.85 in this ...
work). One can also combine multiple passes to reduce finite size ...
effects (instead of generating a key with the individual passes).
10
11 % Decoy state security analysis from Sun, Liang and Li, PLA 373, 2533
12 % (2009), and Ma, Qi, Zhao, Lo, PRA 72, 012326 (2005) and Cai and ...
Scarani,
13 % NJP 11 045024 (2009).
14
15 % Decoy state finite key analysis is incomplete, so the formulas here
16 % follow mostly Sun et al, with corrections from the other papers. One
17 % signal and one decoy level are assumed, with the "Tighter bound" of E.2
18 % in Ma's paper.
19
20
21 % Set decoy protocol parameters
22 % mu is the average photon number of the signal states
23 mu=.5;
24 % nu is the average photon number of the decoy states: this could be
25 % optimized for positive key rates at higher loss.
26 nu=.1;
27
28 % Convert the loss from decibels to a fraction
29 loss=10ˆ(−loss/10);
30
31 % Calculate the gain Q (detection probability) for signal and decoy ...
states
32 Qmu=1−exp(−loss*mu);
33 Qnu=1−exp(−loss*nu);
34
35 % Error rate for signal states from visibility (vis<1)
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36 if vis≥1
37 error('Visibility must be less than 1')
38 end
39 Emu=(1−vis)/2;
40
41
42 % Initialize key rate to zero
43 SK rate finite=0;
44
45 % Total failure probability for each key: the probability that the ...
protocol
46 % fails and the key is not secure, but we don't know.
47 % 10ˆ−9 is sufficient for a few−year satellite mission, but this is
48 % something to be discussed, possibly increased for better performance.
49 epsilon=1e−9;
50
51 % Error correction failure probability: 10ˆ−10 is standard
52 epsilonEC=1e−10;
53
54 % Also optimize over epsilonbar and epsilonbarprime, two parameters of
55 % information theoretic origin that have little operational meaning, and
56 % can carry the condition epsilon−epsilonEC>epsilonbar>epsilonbarprime>0
57
58 % How many search iterations to perform
59 sear=10;
60
61 % Begin search over N mu and N nu, the number of signals to devote to
62 % signal and decoy states respective
63 for kk=1:sear
64
65 N mu=Nreceived*kk/(sear+1);
66 N nu=Nreceived−N mu;
67
68 % Set statistical fluctuation bound to 10 standard deviations
69 ualpha=10;
70
71
72 % Estimate worst case upper or lower bounds on signal and decoy
73 % detection probabilities given ualpha standard deviations
74 Qnu L=Qnu*(1−ualpha/sqrt(N nu));
75 Qmu U=Qmu*(1+ualpha/sqrt(N mu));
76
77 % Estimate worst case upper bound on error rate
78 Emu U=Emu*(1+ualpha/sqrt(N mu*Emu));
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79
80 % Estimate worst case detection probability of single photon states,
81 % since only single photon states are secure against eavesdropping
82 Q1=(muˆ2)*exp(−mu)/(mu*nu−nuˆ2)*(Qnu L*exp(nu)− ...
Qmu U*exp(mu)*nuˆ2/(muˆ2));
83
84 % Estimate worst case error rate due to single photon states
85 e1=Emu U*Qmu U/Q1;
86
87 % Begin search over epsilonbar
88 for ii=logspace(0,−5,sear)
89 epsilonbar=(epsilon−epsilonEC)*(1−ii);
90 ∆2=2*log2(1/(2*(epsilon−epsilonbar−epsilonEC)));
91
92 % Begin search over epsilonbarprime
93 for jj=logspace(0.1,17,sear)
94 epsilonbarprime=epsilonbar/jj;
95 ∆1=7*sqrt(log2(2/(epsilonbar−epsilonbarprime))*N mu);
96
97 % Secure key rate per channel use (i.e. per laser pulse ...
sent by
98 % Alice) is 1/2 for the basis sifting, N mu/Nreceived since
99 % only signal states are used to generate key,
100 % −Qmu*1.22*H2(Emu) for the information leaked to Eve during
101 % error correction, Q1*(1−H2(e1)) for the information Eve
102 % gained by attacking single photon pulses causing error rate
103 % e1, and Qmu*(∆1+∆2)/N mu for the information
104 % theoretic security proofs.
105 SK rate finite new=1/2*N mu/Nreceived*(−Qmu*1.22*H2(Emu)+ ...
Q1*(1−H2(e1))−Qmu*(∆1+∆2)/N mu); %per channel use, ...
decoy or signal included from Scarani 2009, since Sun ...
doesn't have enough Qmu on his ∆s!
106
107 % If the new key rate is better, use that
108 if isreal(SK rate finite new)&&SK rate finite new ...
>SK rate finite
109
110 SK rate finite=SK rate finite new;
111
112
113 end
114 end
115 end
116 end
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117
118 % The total number of secure key bits is then the key rate per laser ...
pulse
119 % times the numebr of laser pulses sent, or the number received ...
divided by
120 % the average loss.
121 %Keylength=SK rate finite*Nreceived/loss;
122
123 Keylength=SK rate finite*Nsent;
124
125 end
C.2 Entangled source QKD and Bell test
C.2.1 Entanglement visibility and count rate
1 function [twofold rate vis]=Visibility(loss1,loss2,darks1,darks2)
2
3 %% Initializations
4 N=4; %Fock space dimension, N must be minimum of 2
5 standard defintions qo toolbox;
6
7
8
9 % 2−channel detectors with active basis choices or 4−channel passive?
10 detector channels=4;
11
12 % Set some parameters like source rate, coincidence window, average ...
photon
13 % number (for faint lasers); optics and detector efficiency should be in
14 % loss already
15
16 %net source rates (i.e. backcalculated from the singles) gives ...
approximately
17 %the epsilon, but for faint lasers, net source rate is the laser rep ...
rate:
18 net source rates=100e6;
19 % coinc window is the maximal source emission time slots − a ...
somewhat simple model
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20 % is to take 1/single photon coherence (in the limit that the single ...
photon
21 % coherence is shorter than the pump coherence)
22 % But it might be set to the coincidence window for simplification
23 coinc window=0.5e−9;
24 f source=1/coinc window;
25
26 % Convert loss in dB to loss
27 var link1=10.ˆ(−loss1/10);
28 var link2=10.ˆ(−loss2/10);
29
30 % Add initial visibility, i.e. polarization misalignment
31 initial vis=.98;
32
33 %% Run it
34 %Make an entangled state from SPDC
35 epsilon=asinh(sqrt(net source rates/f source/2));
36
37
38 %SPDC in chi2:
39 H chi2=(tensor(a,a)+tensor(a',a'))*epsilon;
40 U chi2=expm(−1i*H chi2);
41
42 %SPDC input state for pair of photons in HH
43 spdc state=tensor(U chi2*tensor(vacc,vacc));
44
45 % create entangled SPDC state
46 psi=permute(tensor(spdc state,spdc state),[1 3 4 2]);
47
48 %Use a slightly misaligned HWP to simulate polarization misalignment
49
50 eta=acos(initial vis)/2;
51 H bs = (tensor(a,a') + tensor(a',a))*eta;
52 U bs = tensor(expm(−1i*H bs),ida,ida);
53 psi=U bs*psi;
54
55 % Define constant link2 stuff
56 effc link1=var link1;
57 effc link2=var link2;
58 noise factor1=darks1/f source;
59 noise factor2=darks2/f source;
60
61
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62 %if we have 4 detector channel the state must be converted to ...
a 8 mode
63 %state ( |H1,V1,D2,A2,H3,V3,D4,A4>). To do this we use two ...
four mode beam splitter
64 if detector channels==4
65 %50:50 beam−splitter
66 H bs = (tensor(a,a') + tensor(a',a))*pi/4;
67 U bs = expm(−1i*H bs);
68 four mode U bs=permute(tensor(U bs,U bs),[1 3 2 4]);
69 eight mode U bs=tensor(four mode U bs,four mode U bs);
70 %convert psi to 8 modes and apply beam splitter
71 psi=permute(tensor(psi,vacc,vacc,vacc,vacc),[1 2 5 6 3 4 ...
7 8]);
72 psi=eight mode U bs*psi;
73 end
74
75
76 % Create detectors, including fock space N, combined ...
losses due to the
77 % link, optics efficiency, and detector efficiency, and darks
78 [apd link1, un linkapd1]= ...
BucketDetector noise(N,effc link1,noise factor1);
79 [apd link2, un linkapd2]= ...
BucketDetector noise(N,effc link2,noise factor2);
80
81
82 %double link with arbitrary losses in each arm, measure ...
on fock space
83 %N, state psi, and detector modules 1 and 2
84 if detector channels==2
85 probs2f=real(measure 2folds 4modes unsymetric detectors...
86 (N,psi,apd link1,un linkapd1,apd link2,un linkapd2));
87 elseif detector channels==4
88 probs2f=real(measure 2folds 8modes unsymetric detectors...
89 (N,psi,apd link1,un linkapd1,apd link2,un linkapd2));
90 end
91
92
93 %Double click rate
94 if detector channels==2
95 double1=probs2f(9);
96 double2=probs2f(10);
97 elseif detector channels==4
98 double1=probs2f(9);
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99 double2=0;
100 end
101
102
103 %Rates returned are 'per pulse', so multiply by source rate
104 if detector channels==2
105 twofold rate=sum(probs2f(1:4))*f source;
106 %Determine visibility and QBER from returned detection ...
probabilities
107 QBER=(probs2f(1)+probs2f(4)+double1+double2)/(probs2f(1)+ ...
probs2f(2)+probs2f(3)+probs2f(4)+probs2f(9)+probs2f(10));
108 elseif detector channels==4
109 twofold rate=sum(probs2f(1:8))*f source*2;
110 %Determine visibility and QBER from returned detection ...
probabilities
111 QBER=(sum(probs2f(1:4))+double1/2+double2/2)/ ...
(sum(probs2f(1:8))+double1+double2);
112 end
113
114
115
116 vis=1−2*QBER;
117
118
119 end
1 %Thomas Jennewein, 8.10.2008
2 %Determin the 2fold count rates for a 4 mode state, e.g. |H1,V1,H2,V2>
3
4 %Thoams Jennewein, 12.11.2008, extension for usymetric detectors, ...
such as
5 %in a unsymmetric entangled photon expeirment.
6
7 function ...
probs=measure 2folds 4modes unsymetric detectors(N,in,proj1,unproj1,...
8 proj2,unproj2)
9
10 ida=identity(N);
11
12 final state=in;
13 HH=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,proj2,unproj2),final state));
14 VV=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj2,proj2),final state));
15 HV=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj2,proj2),final state));
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16 VH=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,proj2,unproj2),final state));
17
18 %singles1
19 H1=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,ida,ida),final state));
20 V1=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,ida,ida),final state));
21
22 %singles2
23 H2=sum(expect(tensor(ida,ida,proj2,unproj2),final state));
24 V2=sum(expect(tensor(ida,ida,unproj2,proj2),final state));
25
26 %doubleclicks
27 H1V1=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,proj1,ida,ida),final state));
28 H2V2=sum(expect(tensor(ida,ida,proj2,proj2),final state));
29
30 probs=[HH,HV,VH,VV,H1,V1,H2,V2,H1V1,H2V2];
1 %Thoams Jennewein, 12.11.2008, extension for usymetric detectors, ...
such as
2 %in a unsymmetric entangled photon expeirment.
3
4 %Thomas Jennewein, 8.10.2008
5 %Determin the 2fold count rates for a 4 mode state, e.g. |H1,V1,H2,V2>
6
7 %Evan Meyer−Scott, 2010, added double clicks
8
9 %Jean−Philippe Bourgoin, 08.05.2013
10 %Modified to Determine the 2fold count rates for a 8 mode state, e.g. ...
|H1,V1,D2,A2,H3,V3,D4,A4>
11
12 function probs=measure 2folds 8modes unsymetric detectors(N,in,proj1,...
13 unproj1,proj2,unproj2)
14
15 ida=identity(N);
16
17 final state=in;
18 HH=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
19 proj2,unproj2,unproj2,unproj2),final state));
20 VV=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
21 unproj2,proj2,unproj2,unproj2),final state));
22 DD=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,unproj1,...
23 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,unproj2),final state));
24 AA=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
25 unproj2,unproj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
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26
27 HV=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
28 unproj2,proj2,unproj2,unproj2),final state));
29 VH=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
30 proj2,unproj2,unproj2,unproj2),final state));
31 DA=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,unproj1,...
32 unproj2,unproj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
33 AD=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
34 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,unproj2),final state));
35
36 %multi−clicks
37 H1V1H3=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,proj1,ida,ida,...
38 proj2,ida,ida,ida),final state));
39 H1V1V3=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,proj1,ida,ida,...
40 unproj2,proj2,ida,ida),final state));
41 H1V1D4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,proj1,ida,ida,...
42 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,ida),final state));
43 H1V1A4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,proj1,ida,ida,...
44 unproj2,unproj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
45 H1D2H3=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,proj1,ida,...
46 proj2,ida,ida,ida),final state));
47 H1D2V3=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,proj1,ida,...
48 unproj2,proj2,ida,ida),final state));
49 H1D2D4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,proj1,ida,...
50 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,ida),final state));
51 H1D2A4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,proj1,ida,...
52 unproj2,unproj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
53 H1A2H3=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
54 proj2,ida,ida,ida),final state));
55 H1A2V3=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
56 unproj2,proj2,ida,ida),final state));
57 H1A2D4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
58 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,ida),final state));
59 H1A2A4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
60 unproj2,unproj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
61 V1D2H3=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,proj1,ida,...
62 proj2,ida,ida,ida),final state));
63 V1D2V3=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,proj1,ida,...
64 unproj2,proj2,ida,ida),final state));
65 V1D2D4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,proj1,ida,...
66 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,ida),final state));
67 V1D2A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,proj1,ida,...
68 unproj2,unproj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
69 V1A2H3=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,proj1,...
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70 proj2,ida,ida,ida),final state));
71 V1A2V3=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,proj1,...
72 unproj2,proj2,ida,ida),final state));
73 V1A2D4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,proj1,...
74 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,ida),final state));
75 V1A2A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,proj1,...
76 unproj2,unproj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
77 D2A2H3=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,proj1,...
78 proj2,unproj2,unproj2,unproj2),final state));
79 D2A2V3=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,proj1,...
80 ida,proj2,unproj2,unproj2),final state));
81 D2A2D4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,proj1,...
82 ida,ida,proj2,unproj2),final state));
83 D2A2A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,proj1,...
84 ida,ida,ida,proj2),final state));
85
86 H1H3V3=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
87 proj2,proj2,ida,ida),final state));
88 H1H3D4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
89 proj2,unproj2,proj2,ida),final state));
90 H1H3A4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
91 proj2,unproj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
92 H1V3D4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
93 unproj2,proj2,proj2,ida),final state));
94 H1V3A4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
95 unproj2,proj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
96 H1D4A4=sum(expect(tensor(proj1,unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
97 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,proj2),final state));
98 V1H3V3=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
99 proj2,proj2,ida,ida),final state));
100 V1H3D4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
101 proj2,unproj2,proj2,ida),final state));
102 V1H3A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
103 proj2,unproj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
104 V1V3D4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
105 unproj2,proj2,proj2,ida),final state));
106 V1V3A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
107 unproj2,proj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
108 V1D4A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,proj1,unproj1,unproj1,...
109 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,proj2),final state));
110 D2H3V3=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,unproj1,...
111 proj2,proj2,unproj2,unproj2),final state));
112 D2H3D4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,unproj1,...
113 proj2,ida,proj2,unproj2),final state));
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114 D2H3A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,unproj1,...
115 proj2,ida,ida,proj2),final state));
116 D2V3D4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,unproj1,...
117 unproj2,proj2,proj2,ida),final state));
118 D2V3A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,unproj1,...
119 unproj2,proj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
120 D2D4A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,proj1,unproj1,...
121 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,proj2),final state));
122 A2H3V3=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
123 proj2,proj2,unproj2,unproj2),final state));
124 A2H3D4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
125 proj2,ida,proj2,unproj2),final state));
126 A2H3A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
127 proj2,ida,ida,proj2),final state));
128 A2V3D4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
129 unproj2,proj2,proj2,ida),final state));
130 A2V3A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
131 unproj2,proj2,unproj2,proj2),final state));
132 A2D4A4=sum(expect(tensor(unproj1,unproj1,unproj1,proj1,...
133 unproj2,unproj2,proj2,proj2),final state));
134
135 multi click shared bases=H1V1H3+H1V1V3+H1D2H3+H1D2V3+H1D2D4+H1D2A4+...
136 H1A2H3+H1A2V3+H1A2D4+H1A2A4+V1D2H3+V1D2V3+V1D2D4+V1D2A4+V1A2H3+...
137 V1A2V3+V1A2D4+V1A2A4+D2A2D4+D2A2A4+H1H3V3+H1H3D4+H1H3A4+H1V3D4+...
138 H1V3A4+V1H3V3+V1H3D4+V1H3A4+V1V3D4+V1V3A4+D2H3D4+D2H3A4+D2V3D4+...
139 D2V3A4+D2D4A4+A2H3D4+A2H3A4+A2V3D4+A2V3A4+A2D4A4;
140 multi click unshared basis=H1V1D4+H1V1A4+D2A2H3+D2A2V3+H1D4A4+V1D4A4+...
141 D2H3V3+A2H3V3;
142
143 probs=[HH,VV,DD,AA,HV,VH,DA,AD,multi click shared bases,...
144 multi click unshared basis];
C.2.2 Key generation
1 function [keyLength]=keyrate entangled(vis,Nreceived) %uses the ...
average entanglement visibility and total counts received to ...
estimate the lenght of the secure key. To maximize key generation ...
one must use a visibility cut−off to ignore the worst parts of the ...
pass (this can be optimized for each passes, for simplicity we ...
used a fixed cut−off of 0.85 in this work). One can also combine ...
multiple passes to reduce finite size effects (instead of ...
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generating a key with the individual passes).
2
3 % This function computes the number of extractable secure key bits ...
given a
4 % received entanglement visibility vis and Nreceived raw key bits between
5 % Alice and Bob (Nreceived = number of concident detections in any ...
basis).
6
7 % Key rate formula from Scarani & Renner PRL 100, 200501, (2008) for ...
qubits.
8 % This is acceptable since the security of BB84 with qubits and our
9 % entangled protocol is equivalent
10
11 %N=total signals − get from JP's simulation of satellite passage
12 N=Nreceived;
13
14 % Convert entanglement visibility to QBER for subsequent calculation
15 QBER=(1−vis)/2;
16
17 % The fraction of each bit leaked to Eve by error correction, assuming
18 % error correction efficiency 1.22
19 leakEC over n=1.22*H2(QBER);
20
21 % Total failure probability for each key: the probability that the ...
protocol
22 % fails and the key is not secure, but we don't know.
23 % 10ˆ−9 is sufficient for a few−year satellite mission, but this is
24 % something to be discussed, possibly increased for better performance.
25 epsilon=1e−9;
26
27 % Error correction failure probability: 10ˆ−10 is standard
28 epsilonec=1e−10;
29
30 % Initialize maximum key rate to 0
31 rateMax=0;
32
33 % Optimize over n&m, the number of bits used to generate key and for
34 % parameter estimation respectively. We may be able to set m=n or avoid
35 % this entirely, since our error correction protocol should return ...
the QBER
36 % exactly.
37 % Also optimize over epsilonbar and epsilonbarprime, two parameters of
38 % information theoretic origin that have little operational meaning, and
39 % can be set to any value >0.
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40
41 % How many search iterations to perform
42 Sear=10;
43
44 % Initialize searching values
45 ii=1:Sear;
46 n s = ii/(Sear+1);
47 epsilonbar s = ii/(Sear+1);
48 epsilonbarprime s=ii/(Sear+1);
49
50 % Begin search over n: any bits not used to generate key (n) are used for
51 % parameter estimation (m)
52 for iNS = 1:Sear
53 n = n s(iNS)*N;
54 m=N−n;
55
56 % Begin search over epsilonbar
57 for iebar= 1:Sear
58 epsilonbar=epsilonbar s(iebar)*(epsilon−epsilonec);
59
60 % Begin search over epsilonbarprime; if
61 % epsilonbarprime>epsilonbar, skip this loop
62 for iebarprime=1:Sear
63 epsilonbarprime=epsilonbarprime s(iebarprime)...
64 *(epsilon−epsilonec);
65 if epsilonbarprime>epsilonbar
66 continue;
67 end
68
69 % Delta is another information theoretic parameter ...
related
70 % to the finite number of bits exchanged
71 ∆=2*log2(1/(2*epsilon−epsilonbar−epsilonec)) + ...
7*sqrt(n*log2(2/(epsilonbar−epsilonbarprime)));
72
73 % Squiggle is related to estimating the QBER on a finite
74 % number of bits m
75 squiggle=sqrt((2*log(1/epsilonbarprime)+2*log(m+1))/m);
76
77 % The worst case error rate is QBER + squiggle
78 e1bar=QBER+squiggle;
79
80 % H2 is the binary entropy function, and quantifies how
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81 % much privacy amplification must be performed based ...
on the
82 % worst case error rate, so Hsquiggle is how much extra
83 % information Alice and Bob share beyond Eve's knowledge
84 Hsquiggle=1−H2(e1bar);
85
86 % The final key rate per received coincident pair is then
87 % 1/2 for the basis sifting, (n/N) for the fraction of
88 % signals not used for QBER estimation, Hsquiggle for the
89 % information Alice and Bob share that Eve doesn't know,
90 % leakEC for the fraction of bits leaked during error
91 % correction, and ∆ as a finite size parameter.
92 rate=1/2*(n/N)*(Hsquiggle−leakEC over n−∆/n);
93
94 % If the new rate is better than the old one, take ...
this new
95 % rate and keep searching
96 if rate>rateMax
97 rateMax=rate;
98 nold=n;
99 mold=m;
100 epsilonbarold=epsilonbar;
101 epsilonbarprimeold=epsilonbarprime;
102 end
103
104 end
105 % end
106 end
107 end
108
109 % The number of secure key bits is then the key rate per coincident
110 % pair times the number of received pairs N.
111 keyLength=rateMax*N;
112
113 end
C.2.3 Estimating the success of a Bell test
1 function [Bell paramter]=Bell paramterer(vis,Nreceived) %uses the ...
average entanglement visibility and total counts received to ...
estimate the Bell parameted. To maximize the Bell violation one ...
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must use a visibility cut−off to ignore the worst parts of the ...
pass (this can be optimized for each passes, for simplicity we ...
used a fixed cut−off of 0.85 in this work). One can also combine ...
multiple passes to accumulate more statistics (instead of ...
violating the Bell inequality in a single pass.
2
3 Bell paramter=2*sqrt(2)*vis−12*sqrt((1−(visˆ2)/2)/(Nreceived)); ...
%Estimates the Bell parameter −3 standard deviations based ...
on the average entanglement visibility and total received counts.
4
5 %The success of a bell test requires a Bell parameter to be greater ...
than the classical bound of 2 by 3 standard deviation (the 3 ...
standard deviations are included in the calculations of ...
Bell paramter), if Bell parameter>2 the the experiment is a succes
C.3 Quantum teleportation
A separate program was needed to estimate the performance of quantum teleportation
because is uses both an entangled source and a WCP source.
C.3.1 Signal visibility and count rate
1 function [counts ...
vis]=Teleportation(link dB,darks,eff local,darks local,alpha,epsilon)
2 %calculates the count rate and signal visibility from loss and ...
background count estimates. For the transmitter, eff local is the ...
efficiency of the detector and optical components (not in dB), ...
i.e. eff local=optical components*detector, and dark local is the ...
dark counts of each the detector. In addition, the strengths of ...
the WCP ($\alpha$) and of the SPDC ($\epsilon$) must be specified ...
(optimized for the loss and background).
3 %%Important: darks is the total background counts per detectors ...
(typically 4 detectors for QKD). The background count (which is ...
the summed background counts for all detectors) must therefore be ...
adjusted by dividing by the number of detectors.
4
5 %definitions
6 N=5; %Fock space dimension, N must be minium of 2
7 standard defintions qo toolbox;
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8 no sources=1;
9 f laser=1e9;
10 coinc window=1e−9;
11
12 %coherent state "strength"; mean photon number = alphaˆ2
13 % alpha=0.55;
14
15 %select type of input
16 % (0) triggered photon from spdc
17 % (1) coherent pulse, with strength alpha
18 % (2) ideal single photon
19 % 4 June 2012: made modificaiton on which mode is transmitted that ...
renders
20 % triggered spdc and ideal single photos useless.
21 type input=1;
22
23 %morecomeplete BSM? (0) no, (1) yes
24 mc bsm=1;
25
26 %Initial efficiencies for detectors and optics
27 effc apd=0.6;
28
29 effc optics=0.19;
30 effc hrld=0.2;
31
32 %detecor noise factor: darks per laser pulse
33 % noise conjector: probability for one click:
34 %Pclick=min(Expect(proj apd + noise factor*ida, 1)
35 %exept: if Trace(proj apd + noise factor*ida) =< 1
36 % then it is fine!
37 % variation over the darks is simply achieved by making it a vector
38
39 noise factor=darks*coinc window;
40 % Darks for local detector
41 noise factor local=darks local*coinc window;
42
43 %************************* LOOP for the darks ...
*************************************
44
45 %APD (Bucket Detector) for the Bell analysis
46 [apd proj un projapd]=BucketDetector noise(N,eff local,noise factor);
47
48 %APD heralder (Bucket Detector)
49 [apd hrld un hrldapd]=BucketDetector noise(N,effc hrld*effc apd,...
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50 noise factor local);
51
52 %Source rate estimation, based on the observed singles and coincidences
53
54 singles=1e6;
55 sgl n=singles/f laser;
56
57 %solve quadratic euqation for epsilon (determined by the geomtric sum ...
over
58 %all elements
59 % eff=effc apd*effc optics;
60 % epsilon1 = ...
(eff*sgl n+sqrt(effˆ2*sgl nˆ2+4*(eff+sgl n)*sgl n))/(2*(eff+sgl n));
61 % epsilon2 = ...
(eff*sgl n−sqrt(effˆ2*sgl nˆ2+4*(eff+sgl n)*sgl n))/(2*(eff+sgl n));
62 % epsilon=(max((epsilon1),(epsilon2)))*sqrt(0.5);
63 %epsilon for the heralded SPDC input
64 epsilon herald=0.2;
65
66 % link attenuation
67
68 effc link=10.ˆ(−link dB/10)/eff local;
69
70 %APD (Bucket Detector) for the final teleported state
71
72 [apd link ...
un linkapd]=BucketDetector noise(N,eff local,noise factor local);
73
74 %SPDC in chi2:
75 H chi2=(tensor(a,a)+tensor(a',a'))*epsilon;
76 U chi2=expm(−1i*H chi2);
77
78 %SPDC input state for pair of photons in HH
79 spdc state=tensor(U chi2*tensor(vacc,vacc));
80 % spdc state=tensor(vacc,oneph,oneph,vacc)+tensor(oneph,vacc,vacc,oneph);
81
82 % create entangled SPDC state
83 psi=permute(tensor(spdc state,spdc state),[1 3 4 2]);
84
85 % Rearrage and add vacuum to apply loss
86 psi=permute(tensor(psi,vacc,vacc),[1,2,3,5,4,6]);
87
88 %Lossy beamspliter
89 eta=acos(sqrt(effc link));
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90 H bs loss = (tensor(a,a') + tensor(a',a))*eta;
91 U bs loss = expm(−1i*H bs loss);
92
93 psi=tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,U bs loss)*psi;
94 psi=tensor(ida,ida,U bs loss,ida,ida)*psi;
95 psi=permute(psi,[3,5,1,2,4,6]);
96 %define input states as tensors(H,V); i.e. input polarization=H;
97 % state: |H1,V1,H2,V2,H3,V3>
98 % where mode 1 carries the heralded input state, and mode 2 and 3 are the
99 % entangled state
100 if type input==1
101 %create input from coherent state
102 %Displacement operator, |alpha|ˆ2 = mean photon number
103 U dis=expm(alpha*(a'−a));
104 cohr state=U dis*vacc;
105 in state=tensor(cohr state,vacc,psi);
106 elseif type input==2
107 p 1=alphaˆ2;
108 g 2=0.008; %from Claudon et al., Nature Photonics 4:174−177 (2010)
109 p 2=(1−sqrt(1−4*g 2*alphaˆ2))/sqrt(8*g 2);
110 in state=tensor(sqrt(1−p 1−p 2)*vacc+sqrt(p 1)*oneph+...
111 sqrt(p 2)*twoph,vacc,psi);
112 elseif type input==0
113 %create input state from heralded SPDC photons, represented as ...
an array of the various
114 %components as an array of number states (essentially mixed ...
number state):
115 %SPDC for the heralded input photon:
116 H chi2=(tensor(a,a)+tensor(a',a'))*epsilon herald;
117 U chi2=expm(−1i*H chi2);
118
119 %SPDC input state for pair of photons in HH
120 spdc hrld=tensor(U chi2*tensor(vacc,vacc));
121
122 [herald state ...
count prob]=herald source3(N,spdc hrld,no sources,apd hrld);
123 in state=qo;
124 size hrld=N−1;
125 %since we herald the output photons on the trigger event, we need ...
to only
126 %consider the heralded outputs with index one or more.
127 % for j=1:size hrld
128 % indx = j;
129 % in state{indx,1}=tensor(herald state{j+1},vacc,psi);
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130 % end
131 in state=tensor(herald state,vacc,psi);
132 end
133
134 %rotate input to +45 input
135 in state=tensor(U had,ida,ida,ida,ida,ida,ida)*in state;
136
137 %******************************************
138 %Apply the Bell−measurement with a BS
139 % first move the polarizations together |H1,H2,V1,V2,H3,V3>
140 out state=permute(in state,[1,3,2,4,5,6,7,8]);
141 %apply BS to the H1,H2, and V1,V2 term
142 out state=tensor(U bs,U bs,ida,ida,ida,ida)*out state;
143 % permute back to |H1,V1,H2,V2>
144 out state=permute(out state,[1,3,2,4,5,6,7,8]);
145 %******************************************
146
147 %measurements, 2 channel analyzers
148
149 probs=real(msrmt 3qb 2ch 6mode mc BSM2 WCP transmit(N,out state,...
150 apd link,un linkapd,apd proj,un projapd,mc bsm));
151
152 det prob=probs;
153
154 vis hv=(det prob(1)−det prob(2))./(det prob(1)+det prob(2));
155 vis ad=(det prob(3)−det prob(4))./(det prob(3)+det prob(4));
156 vis lr=(det prob(5)−det prob(6))./(det prob(5)+det prob(6));
157 count r=det prob*f laser;
158 vis=vis ad;
159 counts=(count r(:,1)+count r(:,2));
160
161 end
1 % perform the tomography measurments for a single channel detector ...
with a
2 % the projector matrix on the input state
3 % State nomenclature is |H1,V1,H2,V2,H3,V3> of the qubit 1 and 2 ...
respectively
4 % N is the size of the fock space per mode
5 % Thomas Jennewein 19.8.2008
6 % 8. October 2008 Adaptation for teleportation, i.e. modes 1 and 2 are
7 % projected onto an anticoincidence (BSM), and the mode 3 is observed in
8 % various polarizations
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9 %8.8.2008 adaption for more−complete BSM (improves quality!)
10 % 14.11.2008 choice of more complet ore less complete BSA mcbsa=0 or 1
11
12 function ...
probs=msrmt 3qb 2ch 6mode mc BSM2 WCP transmit(N,in,proj3,unproj3,...
13 proj,unproj,mcbsa)
14 % definitions
15 ida=identity(N);
16 a=destroy(N);
17
18 %Beam splitter 50:50 = Quater wave plate @ 4 5
19 eta=1*pi/4;
20 H bs = (tensor(a,a') + tensor(a',a))*eta;
21 U bs = expm(−1i*H bs);
22
23 %phase operator with i−phase shift
24 H ph i = a'*a.*pi/2;
25 U ph i = expm(−1i*H ph i);
26
27 %check if in is density operator?
28 in shape=in.shape;
29
30 % HV basis one mode 3
31 final state=in;
32 HHH=(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,proj,unproj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
33 final state));
34 VVH=(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,unproj,proj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
35 final state));
36 HVH=(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,unproj,proj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
37 final state));
38 VHH=(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,proj,unproj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
39 final state));
40
41 VHV=(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,proj,unproj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
42 final state));
43 VVV=(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,unproj,proj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
44 final state));
45 HHV=(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,proj,unproj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
46 final state));
47 HVV=(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,unproj,proj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
48 final state));
49
50 %P H3=HHH+VHH+HVH+VVH;
51 %P V3=HHV+VHV+HVV+VVV;
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52 if mcbsa==1
53 P H3=VHH+HVH;
54 P V3=VHV+HVV;
55 else
56 P H3=VHH+HVH+VVH+HHH;
57 P V3=VHV+HVV+VVV+HHV;
58 end
59
60 % LR basis one mode3,
61 if in shape(1)==in shape(2)
62 %density matrix
63 final state=tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,U bs,ida,ida)'*in...
64 *tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,U bs);
65 else
66 %state
67 final state=tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,U bs,ida,ida)*in;
68 end
69
70 HHL=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,proj,unproj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
71 final state));
72 VVL=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,unproj,proj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
73 final state));
74 HVL=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,unproj,proj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
75 final state));
76 VHL=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,proj,unproj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
77 final state));
78
79
80 VHR=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,proj,unproj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
81 final state));
82 VVR=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,unproj,proj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
83 final state));
84 HHR=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,proj,unproj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
85 final state));
86 HVR=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,unproj,proj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
87 final state));
88
89 if mcbsa==1
90 P L3=VHL+HVL;
91 P R3=VHR+HVR;
92 else
93 P L3=HHL+VHL+HVL+VVL;
94 P R3=HHR+VHR+HVR+VVR;
95 end
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96
97 % AD basis one mode3,
98 if in shape(1)==in shape(2)
99 %density matrix
100 final state=(tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,ida,U ph i)...
101 *tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,U bs))'*in...
102 *(tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,ida,U ph i)*...
103 tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,U bs));
104 else
105 %state
106 final state=tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,U bs,ida,ida)...
107 *tensor(ida,ida,ida,ida,ida,U ph i,ida,ida)*in;
108 end
109 HHA=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,proj,unproj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
110 final state));
111 VVA=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,unproj,proj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
112 final state));
113 HVA=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,unproj,proj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
114 final state));
115 VHA=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,proj,unproj,proj3,unproj3,ida,ida),...
116 final state));
117
118 VHD=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,proj,unproj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
119 final state));
120 VVD=sum(expect(tensor(unproj,proj,unproj,proj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
121 final state));
122 HHD=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,proj,unproj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
123 final state));
124 HVD=sum(expect(tensor(proj,unproj,unproj,proj,unproj3,proj3,ida,ida),...
125 final state));
126
127 if mcbsa==1
128 P A3=VHA+HVA;
129 P D3=VHD+HVD;
130 else
131 P A3=HHA+VHA+HVA+VVA;
132 P D3=HHD+VHD+HVD+VVD;
133 end
134
135 probs=[P H3,P V3,P A3,P D3,P L3,P R3];
136 end
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C.3.2 Estimating the success of teleportation
1 function ...
[teleportation vis]=teleportation visibility(vis,Nreceived) ...
%uses the average entanglement visibility and total counts ...
received to estimate the visibility of quantum teleportation. To ...
maximize the teleportation visibility one must use a visibility ...
cut−off to ignore the worst parts of the pass (this can be ...
optimized for each passes, for simplicity we used a fixed cut−off ...
of 0.70 in this work, lower than for the previous simulations). ...
One can also combine multiple passes to accumulate more statistics ...
(instead of violating the Bell inequality in a single pass.
2
3 teleportation vis=(vis)−3*sqrt((1−vis)*(1+vis)/(Nreceived)); ...
%Estimates the teleportation visibility −3 standard deviations ...
based on the average entanglement visibility and total received ...
counts.
4
5 %The success of a teleportation requires a teleportation visibility ...
to be greater than the classical bound of 2/3 by 3 standard ...
deviation (the 3 standard deviations are included in the ...
calculations of teleportation visibility), if ...
teleportation visibility>2/3 the the experiment is a success.
6 end
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Appendix D
List of input parameters used for MODTRAN
For our performance analysis it was necessary to include realistic atmospheric transmission.
In order to estimate this transmission we used a software package designed to calculate
atmospheric radiative transfer: MODTRAN [80]. MODTRAN is a widely used software
distributed by Ontar corporation that was co-developed by the US Air Force Research
Laboratory and Spectral Sciences Incorporated. Using this software one can estimate the
atmospheric transmittance by appropriately choosing various input parameters to suit a
particular situation. In this section we list the input parameters used for our predictions.
The descriptions are based on the descriptions in MODTRAN 5.2.1 user’s manual with the
inputs divided into “cards”.
D.1 Rural (5 km vis.) sea-level
This atmosphere type reflects a worst case scenario that would occur if the ground station
was restricted to a location close to a city and a sea level. It is unlikely that any real imple-
mentations of satellite QKD would be done at a worst location and thus this atmosphere
type gives a lower bound on the expected performance.
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Table D.1: Card 1: Main radiation transport driver.
Name Value Description
MODTRN M MODTRAN band model
SPEED S Slow speed Correlated-k option using 33 absorption coefficients (k
values) per spectral bin (1 cm−1 or 15 cm−1)
LYMOLC blank Do not include auxiliary species with model atmosphere
MODEL 2 Mid-Latitude Summer (45◦ North Latitude)
ITYPE 3 Vertical or slant path to space or ground
IEMSCT 0 Program executes in spectral transmittance only mode
IMULT -1 Program executes with multiple scattering
I RD2C 0 Normal operation of program
NOPRNT 0 Normal writing to tape6 and tape7
TPTEMP 0 No surface emission if H2 is above ground
SURREF 0.3 Albedo of the earth
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Table D.2: Card 1A: Radiative transport driver cont’d.
Name Value Description
DIS f The less accurate but faster Isaac’s two-stream algorithm is used
DISAZM f Not using azimuth dependence with DISORT
DISALB f Not calculating the spectral spherical albedo of the atmosphere and
diffuse transmittance for the line-of-sight and sun-to-ground paths
NSTR 8 Number of streams to be used by DISORT
SFWHM 0 Use default top-of-atmosphere (TOA) solar data
CO2MX 365 CO2 mixing ratio in ppmv
H2OSTR 0 Default vertical water vapor column character string
O3STR 0 Default vertical ozone column character string
C PROF 0 Do not scale default profiles
LSUNFL f The solar irradiance data to be used depends on the spectral reso-
lution of the MODTRAN band model
LBMNAM f The default (1 cm−1 bin) band model database files are to be used
LFLTNM f Do not read file name for user-defined instrument filter function
from card 1A3
H2OAER f Aerosol optical properties are not modified to reflect the changes
from the original relative humidity profile arising from the scaling
of the water column
SOLCON 0 Do not scale the TOA solar irradiance
CDASTM blank Use Angstrom Law description of boundary layer and tropospheric
aerosol extinction data
NSSALB 0 Use reference aerosol spectral single scattering albedo values
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Table D.3: Card 2: Main aerosol and cloud options.
Name Value Description
APLUS Blank Don’t use “Aerosol Plus” option
IHAZE 2 RURAL extinction, default VIS=5 km
CNOVAM Blank Don’t use Navy Oceanic Vertical Aerosol Model (NOVAM)
ISEASN 0 Season determined by the value of MODEL
ARUSS blank Don’t use user-defined aerosol optical properties
IVULCN 0 Background stratospheric profile and extinction
ICSTL 5 Air mass character (1–10, 1=open ocean, 10=strong Continental
influence)
ICLD 0 No clouds or rain
IVSA 0 Army Vertical Structure Algorithm (VSA) not used
VIS 0 Uses the default meteorological range set by IHAZE
WSS 0 Default wind speeds are set according to the value of MODEL
RAINRT 0 Rain rate (mm/hr)
GNDALT 0 Altitude of surface relative to sea level (km)
Table D.4: Card 3: Line-of-sight geometry.
Name Value Description
H1 0 Initial altitude (km)
H2 0 Final altitude, not used for ITYPE=3
RANGE 0 Not used in this case for ITYPE=3
BETA 0 Not used in this case for ITYPE=3
RO 0 Default mid-latitude radius of the Earth (km) of 6371.23 km
LENN 0 Default
PHI 0 Zenith angle at H2 towards H1
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Table D.5: Card 4: Spectral range and resolution.
Name Value Description
DV 0.1 Wavelength increment used for spectral outputs (in nm)
FWHM 2 Slit function Full Width at Half Maximum (in nm)
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J.-P. Bourgoin, S. Doiron, M. Deveaux, and A. Hache´. Single laser beam measurement
of thermal diffusivity. Applied Optics, 47(35):6530-6534, 2008.
J.-P. Bourgoin, G.-G. Allogho, and A. Hache´. Thermal measurement on subnanoliter
sample volumes. Applied Optics, 49(14):2547-2551, 2010.
J.-P. Bourgoin, G.-G. Allogho, and A. Hache´. Thermal conduction in thin films mea-
sured by optical surface thermal lensing. Journal of Applied Physics, 108(7):073520, 2010.
E.2 Published papers from PhD research
E. Meyer-Scott, Z. Yan, A. MacDonald, J.-P. Bourgoin, H. Hu¨bel, and T. Jennewein.
How to implement decoy-state quantum key distribution for a satellite uplink with 50-dB
channel loss. Phys. Rev. A, 84:062326, 2011.
C. Erven, B. Heim, E. Meyer-Scott, J.-P. Bourgoin, R. Laflamme, G. Weihs, and T. Jen-
newein. Studying free-space transmission statistics and improving free-space quantum key
distribution in the turbulent atmosphere. New J. Phys., 14:123018, 2012.
J.-P. Bourgoin, E. Meyer-Scott, B. L. Higgins, B. Helou, C. Erven, H. Hu¨bel, B. Kumar,
D. Hudson, I. D’Souza, R. Girard, R. Laflamme, and T. Jennewein. A comprehensive
design and performance analysis of low Earth orbit satellite quantum communication.
New J. Phys., 15(2):023006, 2013.
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E. Meyer-Scott, V. Roy, J.-P. Bourgoin, B. L. Higgins, L. K. Shalm, and T. Jennewein.
Generating polarization-entangled photon pairs using cross-spliced birefringent fibers. Op-
tics Express, 21(5):6205-6212, 2013.
C. Holloway, J. A. Doucette, C. Erven, J.-P. Bourgoin, and T. Jennewein. Optimal
pair-generation rate for entanglement-based quantum key distribution. Physical Review
A, 87(2):022342, 2013.
Z. Yan, E. Meyer-Scott, J.-P. Bourgoin, B. L. Higgins, N. Gigov, A. MacDonald,
H. Hu¨bel, and T. Jennewein. Novel high-speed polarization source for decoy-state BB84
quantum key distribution over free space and satellite links. J. Lightwave Technol.,
31(9):1399–1408, 2013.
C. Erven, E. Meyer-Scott, K. Fisher, J. Lavoie, B. L. Higgins, Z. Yan, C. J. Pugh,
J.-P. Bourgoin, R. Prevedel, L. K. Shalm, L. Richards, N. Gigov, R. Laflamme, G. Weihs,
T. Jennewein, and K. J. Resch. Experimental three-photon quantum nonlocality under
strict locality conditions. Nature Photonics, 8:292296, 2014.
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J.-P. Bourgoin, N. Gigov, B. L. Higgins, Z. Yan, E. Meyer-Scott, A. Khandani,
N. L. Lu¨tkenhaus, and T. Jennewein. Experimentally simulating quantum key distri-
bution with ground-satellite channel losses and processing limitations.
S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, L. Monat, M. Legre´, and V. Makarov.
Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin-
tossing.
J.-F. Lavigne, C. J. Pugh, J.-P. Bourgoin, B. L. Higgins, and T. Jennewein. Adaptive
Optics for Quantum Key Distribution between an Earth station and a Satellite.
K. Boone, J.-P. Bourgoin, E. Meyer-Scott, K. Heshami, T. Jennewein, and C. Simon.
Global quantum communication with satellites and quantum repeaters.
J.-P. Bourgoin, B. L. Higgins, N. Gigov, C. Holloway, C. J. Pugh, S. Kaiser, M. Cran-
mer, and T. Jennewein. Free-space quantum key distribution link to a moving receiver.
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